Spencer Ackerman is doing some light reading - Matt Gallagher's Iraq war memoir "Kaboom" - and relates this passage in the book. It's pretty amusing stuff - my emphasis added.
A major theme of the book is how field-grade officers are more often than not an obstacle to innovative and effective warfare. It’s something anyone who’s spent time with platoon leaders and company commanders over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan has heard very often: generals can get it or not get it; young officers can get it or not get it; majors and lieutenant colonels, particularly the staff officers… they’re just not going to get it. (Colonels are the wild card.) The oppressive and inescapable weight of Army bureaucracy is going to, as Robert Komer put it so well so long ago, do its thing, and that thing is to impose regularity — often for understandable reasons, if not always good or sensible ones — and lock into place the way Things Have Been Done. (It’s easy to overstate this, and to his credit, Gallagher, a thoughtful and self-critical writer, doesn’t.)
Ultimately Gallagher decides not to make the Army his career. But before he leaves, he offers this observation on page 272:
An unprecedented number of junior officers were leaving the army, despite all kinds of bonuses and perks being tossed our way, not to mention the tanking economy back home. It had a lot to do with the prospect of multiple deployments, certainly, but at least in my case, that wasn’t a deal breaker. The prospect of becoming a field-grade bureaucrat spouting thoughtless drivel to a new generation of junior officers was. I believed that many of the men at the top of the totem pole truly wanted the army to become a learning institution, but in my experience, the giant clog in the middle wouldn’t allow for it. An institution as large as the army didn’t change overnight, and the “that’s the way it was for me, so that’s the way it’ll be for them” mentality persisted.
Lots of caveats here: eventually all men become what they hate, and the next generation of junior officers stuck in horrific wars that don’t look like the ones we’ve fought will curse the counterinsurgent field-grade officers Who Want It Done Like It Was Done In Iraq and Afghanistan. And no one who’s ever spent time immersed in an institution is naive enough to think a true meritocracy will ever exist on Planet Earth. And I’ve met lots of field-grade officers at places like Ft. Leavenworth who eagerly embrace Gallagher’s critique — often because a couple years ago they were Gallagher. (Not that it’s relevant, but I have to link to this after writing that sentence.)
All I can add is, word. Been there, done that, got the t-shirt. I had a simpler explanation for this phenomena - when you're an LT or a captain, you're dumb enough to think that good intentions and initiative are enough to justify your actions, as long as you work with your NCOs. Since you're usually not working on anything really big, you can get away with that, even if you fail at a particular task. Majors and lieutenant colonels, on the other hand, are counting on getting to colonel or at least to retirement, so they're just a little more cautious - about everything. And that impedes things.
A good colonel will know whether or not he's going to be promoted further, and he/she will use their wisdom for good and to mentor the younger officers. Most of the time, they'll even stop thinking about their second career (after retirement) and do the Right Thing. They're funny like that. I suppose I'll have to check this book out, but I'm getting worn out on the Iraq memoir trail. Great stories, good tactical analyses, but they don't really contribute to the development of better operational concepts or strategy. Well, other than the repetitious cycle of everyone doing the same thing year after year without actually progressing.



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