Professionals Discuss Logistics

Over at MilPub, there's a great discussion ongoing about an article from the Naval War College Review, titled "Fundamentals of Strategy." It's not long, and it's got some excellent concepts, in particular the function of logistics as an element of strategy.

With the crucial proviso that strategy must always remain dominant—logistics exists to serve strategy, never the other way around—logistics analysis must always accompany the strategic imagination. Such analysis includes continually probing the boundary between what is logistically feasible and what is not, and other logistics ramifications of strategic objectives. Logistics analysis may at times advise changes of goals—because of logistics limitations on one’s own side or an adversary’s exploitable logistics weaknesses. It should also be borne in mind that logistics (from well functioning supply chains to the health of the population) is the engine of the better peace that is the ultimate aim of most wars—and that engine requires analysis, not just after the war but during it.
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Under twenty-first-century conditions this may be an exceptionally important principle, applicable to future uses of power by the United States. To anchor this problemin recent U.S.military experience in Iraq, consider a question posed by Secretary of Defense Robert M.Gates in his 29 September 2008 speech to aNational Defense University audience: “Why did we have to go outside the normal bureaucratic process to develop counter-IED [improvised explosive device] technologies, to build MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected vehicles], and to quickly expand our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability?”

The difficulty (and urgency) of controlling the logistics snowball naturally begets a further principle: especially given the ultrahigh dimensionality of modern logistics, dependence of strategy on logistics also gives ample room for updated and expanded versions of the old saying “He who controls the spare parts controls the operation.”

With the caveat that strategy must always remain dominant, enough has been said to suggest a further principle: At sufficiently high levels of command—and perhaps separately, at sufficiently deep levels of analysis—strategy and logistics tend to coalesce.

It's particularly interesting when applied to the situation in Afghanistan. Is logistics supporting strategy, or is strategy being driven by logistics? Or have they in fact coalesced into the beast that now will cost us $1 million/soldier in theater?  And if you have a little extra time this week, because it's so slow between Christmas and New Year's, go read this great account of the 1941 German invasion of Russia and the impact of logistics on that campaign. 

Hitler's East Front war was founded on three basic errors:

The strategic error that battlefield victory would always lead immediately to political success,

The economic error that the small, high-quality German force could defeat the large, poor quality Soviet force quickly enough to negate the Soviet advantage in economic depth, and

The political error that one's belief about another (in this case, that the Soviet system was fragile and would topple as the Polish and French had after battlefield disaster) trumped what the other believed about itself.

Kudos, FDChief!

Comments

[Ray]

J: do you think that MRAPS were mistakenly seen as a part of strategy?

[J.]

Yes, yes I do. I think that there was an emotional response to the increased casualties in Iraq to say, hey, let's stop/slow down/ignore the stated strategy of stabilizing Iraq and building up its security forces until we protect our forces better. And the only way that we (the American people as represented by Congress) will accept "better protection" is to get MRAPs into theater.

No one thought, hey, how long will it take to get these massive armored busses into theater, how much will it cost, can they be used anywhere other than Iraq, will they actually help us get the mission done quicker in Iraq? None of these questions mattered, and as a result, our strategy was crippled based on people fixating on body armor and MRAPs instead of trying to understand why conventional warfare tactics were not working in stability operations (and similarly, why COIN tactics were not working with the lack of civil/political involvement).

[FDChief]

And I think you point out the fragility of our COIN "strategy" - that the satraps at DA and DoD realized that it would founder if it was too casualty-intensive. The MRAPs were critical because what was and is important to the public and selling this to the public is the low cost in casualties. Dollars, strategies? Who gives a rip - you can't explain those in a 30-second sound bite on FOX News. But force protection? Crucial. So rather than develope a genuine strategy, we push ahead with out road-bound, driven-from-above tactics and put the MRAP band-aid on the tumor rather than try to figure out why the maneuver forces are getting mined and booby-trapped to hell as the diddy-bop along the goddam roads like my old platoon daddy told me he'd cock-punch me if he ever caught me doing it (sorry, but that's how he trained me...)

A perfect storm of lack-of-strategic-thought-combined-with-confusing-tactics-as-strategy-and-tooling-tactics-to-tools-rather-than-the-other-way-around,

[FDChief]

And ta, for the blogroll - researching Hitler's massive miscalculation of the economic strength needed to hustle the East made me appreciate how being the masters of the battlefield can blind you to the larger economic and political pitfalls.

[a weary warrior/loggie]

Neither strategy nor logistics will prevail in Afghanistan. We should do early what we have done after every war we've lost since WW2. Just take everyone in country who supported the USA and move them to somewhere in America. Preferably not Northern VA as we are knee deep in Vietnamese, El Salvadorans, and Guatamaleans. Believe me, it will be cheaper in the long run.

[Ray]

There has been tremendous public pressure on the UK government in the logistical areas, following injuries and deaths of soldiers which have said to occurred because of, for example, lack of helicopters in the field.
I just wondered how much public opinion can have on strategy (one way or the other) and how much commanders have had to alter plans to accommodate that public pressure.