Armchair Generalist

Ignatius Has Trouble with Fuzzy Math

David Ignatius wonders how in the world President Obama will be able to make an informed opinion on the "success" of Teh Surge 2.0 if it takes a year to get every last soldier and Marine into the theater.

I asked Lt Gen. David Rodriquez, the No. 2 US commander here, in a briefing tonight how long the deployment of the extra 30,000 would take. He answered that "it will happen between nine and eleven months," starting in January 2010. Which means that some troops might not arrive until November 2010.

The next month after that, December 2010, is when Obama plans to assess how well the troops are doing -- so he can decide how many to pull out when the withdrawal begins in July 2011. That doesn't give him much time to make good decisions.

Am I the only person who worries that "fuzzy math" is being used here?

Short answer - yes. Come on, David. Stop acting like a neocon. There's nothing magical about the last brigade of the surge that will somehow become the tipping point in Afghanistan. Either we will see progress in that country over the next year or we won't. The key metrics to Afghanistan aren't limited by US military personnel. Equally important to the success of military operations are reforms within Karzai's government, the growth of local province governments, reductions in drug smuggling, and the growth of the Afghan security forces. 

Ignatius is also joining the neocon fixation over Gen. McChrystal's request for 40,000 troops instead of the 30,000+ he is getting. Again, this is ridiculous and unfounded. If it's extremely difficult to get 30,000 into theater over the next year, not to mention housing and sustaining operations for that number, is adding another 10,000 really a smart thing to do? Or will McChrystal be able to get by with what he's got?

It's the president's role to lead and to develop national strategy objectives against which the general officers execute. December 2010 and July 2011 are two points in time where Obama can assess whether his objectives are being met by the current strategy. It's time for Ignatius and his Kagan friends to STFU and wait it out. After all, they've "won" with their influence in the White House.

Continuing Bad Policy Decisions

Once again, there appear to be parts of the Obama administration who don't seem to understand that they can, in fact, reverse stupid decisions made in the previous administration. From Defense News (subscription required):

The United States and Poland have drawn up an accord regulating the stationing of U.S. troops in Poland, the Defense Ministry said Dec. 4, opening the way for the deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles.

The accord was given the final backing of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and will be signed Dec. 10 in Warsaw, ministry spokesman Robert Rochowicz told Agence France-Presse.

The Status of Forces Agreement is a prerequesite to setting up a U.S. ground-to-air missile base in Poland. U.S. officials say deployment should start next year.

Yes, this is an initiative to deploy Patriot missiles to protect the missile interceptor base aimed at Iran's non-existent nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles that President Obama decided against - or at least to delay - in part to demonstrate his respect to Russian sensitivities and because there was a much easier, cheaper, and more effective alternative available. Another article in Defense News discusses the US ballistic missile defense of Europe (because evidently NATO isn't serious enough in this area) and identifies a timeline of 2018 for putting a land-based SM-3 Block IIA site in Europe, possibly in Poland.

So exactly against what threat are the Patriot batteries protecting, if the interceptor base is no longer there? Iranian air attacks against Europe, when it has no ballistic missiles that can range European capitals? The Russian military, whose government says it is no longer threatened by a non-existent missile interceptor base?

Is this a serious attempt to calm jittery Polish government nerves about the grumbling Russian bear? Or is this a pay-off to ensure that the Polish troops currently deployed in Afghanistan stick around for a few more years? What it certainly is not - a serious military capability intended to deter Iran from "attacking" Europe or, as some extremely idiotic talking heads would have you believe, deter Iran from "attacking" America.

UPDATE: To clarify, I don't think the Patriots are an interim solution until the SM-3s get there, I thought the Patriots were a sweetner to the offer toward the Polish government. Just need to be straight on the proposed missile intercepter base (let's call it the BMD site) versus the US military ground-to-air missile defense capability (Patroits) that was added to counter Russian threats of attacking the BMD site.

Failure to Communicate

TalkingPointsMemo has been late in discovering this strategy model that attempts to depict the complex interactions that take place in a counterinsurgency campaign. Others in the blogosphere have commented on the spaghetti graphic that it appears to be (all hail to His mysterious creations), but TPM (and Richard Engel, the one who "discovered" the graphic) misinterpret its purpose.

Thanks to NBC's Richard Engel, we now have a visual representation of the military's plan. The above chart from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Engel reports, lays out the counterinsurgency strategy to achieve three goals: "Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition"; "Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition;" and "Retain supportive individuals."

No, it is not a visual representation of the plan, nor are the three "goals" indicative of the military's COIN operations. This is a working model by which planners can attempt to examine why it is that certain actions have certain consequences that may be beneficial or detrimental to their plans. It's a serious attempt by a reputable consulting firm to offer policy analysts a tool to better develop and implement plans that achieve tangible results, offering cost/benefit analyses. This is what serious planners are supposed to do, instead of making decisions based on "gut reactions." You have to understand the game before you can be a serious player. Otherwise, you don't belong on the field.

If you take the time to actually step through the methodology and see what can be done with the finished product, it's not so overwhelming. Is it hard? Sure it is. But life is like that. I've seen this model used elsewhere, it's valuable in addressing complex, dynamic issues and playing out "what if" scenarios. It's foolish for people to look at the one slide and groan, "oh, man, there they go with the powerpoint rangers again."

UPDATE: David Betz at "Kings of War" agrees.

UPDATE 2: Stephen Colbert says, "what could be simpler?" Stephen, it's not a "plan," but you can still play "Afghan Candyland" on it if you want.

The Taliban Edge in Soldiering

Matt Ygelsias asks the question - how is it that Taliban soldiers are paid better than Afghani army soldiers, when the US coalition has so much more money than the Taliban warlords? More importantly, is there a flaw in our cost-effectiveness approach in that the Taliban soldiers can get armed, trained, and deployed so much quicker than the Afghan government's personnel?

I can think of a few reasons why, if the Afghan army is trained along the same fashion as the US Army, the Taliban seem to get armed, trained, and deployed more quickly.

1. No mandatory training on sexual harassment, consideration of others, violence in the workplace, operational security, etc.

2. No mandatory wearing of reflector belts while not in combat.

3. No need to to fill out multiple forms to requisition ammunition for training, and no time spent at training ranges.

4. Didn't have to wait for MRAPs to show up before moving into combat operations. Toyota 4Runners work fine. 

5. Don't have to worry about the wife threatening to leave - advantages of polygamy.

6. Don't have to buy a different style of combat uniform because the Chief of Staff had a great idea about a new camo pattern. For that matter, no need to buy those dress uniforms, either. 

7. Easier command and control - don't have to ask 42 other national governments for permission to use their troops.

8. Cheaper ammunition and weapon systems - no need to compete contracts for a new SAW or pistol. Or new fighter aircraft. Or amphibious vehicles. And so on.

9. No internal arguments about whether to use COIN or conventional warfare tactics.

10. No private security contractors making life harder for everyone else. 

Anything else come to mind?

McChrystal-Eikenberry Hearings

Work has been a little heavier than usual, perhaps as government agencies try to complete their projects before the Christmas holiday incapacitates Washington DC. So I'm glad that Spencer Ackerman is on the job, watching the congressional hearings on Afghanistan.

But both McChrystal and Eikenberry replied that the administration was ultimately providing a long-term commitment to Afghanistan, even if the U.S.-led combat phase would diminish over time. McChrystal said setting the date for beginning a “conditions-based” transition would help navigate Afghans’ complex feelings about the presence of foreign troops on their soil. “The guarantee that we, the coalition, will support them but not stay too long is actually a positive,” McChrystal testified. Eikenberry emphasized that the Obama administration envisioned a “long-term relationship with Afghanistan, a diplomatic relationship, a long-term economic assistance relationship” after the ultimate departure of U.S. troops.

The general said he expressed such confidence in his strategy because the Taliban was “not credible as a political entity,” earning acquiescence from Afghans only through the lack of a credible alternative from the Afghan government and its NATO allies. As the U.S. flows forces into southern and eastern Afghanistan to establish “contiguous security” for the population, “the next 18 months will likely be decisive,” McChrystal said. “Rolling back the Taliban is a prerequisite to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda.”
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In an attempt to quash media speculation about a chilly relationship between Eikenberry and McChrystal, the two men made a show of their professional partnership. Eikenberry saw his internal doubts about a U.S. troop increase leak to the media last month. But ambassador said that he firmly supported the administration’s strategy and was “exactly aligned with Gen. McChrystal.” The general returned the compliment by gesturing to Eikenberry and saying, “The person I listen to most is about three feet on my right.”

Ahhhhhh... harmony. Isn't it swell? Now if only the Republican politicians at the hearing would act as responsibly as those two, we might just get somewhere. But lost in this discussion, in the hearings and, who knows, perhaps even in the White House, is the damning fact that no number of additional troops in Afghanistan will fix the non-military factors that remain outstanding. Oh, yeah, and this guy is still running around free and easy after eight-plus years...

The Curse of Think Tanks

I've been viewing with some amusement the flame wars going on between Matt Yglesias and Andrew Exum on the subject of think tanks and their culpability to the overall military industrial complex. Matt started with a Wired blog post by Nathan Hodge on the topic, where Nathan commented that the think tank experts were in fact part of the team that designed the surge. Matt proposes that there is an inherent bias for think tanks that support military action, largely because defense firms and DOD help support think tanks that propose "activist policies." Not that this is a bad thing, nor are these think tanks bad in proposing particular agendas, but that's the way it is. Money goes to the people who are connected with and support the military's success in combat operations.

Andrew took exception to the post, thinking that Yglesias is accusing Exum of falsely pushing COIN in his position at CNAS just because the think tank is funded by the military and defense firms. He goes on to suggest that COIN tactics are much too lowbrow for big defense firms, and that certainly his topics can't compete with hardware firms. It's a bit defensive, and somewhat naive to suggest that "there's no money in COIN." Sure there is - billions in support contracts, logistics, individual gear, hell, $30 billion for MRAPs, and so on.

At the same time, as Nathan responds in the previous link, Matt may have over-reacted by suggesting that think tanks are funded by the military industrial complex to sell their products. Maybe there are one or two who do that, but most of them do perform a function that is largely intangible - "access to leading thinkers, places on the discussion panel, chances to contribute to the Beltway consensus on national-security issues." And think tanks benefit from media links to their articles and talking heads, which increases their influence. Security Crank agrees here. Everyone profits, except for the think tanks that advocate decreasing military budgets and lessening the pace of military operations.

Ackerman throws in his two cents here. I personally don't see think tanks as part of the military industrial complex - they play in the same community and they know each other, but by and large think tanks play a role that is more informative than financial. They are experts, they have agendas, but they assist in telling the story - and when the media fails to do so, then you have to go somewhere for in-depth analysis. But today's think tanks aren't what they used to be. I'll let Charlie Freeman have the last word:

The concept of analysis as polemic finds its major expression in the myriad of “think tanks” – perhaps, more accurately, “belief tanks” – established in recent decades to spin trends and events to promote the ideological or other theses of their founders and supporters. It is also a key characteristic of the cliquish dialogue of the blogosphere, in which partisan commentary reinforces parochial views and fact-checking or skeptical questioning more often elicit obscene ad hominem attacks than serious reflection. Paradoxically, those obsessed with particular issues have more information than ever before to draw upon, even as general civic literacy on foreign affairs and the space for civil debate on public policy issues continue to contract.   

The problem with think tanks and their pundits become more critical when they refuse to be true academics, when they're so obsessed with the sound of their own voices and the smiling faces who come to their conferences that they forget the reason why they wanted to be in a think tank. When they start lecturing instead of studying and promoting a free exchange of ideas, then they've outlived their usefulness other than to be props for someone's defense project. And that takes us full circle back to Matt Y's point. 

Swimmers and Non-Swimmers in Afghanistan

I don't mean to sound off like an arrogant and ugly American, but it irritates me every time I hear President Obama or one of his administration officials state that there are 43 countries in the US coalition for Afghanistan. Bush and his administration used to say the same thing about the "coalition of the bribed willing" in Iraq. Gen. (Ret) Zinni once noted that Eric Shinseki had commented about "swimmers and non-swimmers." He said, "And you’d like to have a hell of a lot more swimmers than non-swimmers. Just being able to tick off a list of countries - some of which that most of us without a globe or a map would have difficulty locating - how many real swimmers are there out there?" We have at least 29 "non-swimmers" in Afghanistan. Download ISAF Troop Strengths.

While it's very nice that these countries send a few delegates out to Kabul to provide moral support to the Long War that is Afghanistan, it would be nice to have a few more swimmers. And when I hear NATO Secretary General Rasmussen talk about 7,000 NATO troops coming to join our merry expedition in Afghanistan, I want to say, yeah, sure they are.

This NY Times article points to a few of the troop adds -Georgia, sending in 1000 troops. Another 1000 from Poland and 5oo more from Britain. 600 from Italy, mostly cops. South Korea is in for 400. Germany and France are waiting until the end of January to commit. And Canada and the Netherlands are committed to pulling out, which accounts for 5000 or so troops. I don't see the "swimmers" getting into the pool... so can we realistically talk about the countries who are seriously supporting the fighting and those who are just helping with training missions and moral support?

UPDATE: Check out the analysis by UK's think defence:

Using this table as a guide a reasonable view of who is actually pulling their weight can be taken.

Pulling the Most Weight

5 out of 5:  United Kingdom, Denmark, United States, Canada
4 out of 5:  Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia
3 out of 5:  Norway, Spain, France

Pulling the Least Weight

5 out of 5:  Slovakia, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey
4 out of 5:  Iceland, Bulgaria
3 out of 5:  Portugal, Belgium, Albania, Croatia, Slovenia

I've just added this site to my blogroll.

Setting a Deadline in Afghanistan

It's a popular statement for the right-of-center to claim that setting a date to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan is a mistake, especially if it is only a short 18 months away. The really insane ones talk about how the Taliban is going to wait centuries, if required, to wait us out. But a commenter over at C&L said it pretty well:

What would happen if the Taliban and AQ reserved their forces and stood down for 18 months?

- Order would be restored.. Afghani government and Coalition order, not Taliban order.

- Afghani security forces would continue to get training. Expansion of security forces would create jobs.

- Infrastructure creation could begin in earnest. Currently more is spent on security for infrastructure programs than for construction. Infrastructure creation requires labor.

18 months will peal away quickly but it's more than enough time to dull the desire for Taliban-style stability.

18 months of work for locals, real jobs will certainly be preferable to getting shot at.

If the Taliban were smart, they would do anything but hide for the next year and a half. They would perpetuate the violence, in fact they would increase the violence. They're well financed and local paid fighters are expendable.

Let's hope the Taliban does hole up for 18 months. A long stretch of peaceful times like that might be just what the coalition troops need, not to mention the Afghani public. And when the 18 months go by, we'll let the Afghan security forces take care of situations in their own country. Of course, that's not what the Taliban will allow - because basically you can take anything the Republican party says on national security and just the opposite will happen.

They Dispute Statements

Last week, former SecDef Donald Rumsfeld claimed that he had never heard commanders in Afghanistan ask for additional troops during his tenure.

"I am not aware of a single request of that nature between 2001 and 2006," Rumsfeld said. "If any such requests occurred, ‘repeated’ or not, the White House should promptly make them public. The President's assertion does a disservice to the truth and, in particular, to the thousands of men and women in uniform who have fought, served and sacrificed in Afghanistan.”

Like Rob Farley, I find it interesting that Rumsfeld was shocked, shocked to hear that commanders in Afghanistan required extra troops to do their mission. What bullshit... I am not going to comment on this issue other to say that it's amazing how many hits you can get on Google for the statement "Rumsfeld disputes statement." 

Republicans Fail National Security

Al Kamen reminds us of the hysterical Republican party's reaction to handing the Panama Canal over to Panama ten years ago - because it was just an insane idea that the US government wouldn't want to continue occupying a country with military and civilian personnel to protect a critical economic asset.

"If we do nothing, I can guarantee you that within a decade, a communist Chinese regime that hates democracy and sees America as its primary enemy will dominate the tiny country of Panama, and thus dominate the Panama Canal, one of the world's most important strategic points," Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.) told a House subcommittee on Dec. 7, 1999, as it debated the handover.

Retired Adm. Thomas Moorer warned that China could sneak missiles into Panama and use it as a launchpad for attacking the United States. And former defense secretary Caspar W. Weinberger wrote that fall that Panama's contract with Hong Kong-based Hutchison Whampoa to control ports at both ends of the passage was "the biggest threat to the canal."

Then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) said he was "alarmed" by the Chicom contract, which "could, in fact, be a threat to our national security." The Clintonites were "allowing a scenario to develop where U.S. national security interests could not be protected without confronting the Chinese Communists in the Americas," Lott said.

The Republicans hated it when President Carter negotiated the Panama Canal treaty, with Ronald Reagan stating "we built it, we paid for it, it's ours." So what's happened since the Panama Canal turnover in 1999? Nothing, really. There was no emergent Chinese threat, as predicted by the right wing. The issue lost its political value after Reagan became president and it became clear that maritime traffic wasn't affected at all.

So why should we credit Republican fears about China today, given that they have no credibility on the issue and only intend to resurrect an external foe for political points? And please, let's not even get into the Republican hypocracy that exists over their "national security concerns" over the current conflicts  in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Decline of David Ignatius

 I used to respect David Ignatius and enjoy his columns. I enjoyed his narration between Bret Scowcroft and Zbignew Brzezinski in "America and the World." Then he took a few helicopter rides with Gen. Petraeus and I think they replaced him with a pod person. That's the only rationale I can think of with his recent comments about President Obama's speech about an Afghanistan strategy.

Military commanders appear comfortable with Obama's decision, although they wish it hadn't taken so long.

You mean that after six years of asking for reinforcements from the Bush administration, to include Gen. McChrystal's immediate predecessor, that the military officers are upset about waiting six-month strategy review after the addition of 21,000 to the size of the force in the spring? Hmmmmm. I don't think so.

The most important question about Obama's strategy isn't political but pragmatic: Will it succeed? He has defined success downward, by focusing on the ability to transfer control to the Afghans. He shows little interest in the big ideas of counterinsurgency and insists he will avoid "a nation-building commitment in Afghanistan." That will make it easier to declare a "good enough" outcome in July 2011, if not victory.

What exactly did Ignatius think was the point of military operations in Afghanistan if not to create the conditions where the Afghans could take charge of their own security? Did he think that we were just supposed to coddle the Afghani security forces forever, or until we kill every living Taliban? President Obama doesn't show interest in COIN because IT'S AN OPERATIONAL TACTIC - that's what the generals are paid to do. He just tells them what the end result is supposed to be, and whatever he decides is "good enough" is what we call victory conditions. It's not a hard concept.

Obama thinks that setting deadlines will force the Afghans to get their act together at last. That strikes me as the most dubious premise of his strategy. He is telling his adversary that he will start leaving on a certain date, and telling his ally to be ready to take over then, or else. That's the weak link in an otherwise admirable decision -- the idea that we strengthen our hand by announcing in advance that we plan to fold it.

Yeah, it's not as if setting a deadline worked in Iraq, right? Oh wait, it did. If we set the conditions for leaving, it does, at the least, allow the US government to plan resources and understand that this isn't an endless death spiral. It does force Karzai and company to understand that they won't have the US military as the palace guard forever. Here's a newsflash for David - the goal is al Qaeda. The Taliban aren't taking flying lessons or planning to smuggle themselves into the United States. We need to stop thinking that every nation needs the US military to hold their hand, and maybe, just maybe, people in another country can actually make their own way toward their own goals and ambitions (even if they aren't the same as our own).

War of Words

I wanted to get back to William Owen's article in Armed Forces Journal. He's concerned that the military obsesses a bit too much on terminology at the cost of not appreciating the universal nature of war. And by "universal nature of war," he means Clausewitz's "Art of War." This terminology change has been particularly noticeable with the recent wars in the Middle East. You might have heard about the whole "counterinsurgency versus conventional warfare" debate... 

Complex warfare will take place in complex terrain, which is essentially terrain that restricts the use of weapons and sensors. Arguably, these are the same restrictions such terrain has always imposed, when it was usefully called “close terrain.” Within complex terrains, there will be civilian populations, now called the “human terrain,” and these will further restrict the use of weapons. Future wars will be conducted around and within populations, because wars are and always have been about people. The highly variable intolerance or acceptance of intentional or accidental killing of civilians has been an enduring aspect of warfare. To suggest that this is new is wholly false. British public opinion cared very little about the civilian casualties of the Boer War, but was extremely moved by Belgian and French civilian casualties at the beginning of the First World War. They were also angered by the death of British schoolchildren killed by zeppelin raids. The Western Front of World War I was played out across a highly populated area of Europe. U.S. public opinion cared little about Afghan civilian casualties or human rights in the wake of Sept. 11. Moreover, the history of warfare suggests that unintentional civilian casualties are far more a political problem than a moral one, because war is a political instrument and public opinion has always played its part.

Historically, armies have always gathered information about the ethnicity, tribal makeup and opinions of civilian populations. The argument that this was done in a “colonial” context is correct, but this is no different from doing the same thing in a “nation-building” context.
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War is not changing. The aims and purpose of organized violence for political gain are enduring and unchanging. Insurgencies are war, and most if not all of the observations made in the Army’s new FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency” manual could have been written in 1991 or earlier. Future wars will be born of future politics, not “globalization” or the Internet. Yes, there will be “unknown unknowns,” but they are just that: unknowable. New words won’t change that.

This led to a great comment discussion in MilPub that started in general military strategy discussion but moved onto AfPak strategies and OSD leadership issues. If I can grasp the essence of the thread, some of the debate was focused on whether the new language was just a political ploy to cover ambitious plans of "influencing governments" out there, if the new language was just confused milspeak without substance, or is there really something new here. I wanted to make two quick points with respect to this discussion.

Clausewitz had some good thoughts about the nature of warfare - so did Sun Tzu. Trying to define different generations of warfare or elaborating on irregular warfare as being conducted different than conventional warfare doesn't contradict their discussions on operational and strategic warfare. It's like saying there's only chemistry as a real science, when one can break out inorganic, organic, and physical chemistry as distinct topics (not to mention quantum mechanics in chemistry). Given the challenge of irregular warfare (and I agree, the term "hybrid warfare" is strained), it probably does some good to review it and to determine whether there are some distinct differences in approaching that challenge. There are always new things to learn, better ways to approach the problem, given changes in culture and technology. I strongly recommend a review of the CT/COIN posts in Kingdaddy's (dormant) blog "Arms and Influence" for some examples.

Seydlitz89, the author of the MilPub post, says that propagandists will tell you that language is power, that the words we use do make a difference. And he's absolutely correct there, except I would say that it's more than just the propagandists. Within the Building, words have power. Names have power. If you're trying to move ahead, if you're trying to advance a new concept, if you're trying to promote a new piece of equipment, you can't succeed without associating it to the right words. We scan the Joint Staff's concept papers and Services' posture statements for the correct sentences to put into powerpoint briefs. A good deal of agonizing goes into the Quadrennial Defense Review because it's understood that the report is only so long, and one sentence in that report can mean the life or death of a program, concept, or even someone's office. We don't combat WMD anymore, we're countering WMD. Words have power, and you ignore this at your own risk.

The basics of war may not have changed, but it has become more complex and there is a desire, shall we say, to do military operations with less collateral damage and with more precision, so that we're able to achieve objectives with less "blood and treasure." At least that's the intent, until the politicians get confused about what they want the military to do (and what the other government powers of diplomacy, information, and economics are supposed to achieve). And sure, a good deal of the bloviating is people trying to sound important or trying to sell something, but that only re-emphasizes the importance of dialogue (something that is sorely lacking in the combating countering WMD community). So it is important, and it will remain important, to examine warfare and to determine whether we're communicating our intent effectively. But the Masters of War will always be watching...

Reacting to the Speech

For those interested, here's the WaPo coverage and the White House transcript. For the WMD crowd, here's the money shots:

"The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered.  And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them."

"We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction.  And that's why I've made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them -- because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them. "

Really hate the "we know terrorists are going to use nukes when if they get them" talk. As Brian Jenkins points out, achieving nuclear terror without nuclear weapons is possible and probably suits the terrorist groups just fine. Others have commented that the odds of terrorists obtaining such a device are about microscopic, due to both technical and security issues.  This myopic focus on a 1 percent chance that terrorists will build, buy or steal a 10-kT nuke and transport it to the United States without being intercepted is just insane and a massive drain on our resources and brainpower.

As for the second paragraph, I'm all for nonproliferation as one aspect of national security, but let's not fool ourselves with pretty language about "true security" coming with the rejection of "more destructive weapons." When it comes to strategic nuclear warfare, the construct was and continues to be a tripod - nonproliferation talks, strategic strike capabilities, and defensive measures. We can argue about the balance between the three legs, but this isn't going to change.

I hesitate to point to the WaPo op-eds, where the conservatives are slamming Obama while agreeing with the troop increases and the left-of-center are bitterly disappointed at the failure to commit to pulling out of the mire. But would you expect otherwise? The (next) interesting thing will be the debate on how to pay for the troop surge, since SecDef Gates promised that all future war operations bills were going to be incorporated into the overall defense budget (as it should). At about $1M per military person, it's a steep cost, but (to use a phrase noted elsewhere) if the war is worth fighting as a vital security concern, isn't it worth taxing the American public to pay for it? Or does the Congress just want to deepen the deficit? As a note, this TPM article discusses how there will have to be a "surge" in contractors - who already outnumber military troops in Afghanistan - to successfully complete the mission.

UPDATE: Prof. Walt identifies the good, the bad, and the ugly. I concur.

The President's Speech - Live Blog

2003: "bring this war to a successful conclusion..." good start. Oh, shit, he's pulling out the 9/11 argument. "to destroy al Qaeda's terrorist network... we sent our troops into Afghanistan." So when do we invade Saudi Arabia?

2008: The Iraq war took the majority of our resources... no kidding. "we will remove our troops from Iraq by 2011." good. 

2009: "Troops in Afghanistan were a fraction of what we had in Iraq... requested reinforcements did not arrive." that's overly generous of him to view Bush's decisions that way.

2010: Huge challenges remain... The Taliban has gained momentum... Our forces lack the support they need... "more serious than [McChrystal] had anticipated." I owe you a mission that is clearly defined for your service."

2012: "I took a long time to review this strategy because you and the American people deserve no less." He does have a way with words, makes Bush look like an inarticulate hick. "I opposed the war in Iraq because of the need for restraint in military power." But now we don't feel that way?

2014: "I've seen first hand the terrible wages of war." "I am convinced our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan." "This is no idle danger." I think Bacevich's argument still holds, to suggest that the "threat" in AfPak require this surge is pretty damn weak.

2015: "al Qaeda seeks nuclear weapons and they will use them if they get them" Oh bullshit. I really hate this weak-ass statement. It has no credibility.

2016: Sending first wave to south provinces, train the Afghan troops, set the stage to allow us to pull out. That is to say, as they stand up, we will stand down. I've heard this song before.

2018: "Just as we have done in Iraq..." Oh my god. what a dangerous statement. Oh, he means giving the locals back their autonomy. We'll see. "No blank checks... hold people accountable for results..." Or what? We're not going to give them billions of dollars in aid?

2020: GEN David Petraeus looks attentive, sitting in the audience. "We need a strategy that works on both sides of the border." For all this talk about supporting Pakistan, the populace there still hates us for the military operations in the region. "Pakistan people must know that we are on their side to help them" yeah good luck with that message.

2022: "Afghanistan is not Vietnam. We have a 43-nation coalition" (not really - maybe the top 10 are really helping). "We can't maintain the status quo and muddle through" (no but you could change the tactics and not directly combat the Taliban). "We can't just ignore the need for a timeline, it's not sustainable" Well, that's the truth. "I refuse to commit US forces beyond our responsibility, means, and interests."

2025: "We can't afford to simply ignore the costs of these wars... I am committed to addressing these costs as we work to bring down the deficit." "We must rebuild our strength at home" Details please. Oh, he expects Congress to do this (haha)

2026: "None of this will be easy." "Precise and nimble in the use of our military power." "Show our strength in the way we end wars and prevent conflict." Commitments to homeland defense, intel collection, taking away the "tools of mass destruction" (TMDs?)

2029: We have to use diplomacy (Bush officials "what is this word diplomacy?"). Promote our values at home - prohibit torture and close Gitmo (yeah!) Moral source of America's authority. Yes, this is a good thing.

2032: "We have not sought world domination - we do not want to occupy other nations" Well, not since December 2008 at least. Finally some applause from the cadets.

2033: "Our strength doesn't come just from the strength of our arms, it comes from our people. And also from you guys in uniform... of the people, for the people, by the people." 

2035: "Remember when we were a united country on 9/12? I refuse to accept that we cannot summon that unity again. We can find a common purpose. We are passing through a time of great trial. Our cause is just, our will unwavering."

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A pretty impressive speech, damn him. I have to admit, as Gordon notes, Obama has consistently said that he was going to add forces to Afghanistan and do the job right. I get that. I think a lot of us thought what he meant was that he was going to announce his exit plans and leave the shit-hole that is Afghanistan. That was not realistic of us, but we had hopes. In our defense, he did use the phrase "finish the job" more than once.

I still think the rationale that the Obama administration uses is shit - that somehow, securing Afghanistan is vital to our interests and that AQ is just chomping at the bits to move back into Afghanistan while eyeing Pakistan's nukes. It's weak, it's not a supportable defense to address violent non-state actors. But at the least, he offered goals, he stated his rationale, and he clearly stated that he's not relying on strictly military power. He demonstrated a basis for using all the elements of national security. And he's committing to start pulling out in mid-July 2011 (none too late to influence the 2012 elections).

So let's see how this all plays out in the next two Friedman units.  

UPDATE: GEN McChrystal approves of this strategy. Not a big surprise, he's a good soldier, knows how to salute and move out.

Obama's Military Escalation

So in the true spirit of LBJ, President Obama is going to double down on the Bush decision to "muddle through" Afghanistan, because (as SecState Clinton said on Monday) we can't allow "an environment in which terrorist groups thrive" - as they already have in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and any number of other weak state governments. I'll reserve my comments till after the speech, but I wonder what the odds are of other nations contributing to the force. Will the Russians will add any troops? "Nyet." How about the French? "Non." The Germans? "Nein." Oh, Canada? "No." India? "नहीं." Italy? "No."

Nope, just us dumbass Americans and a few more English blokes, into the fires of hell. So glad we elected a president who promised "change." My wife noted that this seemed like a repeat of the end of the lackluster AMC mini-series "The Prisoner," where Number 6, after a long campaign of fighting "The Man," realizes that his true destiny is to become Number 2 and continue running "The Village." Maybe President Obama hasn't been reading the right stuff.

"There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."
   - George Kennan, February 1966

I want out of "The Village."

UPDATE: In other news,former VP Dick Cheney remains a huge dick.

Rumsfeld and Franks Let Bin Laden Go

A report from the Senate's Foreign Relations committee suggests that SecDef Don Rumsfeld and General Tommie Franks allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from Tora Bora in December 2001. It was a deliberate decision not to engage with overwhelming force that was available and in country, the report accuses. From Reuters:

"Removing the al-Qaida leader from the battlefield eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist threat," the report says. "But the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism."

The report states categorically that bin Laden was hiding in Tora Bora when the U.S. had the means to mount a rapid assault with several thousand troops at least. It says that a review of existing literature, unclassified government records and interviews with central participants "removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora."

On or about Dec. 16, 2001, bin Laden and bodyguards "walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan's unregulated tribal area," where he is still believed to be based, the report says.

Instead of a massive attack, fewer than 100 U.S. commandos, working with Afghan militias, tried to capitalize on air strikes and track down their prey.

"The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines," the report said.

There is this great overwhelming anger within me, that I discover that, within months of 9/11, the arrogance and stupidity of our military and civilian leadership within the former Bush administration allowed the orchestrator of the largest terrorist act against the United States walk out of Afghanistan without any concern in the world. Steve Benen reminds us that the WaPo - when it had Tom Ricks as a journalist - told us as much in 2002, before Sen. John Kerry suggested in 2004 that CheneyBush had screwed the pooch here. I cannot in any way find the expression within me to say how angry I am that despite how incompetent and foolish the neocon community is, they have pressed on with their ridiculous arguments regarding Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan when they have consistently failed in their statements on any significant point of national security.

But by all means, let's listen to them now as they advise the Obama administration on how we ought to clean up the eight year mess that they've left us. Idiots. Deliberate idiots, dangerous to our society, people who ought to be locked in public stocks and pelted with rocks.

UPDATE: Maybe I'm reading too much into this report. After all, anyone who references Michael O'Hanlon as a source needs to reconsider the position carefully. From App I, Mikey says: "Operation Enduring Freedom has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse." Yes... what a masterpiece, and it only gets better with age.

He Is Our Hero

This video is dedicated to William F. Owen and all the true believers who attended the Army War College and believe in conventional combined arms warfare as the be-all and end-all. Yes, they really believe in this man's writing that much.

UPDATE: Sorry, didn't realise the video has an autostart and there's no pause button. Corrected.

Muppets Still Rock

Muppets do Queen's "Bohemian Rhapsody." Just friggin' awesome... fantastic finish.

This is Very Good News for the Republicans

President Obama has hit the "go" button to begin escalating the troop strength in Afghanistan by more than 30,000. Now for the rest of today and through tomorrow, you will hear from retired general officers and Republican politicians and right-wing pundits about how this was a Good Decision, and how it shows that Democrats are still not good national security experts. You will not hear from Democrats or critics of the decision until the end of the week.

It's a prediction. I hope I'm wrong, but just saying. Here are a few more predictions - NATO will not meet the goal of adding 5,000 more troops to the mix over the next year. The Karzai government will continue to wallow in corruption and drug money. And if Obama does not start withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and still has more than 50,000 troops in Iraq by mid-2010, he can kiss his Democratic majority in the House and Senate good-bye.

Army Mentors Provide Vital Advice

Major Robert Thorton at Fort Leavenworth provides his two cents on the recent media articles about retired general officers and flag officers providing mentoring advice to active duty officers.

As an active duty Army major, I have a different perspective on the use of senior mentors. I have seen how Americans' (and my) tax dollars are spent to ensure the hard won experience from our past informs our current and future military efforts with the best ideas on the complex issues that confront us as a nation.

I have participated in many such exercises and experiments that help us think through potential operations. They range from humanitarian efforts and developing the capabilities of partners and allies to conventional combat and post-conflict reconstruction. I can assure you the military works hard to develop its capabilities for these missions. A valuable part of this effort is the senior mentors program, which invites and pays retired senior military officers, ambassadors and other professionals for the observations, insights and lessons gained over their service.

The senior mentors are selected based on their performance and expertise. They have spent their lives accruing vital knowledge and experience. That includes numerous deployments, serving in diverse capacities and in multiple wars of varying character, and working through the adaptation and rebuilding of units and services in between. They have also had unique experiences that few currently on active duty attain. They have the added benefit of post-service reflection — something hard to come by in today's tempo. 

Read the rest at the link. I agree with the young major, but I understand how others perceive this as a conflict of interests and a bad example for military leaders. Let's agree to disagree here.