Casual Fridays

Prof John Mueller of The Ohio State University has released this book "Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda," and it seemed like this was the right month to review it.  Two years ago,I reviewed Mueller's book "Overblown" - and if you've read it, then you have a good idea of what to expect in this book. There's no doubt for the need of a book like this one. When you get so many exaggerations about the threats of nuclear terrorism, it's good to have authors like Jenkins, Levi, and Mueller to step in and say, "whoa, slow down there. Let's look at this issue closer." However, Mueller's message may be lost in some of his own rather flamboyant statements.

Mueller addresses the issue of nuclear weapons and terrorism from a broad policy perspective, which is what I enjoyed most. Instead of focusing on boring details of the technical complexity of nuclear weapons or trying to engage the emotional aspect of the argument, he stays at the top level of trying to interpret why the government does what it does, and why people want the policy to move one way or the other. He divides his book into three parts: examining the impact of nuclear weapons over the last five decades, examining the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the success (or failure) of arms control actions, and reviewing the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist incident.

The first section largely contrasts the alarmist statements of scientists, politicians, and analysts regarding nuclear weapons against the actual (or perceived) role of strategic nuclear weapons during the twentieth century. If you read nonfiction books on nuclear weapons and related topics, you don't need to be reminded of how many times people have predicted that nuclear weapons would most certainly be used, especially in the 1960s and 1980s, just because (as Albert Einstein stated) "war is inevitable" so naturally, when the two superpowers clashed, the nukes would fly. And yet... they weren't. Mueller notes that the US possession of nuclear weapons certainly did not reduce the chance of warfare - leaders in North Korea, North Vietnam, and Iraq did not fold up merely because the United States was in a conflict with them.

At the same time, Mueller oversimplifies events during this time. He suggests that nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki were unnecessary events that didn't influence the Japanese to end the war. This argument has been recycled more times than necessary, but he gives it very short attention here. He goes into more depth in discussion on how the Soviet Union never wanted a fight during the Cold War, and so that yields the point that nuclear weapons were unnecessary in keeping the peace. One might disagree with that logic - while certainly the arms race got out of control and attitudes on both sides were a little too partisan, it's unfair to suggest that nuclear weapons weren't part of the equation. But he may be right to suggest that political rationale was primary to avoiding conflict rather than the existence of nuclear weapons. I do like his short discussion on defense expenditures during this period - he suggests that the nuclear buildup of the 1960s-1980s was largely fueled by exaggerations of the opposing military threat and a fixation on "worst-case fantasies." And we know that never happens today...

The proliferation section is equally provocative, as Mueller suggests that nonproliferation efforts, fueled by overly exaggerated claims by people like Graham Allison who like to warn about "nuclear weapons cascades" and such, are in fact not helpful and even contrary to their stated goals. He suggests that chemical and biological weapons were added to the term "weapons of mass destruction" not because of the potential impact of said weapons, but rather because "policy makers did not have enough to worry about at the time." I do agree with his observation that the term "WMD" is "often taken to be simply a dramatic synonym for nuclear weapons," but at the same time, I wasn't fond of his casual disregard for how the US government views/treats chemical and biological weapons.

He suggests that the correct policy approach to "rogue nations" developing nuclear weapons is to let them spend billions of dollars toward a weapon system that in actuality has very little influence on political decisions or military operations. That's all the less they spend on conventional weapons, after all - and having less conventional weapons, weapons that they might actually know how, and be able, to use is a good thing. He throws down a challenge to the nonproliferation crowd - identify one nation who might have developed and tested nuclear weapons if the CTBT or NPT didn't exist.  It's not that joining the NPT was the right thing to do for many nations, it just became a no-brainer not to join. He describes the Iraq invasion of 2003 as an "antiproliferation war," which is an interesting idea. In particular, he savages those liberals who suggested that it was okay to invade Iraq if it had WMDs or an active nuclear program. So in fact, the desire to stop "proliferation" led the Democrats to support an unwise military operation that will cost the United States tens of thousands of casualties and trillions of dollars.

The final part of the book on the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist incident will probably not surprise anyone who's read Levi or Jenkins. He scolds the 9/11 commission, various politicians, and the Graham-Talent comedy team who brought us "World at Risk" for deliberately over-hyping the threat and trying to scare the pants off us. Amusingly, he jabs at the G-T team's prediction that terrorists "somewhere in the world" will use a WMD, and because we've dumbed down the definition of WMD so well, any use of chlorine, ricin toxin, or high-yield explosive in any amount during the commission of a crime will fit the prediction. That doesn't mean a nuclear terrorist is out there. As for people who point to the 9/11 incident as if to say "you can't rule out anything," he suggests that the unsophisticated nature of the operation - low risk, using boxcutters and keeping the conspiracy small - was key to the success. The exact opposite would apply to a nuclear event - high risk, technologically demanding, and a large conspiracy would be necessary.

Again, Mueller is a little sloppy on some details. He claims that no state has ever given another state, let alone terrorist organizations, a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. And while I'm pretty sure that he's correct on the state-terrorist transfer concept, China did in fact sell or send chemical weapons (mustard projectiles) to Albania back in the days when Tito was not getting along with the Soviet Union. And I'd have to check my history to see if the Soviet Union ever forward-deployed chemical weapons in Warsaw Pact nations. But perhaps that's not the same. He takes a swing at Pete Zimmerman's and Jeffrey Lewis's article that one could build a nuke for $10 million, suggesting that the actual costs of the operation might be ten times that. It's argumentative.

All in all, this is an enjoyable book to read, because we do need a counter to all the alarmist claptrap about nuclear terrorism being "the gravest security threat to the United States." In viewing other reviews of Mueller's book, I believe I'm not alone in wishing that Mueller's evil twin would stop inserting loose facts and carelessly brushing off significant points in the discussion, especially when the facts don't support his thesis. But I have to agree with his final sentence in the book: "[W]ould-be atomic terrorists are exceedingly unlikely to be successful in such a quest, however intense the inspiration and encouragement they receive from the unintentional cheerleaders among their distant enemies."

Comments

[Maxtrue]

I haven't read the book so I won't comment on just your review, but you seem fair.

I wonder whether Meuller sees nuclear energy as insane. I believe I posted a US Intel report of 1946 discovered over at Pipes here some time back. I was surprised that back then there was excitement over thorium power. We have huge deposits (unlike Helium needed for nuclear detectors). Am I wrong that uranium power required for nuclear weapons sought by the DOD was the principle driver in dumping thorium power and going with a one-track approach despite our having technologically mastered the science of thorium reactors in the mid-seventies? Is it not true that perhaps the best thing we can do is push thorium right now while seeking to prohibit or contain uranium power which can meltdown, produce dangerous waste, use huge amounts of water to cool and make BOMBS?

I also wonder what Mueller thinks about the growing nexus of Syria, NK and Iran as well as their numerous efforts to obtain materials around the world. Mueller can't really think the reasoning ability of the Chinese or Russians matched the mentality we're facing now, does he? Pakistan is fairly unstable. Would he even suggest securing their weapons by force should radical Islamists topple the regime?

Our more immediate problem with Iranian nukes seems well beyond their deterrence capacity to curb retaliation for their mischief (see NK). Is the murky network of criminality and terror that materials can fall into of any oncern to Meuller? When these WMDs or sub-WMDs (dirty bombs etc) surface, how exactly does Mueller deal with the forensics as he (seems)leaving it to fate as to whether we get hit or not via proxies? Obviously, regimes won't directly strike against us, but unless we have some WMD Sherlock Homes on steroids, I question how good we'll be at pointing factual fingers and not just anger ones......

Sounds like Meuller is hedging his bets with the Don Corelone crowd.....though I don't see AQ or the Taliban BUILDING nukes anytime soon. I can't say how close they can come to securing a nuke or two. That's out of my league to say....

[Carl O.]

I wonder if Mueller has seen bertrand Russell's October 1946 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. You know, the one where he advocates pre-emptive nuclear war agianst the Soviet Union? When the Soviet Union got its own bomb, that's when Russell became a "peacenik," but he was always in favor of world government to be enforced by atomic bombs.