Armchair Generalist

Twelve Dead at Fort Hood

There's just not much to say about the tragic news yesterday - twelve 13 dead and 30 injured as a result of a "lone gunman," now identified as an Army major. MAJ Nidal Hasan was a psychiatrist who had graduated from Virginia Tech in 1997 and spent six years at Walter Reed Army Medical Clinic before moving to Fort Hood. He was not a happy man.

In an interview, his aunt, Noel Hasan of Falls Church, said he had endured name-calling and harassment about his Muslim faith for years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and had sought for several years to be discharged from the military.

"I know what that is like," she said. "Some people can take it, and some cannot. He had listened to all of that, and he wanted out of the military, and they would not let him leave even after he offered to repay" for his medical training.
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He had been affected by the physical and mental injuries he saw while working as a psychiatrist at Walter Reed for nearly eight years, according to his aunt. "He must have snapped," Noel Hasan said. "They ignored him. It was not hard to know when he was upset. He was not a fighter, even as a child and young man. But when he became upset, his face turns red." She said Hasan had consulted with an attorney about getting out of the service.

On the rare occasions when he spoke of his work in any detail, the aunt said, Hasan told her of soldiers wracked by what they had seen. One patient had suffered burns to his face so intense "that his face had nearly melted," she said. "He told us how upsetting that was to him."

It's clear that this was not a simple case of "Vietnam Vet" syndrome. He was a prior enlisted soldier who got a commission through ROTC, and was promoted to major last year. Hasan had not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, but he was faced with the aftermath of that conflict on a very personal basis. In a big organization like the Army, and on a huge and busy base like Fort Hood, it's clear that his colleagues and other people who probably saw his behavior worsen didn't see the opportunity to intervene. With big organizations, sometimes the system fails the individuals who need the most help. It's a horrible situation, but this is what war can lead to - the injuries aren't limited to the battlefield. Thoughts and prayers with the families of the victims at Fort Hood.

Is This "Population-Centric" COIN?

Journalist Sean Smith of the UK Guardian offers fantastic video and commentary on the US Army's 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment as they conduct operations in Afghanistan. Ask the question, are these COIN tactics supporting the overall operations and national strategy? Hard to tell.

Make sure to watch the last two minutes for an interesting view of the medium-sized MRAPs - breaking down constantly, not helping the mission success much at all. Wow, such a good thing that DOD rushed out and bought $20 billion worth of these vehicles...

Options With the Karzai Brothers

The NY Times has a series of short op-eds from various defense analysts on the current situation in Afghanistan, given the re-election of President Karzai and his brother's ties to the drug industry and the CIA. I think Andrew Bacevich's view is the only one worth reading.

In fact, of course, the ineffectiveness, corruption, and doubtful legitimacy of the Karzai government matter quite a lot. They render that much more difficult the already imposing task of trying to pacify Afghanistan. Nation-building there is a task that we will undertake using bricks without straw.

To what end? Even if possible, pacifying Afghanistan will require many years of effort and will cost several hundred billions of dollars while consuming hundred if not thousands of American lives. Does anyone seriously think that such a “victory” if gained will drive a stake through the heart of violent jihadism? All the evidence points in just the opposite direction: the mucking around of the United States in the Islamic world, whatever our intentions (and they have seldom focused on spreading freedom and democracy), simply makes matters worse. 

At the least, this is crystal clear as compared to Fred "the madman" Kagan's point of view.

More important, though, are the following questions: Where is the equivalent work on the political side of the equation? Where is the assessment of the key changes the U.S. must insist upon in the way the Afghan government is organized and run? Where is the detailed strategy, with the list of necessary resources, for persuading President Karzai to make those changes?

One might object that any such strategy should remain secret, which is true. But, then, the details of General McChrystal’s proposed military strategy and force requirements should also have remained secret. General McChrystal has proposed a strategy to regain the initiative from the Taliban and drive change within the Afghan government.

Kagan doesn't have any answers to the political mess in Afghanistan, and neither did General McChrystal's report. McChrystal did, however, identify it as a major issue that needed to be addressed if the US government is to be successful. That's a more honest view than what Kagan can attempt.

Nukes In Europe

The NY Times has this interesting article on discussions within the German government about the alleged presence of US non-strategic nuclear weapons in its country. Notably, the newly elected administration is thinking about ordering them out.

On the face of it, no issue could be better suited to Mr. Westerwelle who, as leader of the Free Democrats, has made this his foreign policy priority (and not Russia or Afghanistan). It is popular with a public staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. All Mr. Westerwelle has to do, with support from Mrs. Merkel, is to ask the United States to remove the weapons when he visits the United States next month, days after Mrs. Merkel holds talks in Washington. And if Mr. Obama is true to his word, there is no reason why the United States could not take them out, as it has quietly done over the past few years from other locations in Germany and other West European countries belonging to NATO, according to German defense experts.

There are, however, two hurdles Mr. Westerwelle will have to jump. One is Europe’s two nuclear powers, Britain and France, which are afraid that after the U.S. arms are gone, their own nuclear weapons will come under scrutiny.

The other is resistance inside the U.S.-led NATO military alliance. Many member states are afraid that if the United States does pull all its weapons out from Germany and the rest of Europe, there would be negative consequences. The most important one is alliance solidarity, which is fragile enough because of the war in Afghanistan. “The weapons are the foundation of that solidarity. Take them away and what have we left?” said a NATO diplomat who requested anonymity because the issue is so sensitive in the 28-member alliance. 

Wow. Here we are, coming up on the 30th 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, and we still have this Cold War mentality in place. You have to wonder exactly what the justification is - that the Russian bear can't be trusted? That we might need forward-deployed tactical nukes for use against Iran? The mind reels. If the British and French governments don't want to give up their nukes, then don't. At the strategic level, one can justify the need for a nuclear stockpile. But non-strategic (or tactical) nukes in Germany? Doesn't make sense. Time to move them out. 

Two other notes of interest. SecState Clinton has an article at Foreign Policy magazine talking about the Obama administration's nonproliferation posture. Her points are not too surprising:

We seek to strengthen each of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of global nonproliferation -- preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And to those three pillars, we should add a fourth: preventing nuclear terrorism.

The most effective way to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is to ensure that nuclear materials that can be used to build weapons are well protected against theft or seizure. That is why the United States has proposed a plan to secure all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide within four years -- a plan that has now won the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council.

I don't like tying the issue of nuclear terrorism to how nations develop and stockpile nuclear weapons. To me, these are distinct issues that are complex enough without linking them together. But this administration is hot on the issue, just like the last one was. It's a knee-jerk reaction to over-inflated fears based on the wild statements of one terrorist organization who has desires but no capability.

However, it would seem that moving the US nukes out of Europe would be a positive step for the Obama administration. It ought not to disrupt the START negotiations, which are more focused on strategic nuclear weapons. And I'll stress again that no one is talking about unilateral disarmament within the next few years (or even the next decade). Clinton points out that a nuclear-free world may not happen in our lifetime (which is my bet). And so in the meantime, do we need to review the possibilities of what we would do in the event of a nuclear war? Andrew Krepinevich at the CSBA says yes, if we want to retain a secure future.

Chimera of Victory

COL Gian Gentile gets an op-ed in the NY Times to suggest that our leadership isn't very good at observing historical lessons.

The ongoing ability and wiliness of insurgent groups in Iraq to carry out suicide attacks undermines the notion that the surge worked and, through military force, put an end to the violence.

These histories should also inform our thinking on Afghanistan.

History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case. Regrettably we don’t seem to be learning anything from history with regard to Afghanistan. We are making the same blunders.

Gentile says he is not anti-COIN, he's just against the over-reliance on COIN as something that displaces other Army strategies, such as being prepared for conventional warfare. But we ignore his words at our peril. It doesn't look like that President Obama or his advisors are going to listen - they have to play the tough hawks, trying to stabilize the situation before they admit that this can't be solved by more US troops and more billions of dollars. And with Karzai in power for another five years? Not a good thing.

Uncommon Wisdom

Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus sez:  “If we keep designing ever more exotic, ever more expensive ships, we’re going to unilaterally disarm.”

Wisdom about gold-plating your force into obscurity - hat tip to Wiggins

COIN v. CONV - A Significant Difference

I don't usually comment on a blog post that comments on another blog post, but I believe Matt Yglesias hits on an important issue in his observations on Andrew Exum's interview with Washington Post reporter and author Greg Jaffe.

Greg Jaffe, speaking to Andrew Exum, says “This whole conventional vs. irregular debate is stupid.”

War is war. And we waste far too much energy trying to categorize it. I think most lieutenants, captains and majors are beyond this false conventional vs. irregular frame that we try to impose on war. I wish I could say the same for the more senior people in the Pentagon.

I think there’s a lot of truth to that. At the same time, just because things look one way to “lieutenants, captains and majors” and another way to “senior people in the Pentagon” doesn’t mean we should take a dismissive view of the senior people’s outlook in a rush to celebrate the insights of the practical warfighter.
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And when you get down to the guts of defense budget politics, these high-level strategic concepts matter a great deal. Nobody, of course, is going to say that the U.S. should somehow completely abandon its ability to fight conventional wars. But the choice between a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to scare China & Russia” or a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to intervene effectively in third world backwaters” has very real implications for what kind of hardware purchases look cost effective.

There is no doubt in my mind that the issue of "hardware purchases" looms very large in the minds of senior military and civilian decision makers. Conventional warfare means lots of tanks, armored vehicles, stealthy jets, next generation bombers, submarines, destroyers, and aircraft carriers. And let's not even get into the care and feeding of that massive military machine. Counterinsurgency operations, or COIN, is completely the opposite, with a focus on maintaining security and diminishing the insurgent grasp on the population without destroying real estate. Also a no-brainer that the DOD budget is already too bloated, and that in managing two wars, protecting the homeland, and trying to modernize its equipment, there's going to be some in-fighting.

But more importantly, the issue is also in the theory and execution of national strategy. The basic idea of military doctrine is that small military units execute tactics on the ground that must support the overall plan of operations within a theater. The theater commander needs to ensure that he has adequate numbers of personnel, that operations continue toward a particular set of goals, and that the logistics support those operations - and his operations must support the overall national strategy for that region. If your tactics and operations don't align against the strategic goals and expected outcome, then you're doing something wrong - even if you're General McChrystal.

Now under the Bush administration, strategic goals and outcomes changed every Friedman unit (six months), which made it difficult to effectively plan operations or execute tactics. But one thing that was certainly clear was that conventional tactics that destroyed the Taliban in 2002 and that took the Iraqi army out in 2003 didn't support the post-conflict goals. You can't prosecute military operations with a conventional frame of mind when what one really needs is an approach to irregular warfare. That's why we failed in Lebanon in 1983. 

Greg Jaffe is a good journalist, and I look forward to reading his book. On the other hand, making a statement like "War is war. And we waste far too much energy trying to categorize it" is a remarkably stupid statement. Nuclear war is not the same as conventional war. Conventional war is not the same as irregular war. Our military needs to be able to operate across a range of different operations, and needs to be equipped properly to execute its operations quickly and efficiently. But what we really need is national leadership that understands the nature of war, that knows how to develop a strategy that is executable, and that knows when it's time to go. From Sun Tzu:

All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

Thus ends the lesson.

If Sarah Connor Was In Afghanistan

From xkcd, some twisted humor. I like the original movie better...

He's Quite Insane, You Know

SHORTER Fred Hiatt: "We have to invade Somalia and stabilize the government. You know, the way we successfully did Iraq and Afghanistan."

It's Not Just About the Numbers

I wanted to echo Brother Matt's point at Foreign Policy Watch that this AP article at the Huffington Post, "Troops In Afghanistan Outnumber Taliban 12-1" written by Slobodan Lekic, does completely miss the point.  We don't expect journalists to understand military theory before they write about military issues, so this doesn't surprise us. But it does bear correcting the observations within the article.

There are already more than 100,000 international troops in Afghanistan working with 200,000 Afghan security forces and police. It adds up to a 12-1 numerical advantage over Taliban rebels, but it hasn't led to anything close to victory.

Now, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan is asking for tens of thousands more troops to stem the escalating insurgency, raising the question of how many more troops it would take to succeed.
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The 12-1 ratio may be misleading because two-thirds of the Allied force is made up of Afghans, who lack the training and experience. The Taliban usually fight in small, cohesive units made up of friends and fellow clansmen. A more meaningful ratio, then, might be 4-1 or 5-1.

Historically in guerrilla wars, security forces have usually had at least a 3-1 advantage.

Now, any strategist worth his/her salt will tell you that numerical supremacy within a theater of operations doesn't count for squat. It doesn't matter whether the US coalition outnumbers the Taliban by a ratio of 12-1, 5-1, or 3-1. What matters is what the ratio is when US forces are engaging the Taliban in tactical battles, such as those in Nuristan provinces. If the side with superior forces is spread out and trying to cover everything, then the side with fewer numbers and more agility has the combat advantage. This has happened time and time again through history.

These numbers and rations ought not to be considered in McChrystal's request for 40,000 more troops. What matters is what strategy is pursued - country-wide COIN operations, conducting combat operations, protecting "ink spots" and vital regions, or just training Afghan security forces and protecting the government. McChrystal didn't ask for enough to do a country-wide option, so I'm guessing that he's going for "ink spots" plus combat operations. President Obama seems to be leaning toward just doing the "ink spot" strategy, which might not require additional troops.

So ignore the talk about force ratios and troop increases - it's not relevant until a sustainable long-term regional strategy is developed and implemented. The real unanswered question remains, "How does this all end?"  

Obama Signs Defense Auth Act

With some fanfare, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010. About $550 billion is dedicated to the normal military functions of operations, R&D, and personnel, and another $130 billion would go to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Good news is no more defense "emergency" funding bills for military operations that have been ongoing for six-plus years. He noted the success in holding the line on particular defense projects that had... troubles.

 As Commander-in-Chief, I will always do whatever it takes to keep the American people safe, to defend this nation.  And that's why this bill provides for the best military in the history of the world.  It reaffirms our commitment to our brave men and women in uniform and our wounded warriors.  It expands family leave rights for the family members of our troops and veterans.  And it makes investments in the capabilities necessary to meet 21st century challenges.

     But I have always rejected the notion that we have to waste billions of dollars of taxpayer money to keep this nation secure.  In fact, I think that wasting these dollars makes us less secure.  And that's why we have passed a defense bill that eliminates some of the waste and inefficiency in our defense process -- reforms that will better protect our nation, better protect our troops, and save taxpayers tens of billions of dollars.
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    Now, this bill isn't perfect.  This bill is an important step forward, but it's just a first step.  There's still more waste we need to cut.  There are still more fights that we need to win.  Changing the culture in Washington will take time and sustained effort.  And that's why Secretary Gates and I will continue waging these battles in the months and years ahead.     

     But I will say that when Secretary Gates and I first proposed going after some of these wasteful projects, there were a lot of people in this town who didn't think it was possible, who were certain we were going to lose, who were certain that we would get steamrolled, who argued that the special interests were too entrenched, and that Washington was simply too set in its ways.
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  And already I've put an end to unnecessary no-bid contracts.  I signed bipartisan legislation to reform defense procurement so weapons systems don't spin out of control.  And even as we made critical investments in the equipment and weapons our troops do need, we're eliminating tens of billions of dollars in waste we don't need.  So no longer will we be spending nearly $2 billion to buy more F-22 fighter jets that the Pentagon says they don't need.  This bill also terminates troubled and massively over budget programs such as the Future Combat Systems, the Airborne Lasers, the Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, and a new presidential helicopter that costs nearly as much as Air Force One.  I won't be flying on that.

     At the same time, we accelerated or increased weapons programs needed to confront real and growing threats -- the Joint Strike Fighter, the Littoral Combat Ship, and more helicopters and reconnaissance support for our troops at the front. 

Yeah, except it doesn't terminate the Future Combat Systems project, it just stopped the ground vehicle portion, and then the Army renamed the effort and continues the project. The Airborne Laser program isn't terminated, it was moved back to early research and development and just won't be procured or fielded in the near future. Same for the presidential helicopter - the project continues because the need is still there, but a new team will be in charge. And then there's the half billion in R&D that Congress wants to be applied to a second engine for the F35 - which the Pentagon didn't ask for. So no, there weren't major changes, but some process changes may have been made that might make certain acquisition projects more efficiently executed.

And this bill also reduces waste and fraud in our contracting system, as well as our reliance on private contractors for jobs that federal employees have the expertise and the training to do.

Yeah, not so much. If the employees had the expertise and training in the first place, we contractors would never be hired. And then there's the minimum 9-12 month waiting time between applying for a fed job and actually starting work. We're not going to see substantive change in any time soon. Finally, this was the DOD Authorization Bill - it says what DOD is allowed to fund, but isn't binding on the actual funding costs. That will come in the DOD Appropriations Bill, which isn't out of committee yet. So... good luck with that, Mr. President. 

Good Morning Afghanistan

Check out Defense.gov - DOD is trying to get into the 21st century information process.

Our NATO "Partners"

There has been some talk in the papers about the NATO Secretary General's support for Gen. McChrystal's report. I would suggest that what he said was that Afghanistan clearly does need some COIN support. What he also said was this (see around 3:30 mark):

"NATO will consider the addition of ground forces when the time is right."

Wow. So it's okay to endorse the strategy, but there's no way that NATO is going to actually add any substantive amount of troops to the mix. Other than Britain, I am not sure we're going to see more than a few dozen military personnel from the rest of the community. So whenever NATO wants to get serious about sending its fair share of troops - say, about 20,000 or so - then feel free to discuss how our operations in Afghanistan ought to be conducted, Mr. Rasmussen.

More from Spencer Ackerman.

Experts Talk Logistics

Interesting testimony from OSD Policy and the Joint Staff to the House Armed Services Committee, explaining how we're pulling equipment out of Iraq.

DoD has been planning the drawdown of equipment for over a year now, and we are in the process of executing that drawdown now.  USCENTCOM has a plan, orders, and contingencies to support posture requirements for August 2010 and beyond, and the relevant DoD components meet regularly to resolve the issues and overcome the obstacles that inevitably develop in a logistical operation of this magnitude.

The equipment drawdown is a priority for all relevant DoD components, many of which have teams positioned in Iraq to provide on-site expertise and assistance.  To facilitate disposition instructions for those items destined for national-level reset programs, the Army Materiel Command has positioned the Reposture Retrograde Task Force both in Kuwait and in Baghdad with MNF-I.  Similarly, Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) and Marine Force Central Command (MARCENT) have liaison officers co-located with MNF-I to facilitate retrograde of service-specific equipment.

Equipment and materiel have been divided into the following four categories: (1) Equipment and material from the Iraq Joint Operations Area that will be refurbished and ultimately redistributed to U.S. forces in Afghanistan; (2) Equipment and material that will be retrograded to home stations; (3) Equipment and material that will be retrograded to depot/reset programs; or (4) Equipment and material that will be transferred to the Government of Iraq or the Government of Afghanistan. 

In order to reduce the volume of materiel being moved at the height of the drawdown, the Services have validated equipment accountability in Iraq to determine which pieces of equipment are not mission essential and can therefore be retrograded early.  In this way, we will be able to draw down equipment gradually, as troops are drawn down. 

One thing DOD does well - move stuff and people around.

Dick Cheney Is A Dithering Ass

But you knew that already. Of all the people who ought to consider watching one's words, he ought to consider carefully the charge of "dithering" in Afghanistan. More than six years go by as the CheneyBush administration "muddled through" Afghanistan while the main event took place in Iraq. Now Darth Cheney thinks he's got the cahones to step up and tell this administration how it's done. As George Will put it, maybe Cheney should have dithered about the decision to invade Iraq.

I thought about posting a lengthy article about why this administration is doing the right thing by examining the options and determining what's the smart thing to do, after President Obama had increased troop strength by 17,000 and outlined some objectives for Afghanistan earlier in the year. But I think Fareed Zakaria does a much better job than I could.

Advocates of a troop increase act as if counterinsurgency is applied physics. McChrystal's team, having done the mathematical calculations, has apparently arrived at the exact answer. There is no room for variation or middle courses, the argument goes. But the theory that "it's 40,000 troops or no counterinsurgency" is absurd. The best evidence is that senior military officers assured me at various points over the past year that with the latest increase in troops they finally had enough forces to do counterinsurgency.

The crucial judgments that have to be made involve what the troops will do and how much of Afghanistan to cover. One option is the idea Ricks recently suggested to me: "Why not do the Petraeus plan [counterinsurgency] for the major population centers and the Biden plan [counterterrorism] for the rest of the country?" Following that middle course might be the most practical solution; more forces could still be needed, as McChrystal suggests, or perhaps we can make do with the almost 100,000 coalition forces already there. Obama should carefully consider all the options before racing to demonstrate how tough he is.

Hey Dick? Go back to your undisclosed location. No one missed you when you were quietly watching Faux News in your den.

Bombs in Baghdad

There was a horrible bomb attack in Baghdad that has people worrying about what the future of Iraq is going to be.

The bombers apparently passed through multiple security checkpoints before detonating their vehicles within a minute of each other, leaving at least 132 dead and more than 520 wounded strewn across crowded downtown streets. Blast walls had been moved back off the road in front of both buildings in recent weeks.

It was the deadliest coordinated attack in Iraq since the summer of 2007 and happened just blocks from where car bombers killed at least 122 people at the Foreign and Finance Ministries in August, in the continuation of a focused attempt by insurgents to strike at the government’s most critical functions.

Having an attack practically equivalent to the Oklahoma City bombing has got to have shaken the Iraqi public. But we ought not think that this security issue is our problem. It's not. Let's not get in the middle of a civil war after so closely avoiding it a few years ago.

UPDATE: Andrew Sullivan offers a good reality check.

Surreal Conversations

Shorter Herbert and Brooks: "Gee, why doesn't the American people sacrifice more for the troops fighting in the Middle East the way they did during World War II?"

I don't know, maybe because the past administration had a leader that said "Don't sweat it, go shopping, everyone gets a tax break"??

Tell me if I'm off-base, but I really think these two guys don't get the picture. It's not World War II, we're not fighting the Nazi war machine, and the past - and current - administration hasn't given the public a clear idea of why we should continue fighting. Although we are spending as much as we did for WW2, although for a much smaller piece of terrain.

UPDATE:  I didn't mean to go off-course into the previous administration's many faults related to this war. To be specific, Bobo's comment here smacked of patronizing the troops:

Finally, we could treat the soldiers and Marines for what they are — warriors. Sometimes I feel we treat them as victims, long suffering souls who go to places like Iraq and Afghanistan to mainly just endure. They’re trained not to be victims but warriors. Sometimes I don’t feel we respect them for the fighting prowess they possess. As a culture we are a lot more comfortable with victims than warriors.

If we are expected "to take this stuff a lot more seriously," then the responsibility begins with the leadership to set the example. Who's advocating for a public campaign of support for our troops to continue a generational war on worldwide terror groups? Let's see anyone in Congress put forward a resolution to have the public "share the burden" by adequately paying for the bills that the war has and will cost, so we can all feel the pain. No, we see other priorities intrude instead.

Reading Material

Matt Y talks about the reading material in the White House and what it might mean in the deliberations about Afghanistan.

I’ll note in particular that hawks’ obsession with Lewis Sorley’s A Better War is pretty pathological. Whether or not you buy what Sorley is saying about military operations in Vietnam, you can understand the war on a strategic level without ever worrying about Creighton Abrams. Vietnam wasn’t, after all, an abstract exercise in U.S. military prowess. It was part of the Cold War. The hawks’ claim was that Communist victory in Vietnam would imperil the credibility of US commitment to key allies in Europe and Japan and set off a “domino effect” that threatened US national security. The doves said that was dumb, and Communist victory in Vietnam would have no dire geopolitical consequences.

We left Vietnam, and the doves were proven utterly and completely right about the main strategic issue.

I do like Dr. Sorley's writing - there's no one else who's written as much or as well about General Creighton Abrams, but maybe Matt has a point there. Both Lew Sorley and Gordon Goldstein had dueling articles in the NY Times lately reference the comparison of Afghanistan to Vietnam. If I had to pick, I'd fall in the Goldstein camp (not surprising, perhaps based on my recent reading of Halberstam's "Best and Brightest").

New PACOM Commander is Dangerous

Via Rob Farley, the NY Times reveals something unique and interesting about ADM Robert Willard, the new USPACOM commander:

Adm. Robert F. Willard assumed control of the U.S. Pacific Command in a Monday ceremony presided over by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who stopped in Hawaii en route to meetings in Japan and South Korea.

In the 1980s, Willard was the executive officer at the Navy Fighter Weapons School, also known as ''TOPGUN.''

Willard was a consultant and flight choreographer on the 1986 film ''Top Gun.'' He also portrayed a Soviet MiG-28 pilot who wore a black helmet and took on Cruise, who famously gave Willard's character ''the bird'' while flying upside-down above him.

Filed under "why watching military warfilms is relevant in today's society." You just never know who's rising to the top or what interesting observations can be made.

UPDATE: Starbuck identifies the Navy pilot who stood in for Tom Cruise in the same engagement.

Disengenuous Arguments

Andrew Exum points to Stephen Biddle's article in The New Republic as "an important and timely piece of work." In it, Biddle runs through a number of alternatives to McChrystal's proposed troop increase and declares them all unfit to support a true COIN strategy.

None of the usual middle-way proposals are thus likely to be effective as alternatives to reinforcement. Many are potentially important components of an integrated, properly resourced COIN strategy. But to pull pieces out of this integrated context and undertake them as substitutes for major troop deployments is to deny them essential preconditions they need to function. The pieces of orthodox COIN strategy interact: security enables development and governance, development and governance enhance security, governance facilitates counterterrorism, counterterrorism improves security, security enables negotiation and reconciliation. Each is a valuable complement to the others; none is a viable substitute. Integrated COIN is itself no guarantee of success. Social scientists have estimated its success rate at somewhere between 25 and 70 percent at best. But middle ways are even less promising because they lack the key enablers of an integrated strategy and the synergies that result.

To which I will have to say, "no shit." If you start with the assumption that the US strategy in Afghanistan has to be based on the application of COIN tactics to defeat the Taliban, of course it will require both substantial troop and funding increases. Pat Lang has outlined this obvious point several times, as have others. There's nothing in this article that hasn't been stated before, and it leaves us with the false choice of accepting McChrystal's troop request or failing utterly.

Biddle pointedly avoids talking about the failure of the Afghani government to provide security and a vision of a future to its people that is preferable to the Taliban's way of life. I don't see how pouring US money into the Afghani government's coffers, at a rate of several times its annual GDP, and increasing US troop strength in that country will pave the way to success if the Afghani government isn't an effective partner and won't front the combat against Taliban forces. And understand, 40,000 troops won't be enough if there is no significant increase in civilian support to Afghanistan's significant civil sector problems.

Exum has published a short paper on three possible futures for Afghanistan. While we all would like to see the best case scenario of a peaceful and functioning Afghani state free of Taliban and AQ, it's not realistic to expect that endstate (and both Biddle and Exum refuse to speculate on how many Americans bodies and hundreds of billions of dollars will be required for that "peace of mind"). I liked Andrew Kaplan's summary (in comments to Exum's post) of Biddle's article: "COIN may not work, COIN may be really expensive, and Afghanistan is really difficult and not really in our interests - let's COIN the shit out of Afghanistan!"