Gary Stoller at USA Today has really outdone himself. He's discovered that the majority of mass transit stations outside of airports are, in fact, vulnerable to terrorist threats. Can we ever feel normal again?
"Mass transit systems are much less secure than the aviation sector or certain key government buildings," says Clark Kent Ervin, the Department of Homeland Security's former inspector general.
And they'll likely remain that way, USA TODAY has found in its examination of rail security, which included an analysis of the National Counterterrorism Center's incident database and interviews with Congress, federal security officials, transit authorities, rail operators, independent security experts and passengers.
The nation's vast network of more than 3,200 stations and more than 20,000 miles of track combined with the impracticality and cost of screening every passenger leave U.S. subways and rails exposed to the type of terrorist attacks 22 other nations have experienced the last five years.
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In an April report, the American Public Transportation Association said public transportation systems "are facing unprecedented funding challenges due to widespread declining state and local revenues."
The association, which represents transit agencies and rail and bus operators, found 70% of 151 transit systems that responded to an association survey project "budget shortfalls" this year.
William Millar, the association's president, says transit authorities don't have the necessary resources. More than $30 billion has been allocated for aviation security since 9/11, compared with $1.7 billion for subway, passenger rail, cargo rail, bus and some ferry security, Millar says.
Yes, this is one area that you just can't throw enough money at. Because if you're set on providing protection to all the mass transit centers, what about the public shopping malls, major league sports arenas, national landmarks, and government buildings? One might suggest that a risk management approach could be useful, noting from the NCTC incident database that the overwhelming majority of terrorist incidents DID NOT OCCUR in the United States - for instance.
This is a particularly useless "investigative journalism" piece (as Andrew Sullivan notes, kind of an obvious news story at that). There does need to be a balance between what local and state officials do with their own funds plus the federally-allocated DHS funds they receive every year, and what the federal government ought to be doing. And in fact, Stoller does get around to mentioning that role - in the last paragraphs of the story.
Ultimately, analysts say, the key to thwarting terrorism on the nation's rails is intelligence to prevent an attack — which has worked.
No shit? Really? No, the real danger here is when congresspeople get "concerned" about this rather obvious situation - that the federal government isn't putting Jersey barriers around every vulnerable public meeting spot and peppering the landscape with chemical and biological agent detectors. They can't simply say, "Yeah, it's an accepted risk, and we're not going to throw billions of dollars against protection schemes when we've been successful using intelligence and law enforcement to stop the incidents from happening."
It would be nice if they did that, but I'm not holding my breath. The Congress needs its security theater to show the public how responsive they are against imagined threats.
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