Keeping Smallpox Alive

Interesting op-ed by DHHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius in the NYT on why the United States isn't likely to destroy its small cache of smallpox virus anytime soon.

We fully agree that these samples should — and eventually will — be destroyed. However, we also recognize that the timing of this destruction will determine whether we continue to live with the risk of the disease re-emerging through deliberate misuse of the virus by others.

Those who advocate immediate destruction would have us believe that another smallpox outbreak is unthinkable. They want us to believe that there is no need to ensure the global community is adequately prepared to deal with an outbreak and that the only risk comes from maintaining the highly secured samples. For these reasons, they argue that the World Health Assembly should set an immediate date for destruction.

It should not. Although keeping the samples may carry a miniscule risk, both the United States and Russia believe the dangers of destroying them now are far greater.
-----------
We have more work to do before these safe and highly effective vaccines and antiviral treatments are fully developed and approved for use. Once they are ready, we intend to share the fruits of this research with the world. Destroying the virus now is merely a symbolic act that would slow our progress and could even stop it completely, leaving the world vulnerable.

Destruction of the last securely stored viruses is an irrevocable action that should occur only when the global community has eliminated the threat of smallpox once and for all. To do any less keeps future generations at risk from the re-emergence of one of the deadliest diseases humanity has ever known. Until this research is complete, we cannot afford to take that risk.

Hey, whatever you have to tell yourself. I don't agree that there is a substantive risk of any nation other than Russia or the United States might re-engineer smallpox from its genetic code in a laboratory. But who knows? I don't fully appreciate the state-of-the-art in biotech, it moves too quickly. But I also don't agree with the peaceniks who think that a world free from smallpox is only a step away, idealy through the destruction of the remaining samples that (ostensibly) are only in secured labs in the United States and Russia.

Keep the virus around as insurance against the unknown. It's not going anywhere, and it doesn't cost much to maintain. What could go wrong?

Comments

[tammy swofford]

Agree with your final volley. We keep it as insurance against the unknown. Chimera smallpox-ebola engineering has been tossed around and is old news. But as our samples are secured in hot labs, it seems a miniscule and extremely remote danger to our general public. Every now and then a case of smallpox emerges, not unlike the occasional outbreak of medieval disease processes in India due to the rat population waltzing along in the landscape. Would we also destroy our measles samples? Nigeria had an outbreak a few years ago. What about Ebola and Marburg? Hmmm

Tammy

[belphagor1527]

"We fully agree that these samples should — and eventually will — be destroyed."

Translation to English: 'We'll be keeping these until the next geological epoch.'

I'm not sure I understand the doublespeak here. I can't imagine anyone is fooled into thinking that destruction is going to happen anytime soon. Why not just say 'It ain't happenin'.'