Being All You Can Be - In the Army

Spencer Ackerman is doing some light reading - Matt Gallagher's Iraq war memoir "Kaboom" - and relates this passage in the book. It's pretty amusing stuff - my emphasis added. 

A major theme of the book is how field-grade officers are more often than not an obstacle to innovative and effective warfare. It’s something anyone who’s spent time with platoon leaders and company commanders over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan has heard very often: generals can get it or not get it; young officers can get it or not get it; majors and lieutenant colonels, particularly the staff officers… they’re just not going to get it. (Colonels are the wild card.) The oppressive and inescapable weight of Army bureaucracy is going to, as Robert Komer put it so well so long ago, do its thing, and that thing is to impose regularity — often for understandable reasons, if not always good or sensible ones — and lock into place the way Things Have Been Done. (It’s easy to overstate this, and to his credit, Gallagher, a thoughtful and self-critical writer, doesn’t.)

Ultimately Gallagher decides not to make the Army his career. But before he leaves, he offers this observation on page 272:

An unprecedented number of junior officers were leaving the army, despite all kinds of bonuses and perks being tossed our way, not to mention the tanking economy back home. It had a lot to do with the prospect of multiple deployments, certainly, but at least in my case, that wasn’t a deal breaker. The prospect of becoming a field-grade bureaucrat spouting thoughtless drivel to a new generation of junior officers was. I believed that many of the men at the top of the totem pole truly wanted the army to become a learning institution, but in my experience, the giant clog in the middle wouldn’t allow for it. An institution as large as the army didn’t change overnight, and the “that’s the way it was for me, so that’s the way it’ll be for them” mentality persisted.

Lots of caveats here: eventually all men become what they hate, and the next generation of junior officers stuck in horrific wars that don’t look like the ones we’ve fought will curse the counterinsurgent field-grade officers Who Want It Done Like It Was Done In Iraq and Afghanistan. And no one who’s ever spent time immersed in an institution is naive enough to think a true meritocracy will ever exist on Planet Earth. And I’ve met lots of field-grade officers at places like Ft. Leavenworth who eagerly embrace Gallagher’s critique — often because a couple years ago they were Gallagher. (Not that it’s relevant, but I have to link to this after writing that sentence.)

All I can add is, word. Been there, done that, got the t-shirt. I had a simpler explanation for this phenomena - when you're an LT or a captain, you're dumb enough to think that good intentions and initiative are enough to justify your actions, as long as you work with your NCOs. Since you're usually not working on anything really big, you can get away with that, even if you fail at a particular task. Majors and lieutenant colonels, on the other hand, are counting on getting to colonel or at least to retirement, so they're just a little more cautious - about everything. And that impedes things. 

A good colonel will know whether or not he's going to be promoted further, and he/she will use their wisdom for good and to mentor the younger officers. Most of the time, they'll even stop thinking about their second career (after retirement) and do the Right Thing. They're funny like that. I suppose I'll have to check this book out, but I'm getting worn out on the Iraq memoir trail. Great stories, good tactical analyses, but they don't really contribute to the development of better operational concepts or strategy. Well, other than the repetitious cycle of everyone doing the same thing year after year without actually progressing.

Comments

[Mark]

This is why the retirement system needs to be changed. If you spend 10 years or more in the military, you should get something for it. Even if it's only 2.5% per year you were in and not payible until you're 50 y/o. Have full retirement for those who do 25 years.

You would get more people staying in and you would get a lot fewer of the "don't hurt my chance at retirement" types. Or E-6s that spend all their time avoiding work and waiting for their 20 years to be up.

[Thomas]

This is hardly unique to the Army or to the DoD. Middle management is a shit hole, full of incompetents, careerists and burnouts in just about any organization of any size.

[Publius]

You're not going to do much about lieutenant colonels or the 05 rank in general. They are the fulcrum. They command battalions, squadrons And ships. They are the last level of command close to the troops. It's very sad to hear this.

Major, OTOH, is a shit rank. A probationer who's always an assistant or staffer of some kind. In my experience, this is where a good captain—and recall one's got to be a good captain to make major—goes south. This is where the pettiness and timidity come out.

Company command should be a major's billet. Given the decentralization of functions, the greater firepower available and the autonomy needed at the company level, a more seasoned officer is needed. That's where your major comes in. That's where he no longer has any excuses.

When I was on active duty, we used to joke about how promotion to 06 required a lobotomy. I'm not so sure most colonels are actually capable of honestly assessing their chances at stars. I think most of 'em always think they might make it. Talk to a retired 06. Amost without fail, they'll tell you, "well, I would have made general if I'd wanted to stay on active duty." Right.

One might also wonder just how much near-100% selection rates to 04 and 05 factor into the equation. ISTM there are a lot of folks on active duty at the field grade level that wouldn't have been there 20 years ago. Think about it. 100% percent to 04 means a third of the promoted cohort wouldn't have been there years ago. A guy who wouldn't even have made major if the the warm body factor weren't in play just might be strutting around with stars 10 years later.

So why are so many top notch company grades leaving, a factor that leads to virtually automatic promotion to field grade for any warm body? Well, duh.

Whenever I think of the many thousands of fine officers thrown out in the early 70s and 90s, I always think, "well, you go to war with the Army you have, not the one you'd like to have."

[LMutt]

I don't know if it's an Army-Navy difference, but I've met and worked with many a Navy captain who was well aware that he was in his final tour (which often meant a damn-the-consequences attitude toward daring changes), and those who seemed to think they were heading up almost always did. But maybe I've been lucky.