Tactical Nukes Are Next to Go

Matt Eckel at Foreign Policy Watch points to this NYT article discussing the Obama administration's next arms control topic - "non-strategic" or tactical nuclear weapons. From the NYT:

Today, the United States retains about 500 tactical weapons, according to the figures released this year, and experts say about 180 of them are still stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Russia has between 3,000 and 5,000 of them, depending on the estimate, and American officials have said Moscow moved more of them closer to NATO allies as recently as last spring in response to the deployment of American missile defense installations closer to its territory.

“In the 21st century, there is no plausible military, political or deterrent justification for the Russian government to deploy several thousand such weapons,” said Frank Miller, a former national security aide to President George W. Bush and now now at the Scowcroft Group in Washington.

Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation believes that any deal to withdraw tactical nukes from Europe would ultimately benefit Russia in the Great Game that is war. And of course, neither belief here is entirely true. Given that Russia has a rather weak conventional military force, it relies on tactical nuclear weapons as a defensive measure to discourage any ideas of invasion or border challenges.  As Matt notes, it's all in the context of general military operations and strategy.

Without getting into the specifics of where tactical nuclear weapons are deployed, or the minutae of their operation, I'd simply point out that, for all the well-intentioned efforts to depict nuclear war as its own ballgame with its own rules, war is war. People are killed just as dead by conventional weapons as by nuclear ones. Thus, the balance of conventional forces needs to be considered when assessing the wisdom of a given nuclear deal. In other words, NATO presumably relies less on tactical nukes than the Russians because NATO's conventional forces are more capable than those of Russia. Even if a deal with Russia allowed Russian tactical nukes to be more readily deployable than American ones, that would not ipso facto give Russia an overall strategic advantage. It may be that, even with Russian tactical nukes more easily deployed, NATO forces would still prevail in a ground war. And in the meantime, there would be far fewer tactical nukes overall, reducing the (far more plausible) likelihood of theft or unauthorized use.

We don't need US tactical nukes in Europe, nor do we really need US military forces in terms of Army brigades and Air Force fighter/bomber wings in Europe. Both are there for "security assurance" reasons, so European nations can continue to underfund their defense programs maintain a minimal defense posture in respect to other economic priorities and not worry about the Russian bear coming across the border. It's so indicative of a twen-cen mindset. And what will become an ironic satire of the New START talks, all the Republicans who were moaning about how tac nukes weren't addressed in the treaty will be sure to argue vehemently that we cannot afford to take any out of Europe in the near future.

UPDATE: Fixed for clarity.

Comments

[Doug]

"so European nations can continue to underfund their defense programs"

And here comes Sven Ortmann in 5, 4, 3...

[Doug]

I should add that I'm an active-duty Army officer currently in Iraq who thinks that the US spends way too much on defense for what we get out of it, and I don't know nearly enough about European defense spending to comment intelligently about them one way or the other. But I've been reading both of your blogs long enough to recognize some prime Sven-bait when I see it.

[Ray]

Sven can answer the finances but:

"nor do we really need US military forces in terms of Army brigades and Air Force fighter/bomber wings in Europe."
J, this raises a questions that have often occurred to me. What do we do with all those troops and equipment when brought back? How to maintain military readiness and experience across the whole climatic and geographical fields? What jobs do the troops have to come home to, not if, but when those if cut
-backs are made? That's an area I'd like to see clarified.

[J.]

Well that's a good question, Ray. I think you'll see four things happening. 1) the units will return to major US military bases that might still have some room - Ft Hood, Ft Lewis, Ft Bragg, etc. 2) Congress and others have been implying the need to consider reducing troop numbers in light of defense cuts to equipment, so some units may be retired. 3) the military will allow retirements, medical disabilities, and discharges to attrit the force without recruiting more troops to replace them. 4) our state-side training and doctrine command staffs have been severely reduced by the war and there are ample opportunities to get these vets into those jobs.

As to where the people who leave the military will go, the Obama administration is pressuring the government agencies to give preferential treatment to military vets. I think this is a nod to their service and recognition of the tough job market out there, that they ought to have a little bit of an edge. This will, however, have the unfortunate side effect of denying some smart, young people from getting into the govt, but that's the breaks.

[S O]

Doug; vacation and all...

TacNukes are a very different crop now than they were during the Cold War. Their per-unit value in naval and air warfare has increased because there are less warships and less air wings. The greatest navy of the world could be ruined by hundred fission nukes.

TacNukes' value per-unit in warfare on the ground is on the other hand probably negative by now.
Army forces disperse way too much and are unlikely to be detected, identified and verified as proper target when stationary. Armies operate with battalion and even company battlegroups nowadays - even a 10 kt fission nuke is more harmful than can be justified by a 50% destruction of such a battlegroup. This is especially true if you are fighting against invaders or in a limited war or if the target is in hilly or settlement terrain.

I see little military purpose beyond a TacNuke arsenal of about 200-400 warheads (and the yield doesn't need to be greater than 20 kt) per alliance.

Europe has an arsenal of about that size, the U.S. has more, Russia has more, the full Chinese and Israeli arsenals are estimated to be at that size.

Dual-purpose warheads (compatible both with intercontinental and battlefield delivery systems) could allow for an even smaller arsenal without much loss of deterrence.

About the "underfunded" thing; it depends on your expectations. The current European level of military spending seems to fit with the expectations better than a much higher level did during the Cold War.

Btw, the least relevant question about nukes is on which continent you store them. You can move them from one continent to another in a day, and it's borderline insane to expect their defensive employment on day one of a hot conflict.