Okay, when I mocked a crazy lady's view of the 2001 anthrax attacks and manufacture of anthrax vaccine yesterday, I really didn't expect that anyone else - let alone a U.S. congressional representative - would share the view that the anthrax attacks were the reason that the US government went into Iraq. But then again, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) has not been very rational about this particular issue.
The anthrax attacks “made it possible to manufacture the argument that there was WMD in Iraq and links to Al-Qaeda,” Rep. Rush Holt, a leading Congressional critic on the anthrax investigation, tells Danger Room.
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“It was the second and confirming incident that a worldwide network had penetrated the United States, that the country was under widespread attack — and that anything was possible,” Holt says. “The enemy could be anywhere and everywhere and use any means to attack.”
I don't know why Holt thinks this is relevant to the FBI's investigation of Ivins, other than there is this crackpot theory by some who are convinced the anthrax came from Iraq - despite the overwhelming lack of evidence to support that statement - and therefore, the Bush administration must have had a relevant reason to think the anthrax came from overseas, thus supporting the need to invade Iraq.
It may be that Holt got this brilliant idea based on a Newsweek article by Jacob Weisberg who suggests that the anthrax attack had a bigger effect on the Bush administration than previously appreciated, to the point that he believes the Bush administration would not have invaded Iraq had the 2001 anthrax attacks not occurred. I find his theory much less than convincing. Weisberg writes:
In a November 2001 speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Cheney offered this definition: "We will hold those who harbor terrorists, those who provide sanctuary to terrorists, responsible for their acts."
But by the time Cheney spoke those words, a second wave of terrorism had already exposed the inadequacy of Doctrine 2.0. The anthrax attacks in New York and Washington created a sense of vulnerability that was in many respects greater than the mass murder at the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Inside the administration, the October bioterror attacks had a larger impact than is generally appreciated—one in many ways bigger than 9/11. Without the anthrax attacks, Bush probably would not have invaded Iraq.
At that point, nearly everyone involved in national security assumed there would be another wave of terrorist attacks. The daily intelligence summary substantiated this panic; "chatter" was at record levels. In an effort to understand the potential threat, Cheney's chief of staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby ordered up a briefing on a war game, known as "Dark Winter," which modeled a smallpox outbreak in an American city in much the way "continuity of government" exercises Cheney had participated in during the 1980s simulated nuclear catastrophe.
According to a source close to Bush, Cheney swiftly reported back to the Oval Office with a sobering message: the United States was essentially defenseless against the most likely form of assault, a biological attack. "I sat through the most gruesome briefing in the Oval Office about anthrax, how it could spread, and how we had no defenses," Bush's first press secretary, Ari Fleischer, told me in the summer of 2007. "Dick Cheney was the strongest advocate of the possibility of attack and need to prepare for it."
I don't question that Cheney was really freaked out by the anthrax attack, and in response, he was a strong advocate for Projects BioShield and BioWatch under the proposed "Biodefense for the 21st Century" strategy. He pushed the "one percent doctrine" in that he decided that if there was a one percent chance that a terrorist could get a nuclear bomb into the United States, it was worth taking extraordinary steps to prevent that from occurring. This mentality has not, to date, resulted in any capability within the government to prevent or adequately respond to either bioterrorism or nuclear terrorism in any comprehensive form, but that's beside the point.
The idea that the CheneyBush administration either seriously thought Saddam was the source (or potential source) of anthrax for terrorists or just used the 2001 anthrax attacks as pretext for the invasion has already been debated to death (I thought). IT ISN'T THE CASE. IT WAS NEVER THE CASE. I don't know how many memoirs and analyses of the Iraq invasion we need to understand this simple point. The purpose of the Iraq invasion was to remind the Middle East that they weren't to frak with the United States unless they wanted to be seriously spanked. Oh, and if military power resulted in the export of democracy to an Arab nation, that would be a good thing, too.
The issue of WMDs in Iraq was a fraud. No one with any legitimate background in military analysis believed that Saddam's' chem-bio weapons were a serious enough threat to justify a preventive invasion. If Saddam was building a nuke, that might be different, but we knew he wasn't. The issue of the United States being vulnerable to biological weapons delivered by a terrorist group was a completely different issue that also had the CheneyBush administration's attention at the same time. But anyone who was active during that time could say, again with any degree of seriousness, that the two issues were either linked or of the same importance. They just weren't. And pointing to $50+ billion over a ten year period as "proof" that the US biodefense program is important is laughable - it's peanuts in the big picture and we really don't have much to show for it today. But that's a story for another day.
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