Green Lantern Theory

More than four years ago, Matt Yglesias proposed the Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics, which simply stated, notes that Very Serious People in the Beltway believe that any foreign policy challenge can be solved with the appropriate level of sustained willpower. Whoever blinks first, loses. Duncan Black notes that this attitude is still very much alive, at least with David Ignatius at the WaPo talking about Afghanistan.

Like any war, this one is ultimately about willpower, and America has an advantage in Petraeus, one of the strongest-willed people you could hope to meet.

This is the classic neo-con/idealist attitude, that moral strength and the will to use military force (despite all odds against you) will somehow result in foreign policy successes. In Ingatius's defense, Black didn't print the entire paragraph, the context of which redeems Ignatius as more of a realist than an idealist.

But this winner's psyche is not sufficient. History shows that three variables are crucial in countering an insurgency: a real process of reconciliation, no safe havens for the enemy and a competent host government. None are present in Afghanistan.

And then Ignatius goes on to offer a set of questions that Petraeus should be considering as he charges off to "complete the mission," however poorly its strategy is defined and however low the odds of success are. Ignatius (and others) have yet to come to grips with the point that Teh Surge didn't achieve strategic success in Iraq, and Teh Surge 2.0 isn't going to acheive strategic success in Afghanistan.

Comments

[Thomas]

A better "Green Lantern Theory" would be the establishment of an elite, career, military force with access to a lot of versatile resources and that is beholden to no particular nation that could be deployed at short notice to head off the worst of humankind's atrocities before they really get going.

But who am I kidding.

[Ray]

Any civilian populace doesn't understand military willpower as providing an acceptable peace. After all, they are not soldiers though some may be ex-military- but they, too are civilians once more. This Green Lantern, etc, is discussed as principle or proposition to be applied under all circumstances. But military knows that each region has it's own topography, and culture where those people inhabit.
Afghanistan hasn't a homogeneous population; it believes (in many cases, self-visually spiritually)and if it came to willpower as contest, it has many things to encourage defence and continuance of violence towards occupying forces: foreigners on their homeland, and of different cultures and religions and habits which are viewed as alien. The foreigners are automatically set apart and distant from a general benign cause that the Afghans might engage with, by the foreigners being rendered faceless in their wearing of uniforms and stating with aggression (for whatever cause)that the foreigners presence and violence is for the public good. On the other hand, the foreigners see themselves as simply doing a job which is not their homeland, and they have no intention of remaining longer than necessary. Someday they'll be gone. Willpower is only useful if you know your enemy's stamina and future prospects, and that they have less, in the long tem, willpower than yourselves.
This war has lasted years, and no end in sight. Willpower on both sides has already received a long trial. What do these writers mean by willpower anyway? Do they mean "Resolve"?
No war can be won which has permanent withdrawal of its troops on the agenda, without a stable regime and that with the (active)participation of a sizeable majority.
Afghanistan isn't democracy minded; not the Western brand, anyway.Therefore willpower has no central core.

[belphagor1527]

Well, this certainly isn't a Beltway phenomenon. VSP throughout history have felt that victory was essentially a conflict of willpower. See the work of Frau Riefenstahl for more.

[courtneyme109]

In future years, AFPAK will be a model of the subtle battles of cunning and influence projection between asymmetric foes that has already become the norm in 21st century conflict. The rules and lessons of these conflicts, like the unending Syrian, Iranian and Saudi influence battle in Lebanon are getting all internalized by the world’s only super power. Influence fighting.

In the forever war, winning is not losing. It’s realizing that a principal interest is at stake and that large amounts of resources must be sunk every year just to come out even.

A player in the forever war realizes that to invest in a conflict will only yield marginal yearly gains and losses, but it’s worth it because to not invest and leave entirely yields nothing.