I haven't done an "educating the media" post for a while, and here's an opportunity to do so. Elaine Grossman at Global Security Newswire wrote a lengthy article titled "Pentagon Might Shift Command Responsibility for Combating WMD Spread" that features a few errors in interpretation. Elaine's a top-notch journalist, but I think her sources may have unintentionally mislead her, or perhaps she misinterpreted their information. If she would have contacted me, I could have set her straight, but... now I have to do a corrections page for the story.
In the first part of the article, she references the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and its few notes on countering (not combating) WMD capabilities. She equates a JFCOM assessment, which was directed by OSD to review the strategy by which the Department conducts its counter-WMD missions, with a line in the QDR directing the stand-up of a permanent Joint Task Force for WMD Elimination (JTF-E). These are two separate things. The JFCOM assessment is a very limited (nuclear only) and by some analysts at Norfolk to start the discussion on whether the 2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD and the 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD need to be adjusted (new administration decides that the previous administration's stuff is crap - I'm sure you've never seen that attitude displayed before).
The JTF-E is this idea that the US government is going to swoop into an adversarial country that is failing or has collapsed (or after a US preventive invasion, whatever) and grab all of its WMD personnel, equipment, materials, and documents. The 2006 QDR had a tasking to make the Army's 20th Support Command (CBRNE) into a JTF element. This was an attempt to do a JTF on the cheap, without actually investing in the people and infrastructure to create a JTF. Well, now they want a full-scale JTF that would be the headquarters element to plan and provide for the 20th SPT CMD and other defense agencies conducting a WMD elimination mission. Interesting that SecDef Gates says "well, that's just a QDR recommendation." No one wants to pay for the billets and the office space for a permanent capability that may be used just once (North Korea). Okay, maybe twice (Pakistan).
JFCOM is doing the C-WMD assessment and JFCOM is supporting the JTF-E concept, but they are two very different initiatives. That leads into the next point - who ought to be in charge? Let me drop down to the bottom half of the article where it discusses the DTRA STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (not Strategic Center, Elaine) and how Gen. Kevin Chilton, current commander, USSTRATCOM, has decided that counter-WMD is just not in his "must do" box. So in comes Dr. Jeffrey Lewis (the ArmsControlWonk) to suggest that "JFCOM or SOCOM would do equally well" as STRATCOM " given the type of operations we are imagining." He also suggests that "tailored regional counterproliferation initiatives " for the geographic commands is the way to go.
Two quick points - yes, tailored C-WMD initiatives is definitely the way to go, and they're already doing that. USSTRATCOM has, at the least, worked to ensure that the geographic commands do develop C-WMD plans that are appropriate to their own theaters and that are executable and in line with national strategy. They call this "synchronizing" the C-WMD operational plans. The idea is that, because the transportation of WMD materials and technology cut across geographic boundaries, you need a global approach to the problem. Second, JFCOM's not the answer, they focus on concepts and experimentation and force providing, they don't have the capability to do this. SOCOM's not the answer, they only care about countering terrorist ambitions regarding WMDs, not the much more dangerous national programs. The two commands were both considered and rejected by former SecDef Rumsfeld, when he decided that STRATCOM was the correct answer.
Now for some dart-throwing. In the article, a "senior military official" was quoted:
The senior military official last month noted that Washington has significantly bolstered the U.S. ability to withstand a WMD attack, which should decrease incentives for a terrorist to acquire a nuclear or biological device.
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To a terrorist, "the message is, 'You won't be successful, so why [bother]?'" the senior official said.At the same time, though, "we need to do more in the area of prevention," the official told GSN.
Wow, what blinding ignorance. This official obviously believes in the old deterrence theory that says, hey, if we have "passive defense" and "civil defense" type capabilities, then our adversaries will become discouraged that their CBRN attacks will have no impact. What a fallacy. First of all, let's be clear that our homeland defense capabilities regarding a CBRN incident are pretty damn limited. We can either get lucky and interdict the group before it releases an attack, or we can clean up afterward. In the latter case, it may be that first responders, aided by the military, can limit casualties, but the terrorists win even if they only release a few grams of material. It doesn't matter how many deaths they cause, the sheer media frenzy will guarantee success. And emphasizing nonproliferation is a great thing, but it doesn't improve the military's or the nation's protection when the attack goes down.
And then there's the arms control experts weighing in on the military's contribution to nonproliferation - they are skeptical.
Still, some experts question whether the U.S. military role in countering WMD proliferation should grow at all, when much trafficking in dangerous materials takes place in commercial shipping and is policed by civilian agencies.
"Getting the military more involved in blocking the bomb's further spread sounds great until you realize that most of the blocking we are talking about does not require or entail the use of military force," said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. "Instead, the key things needed are clear rules, sound intelligence, greater international cooperation, and generally quiet, effective civilian enforcement."
Lewis agreed.
I don't agree. First of all, how good is the State Dept at working these issues? How about that failure to commit to a verification regime for the BWC? Really not helpful. Second, the US military does have a deterrence role by holding an adversary's offensive WMD infrastructure at risk by conventional and unconventional attack. The US military owns most of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that would detect, monitor, and verify the presence of offensive WMD research, development, and testing. The "mil-to-mil" contacts in the geographic commands are often the primary conduits to developing other nation's capabilities to counter WMD and to reduce the threat of a nation's CBRN munitions (if they are present).
Now DOD is in the support of those "quiet, effective civilians" but let's not minimize the DOD role. DOD has more money and personnel to do the work where the civilians aren't doing enough. Both State and DOD could and should do more in nonproliferation, but it's currently hard to see any progress as long as this administration (like others) believes that a single strategy can both counter nation-state WMD programs and counter terrorist ambitions to obtain WMDs. Efforts to include "emerging infectious diseases" and other "emerging threats" into the threat picture only retards progress. And highlighting nuclear and biological terrorism as your top concerns (when it isn't clear that they have this capability) just results in wasting assets, but that's where the state of play is today.
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