Winning Afghanistan - Just Like Winning Vietnam

Rob Farley points to a Small Wars Journal article by COL Gian Gentile, where he proposes a "better understanding of the Vietnam War." Gentile is concerned that the COINdanistas are using the Vietnam conflict as an excuse to say "if they let us fight the way we want, then we would have won." Says Gentile:

The United States lost the war in Vietnam not because it didn’t get Coin, or screwed up at the tactical level of war, but because it failed at Strategy.  As the Chinese philosopher of War Sun Tzu most eloquently stated a long time ago but still rings true today; “strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory,” but “tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”  In Vietnam because the United States failed at strategy and because the Vietnamese communist enemy wanted victory more, there was nothing but noise.  It is within that greater context of Sun Tzu’s noise that these flawed histories of Vietnam (for example Sorley’s A Better War; Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam; and Nagl’s, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife) operate and flourish. 

Rob suggests that General Petraeus would have never succeeded in pushing COIN during Vietnam because the strategy as well as the tactics were faulty, and that the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union precluded any discussion of diminishing the military's conventional power. It's a pretty good theory. 

Of additional interest is Rob's suggestion that General Petraeus's obsessive physical fitness behavior is deliberately at such a high level because he had to convince the promotion boards that his egg-headed behavior shouldn't be used to hold him back from promotion from field grade to general officer. I think he's right on target with that, too. Throw General McChrystal into that mix as well. 

Comments

[Andy]

You know, sometimes people just like to PT.

[J.]

Come on, Andy. I didn't want to draw out a point, but the Army - and in particular, the infantry - have always had an emphasis on "the old man leading the PT run." If you're military, then you know that the official photo counts just as much at promotion time as what you've actually done in the ORB. You have to look fit and you have to be able to keep up with the young 'uns to be A Leader. "FOLLOW ME - I AM THE INFANTRY" and all that jazz.

Readin' and writin' is not encouraged, it shows independence within an organization that stresses conformity and supporting your boss. Actual job performance isn't as important, as long as you check the "joint" box, get the company and battalion commands, get your wings/Ranger tab, and don't lose any major weapon systems in the field. I don't begrudge this fact, I just acknowledge that it exists.

[Andy]

I agree with you about some of the insanity of the personnel system.

However, my point was to question the implication that Gen. Petraeus became a PT freak in order to get promoted. How can anyone say with any certainty that is the case, particularly since he's still a PT freak even with 4 stars. Point being that his PT freakiness is probably not because of the promotion system.

[J.]

Ah, I take your point. I misread Rob's mention of Tom Rick's statement re: Petraeus.

[Armywonk]

You also have to consider that Petraeus has had two serious injuries (shot in the chest on the range and broken hip from parachute jump) that probably contributes to his desire to stay in shape

[Publius]

I don't think Petraeus's love of PT had anything to do with his promotions. During my career, the scores, etc., were meaningless; all that mattered was that one passed. And if Petraeus wants to break his feet down, I say go for it. I doubt he'll have to carry a heavy ruck for any distances any more. What I don't like—and what a promotion board should have, but wouldn't have, held against him—is the sick shit about testing others in the morning run.

Yeah, it is sick. It's funny how much one learns in the years following military retirement. I was somewhat fortunate in that I spent most of my time in MI branch, and in CI and Humint there, but even in a branch that's supposed to actually think, I was often struck by the anti-intellectual high-school locker room atmosphere that was sometimes all too prevalent.

Fair? Perhaps not. No military officer is stupid. But they sometimes sure seem to be trying to convince folks of their shallowness. Petraeus and some of the other generals should grow up. Maybe if they'd been in combat when they were younger...

[USAFREOD]

Publius makes a valid comment on the disturbing trend in "anti-intellectualism" that continues to flourish in the Officer Corps. Promotions appear to be based upon who can more colorfully fill the squares. I would submit that it is not limited to the Army. The Air Force started down the path to "anti-enlightenment" with the death of the Cold War, and the loss of SAC. There was a day when the CoS came from SAC, and the first letter was STRATEGIC... Good ole' Curt LeMay knew what he was doing. Look at the insane focus on tactical air power over strategic "revolutions in military affairs" that UAVs represent and mainline AF leadership resisted for years until OIF/OEF. After almost 10 years it appears they are changing direction out of necessity, not forethought (and a good kick in the pants from SECDEF!) Too bad it will make it harder to justify additional GO billets for the "universal management badge" crowd (the rated fighter mafia...)

Back to the topic; Summer's book, On Strategy used to be required PME reading back in the day. The title says it all. He pointed exactly to the issues of tactics over strategy in Vietnam.

Not to bring up politics, but as the electorate has been reduced to sheeple, the Officer Corps has tended to follow. "Disagreement = Disloyalty." Lemmings leading lemmings. Being a "leader" used to mean making unpopular statements and decisions, and sometimes 'falling on your sword' as a matter of duty to the country. As on old Chief (AF E9) lectured me as a shiny new 2Lt, "LT, you get your lovin' at home!"

[AB]

It's now conventional wisdom in Washington that Viet Nam was "won" by 1972 and that only the treasonous Democrats in Congress kept us from savoring the victory. Like all conservative bullshit, this fantasy evaporates on close examination. But its combination of counterintuitiveness, hatred of liberals and hippies, and telling the officer corps what it wants to hear makes it completely irresistible to the establishment Washington press corps.

[Carl O.]

Of course, the fathre of the books you list is William Colby's Lost Victory. However, the most interesting thing he reports on in there is ane arly '60's CIA assessment that concluded that if the US pulled out then (as Kennedy wanted to do in 1963) the Saigon would collapse by 1965 and the war would be over. Had we accepted that wisdom then, a couple of million people would not have died needlessly.