COIN v. CONV - A Significant Difference

I don't usually comment on a blog post that comments on another blog post, but I believe Matt Yglesias hits on an important issue in his observations on Andrew Exum's interview with Washington Post reporter and author Greg Jaffe.

Greg Jaffe, speaking to Andrew Exum, says “This whole conventional vs. irregular debate is stupid.”

War is war. And we waste far too much energy trying to categorize it. I think most lieutenants, captains and majors are beyond this false conventional vs. irregular frame that we try to impose on war. I wish I could say the same for the more senior people in the Pentagon.

I think there’s a lot of truth to that. At the same time, just because things look one way to “lieutenants, captains and majors” and another way to “senior people in the Pentagon” doesn’t mean we should take a dismissive view of the senior people’s outlook in a rush to celebrate the insights of the practical warfighter.
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And when you get down to the guts of defense budget politics, these high-level strategic concepts matter a great deal. Nobody, of course, is going to say that the U.S. should somehow completely abandon its ability to fight conventional wars. But the choice between a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to scare China & Russia” or a mindset that says “the main purpose of the military is to intervene effectively in third world backwaters” has very real implications for what kind of hardware purchases look cost effective.

There is no doubt in my mind that the issue of "hardware purchases" looms very large in the minds of senior military and civilian decision makers. Conventional warfare means lots of tanks, armored vehicles, stealthy jets, next generation bombers, submarines, destroyers, and aircraft carriers. And let's not even get into the care and feeding of that massive military machine. Counterinsurgency operations, or COIN, is completely the opposite, with a focus on maintaining security and diminishing the insurgent grasp on the population without destroying real estate. Also a no-brainer that the DOD budget is already too bloated, and that in managing two wars, protecting the homeland, and trying to modernize its equipment, there's going to be some in-fighting.

But more importantly, the issue is also in the theory and execution of national strategy. The basic idea of military doctrine is that small military units execute tactics on the ground that must support the overall plan of operations within a theater. The theater commander needs to ensure that he has adequate numbers of personnel, that operations continue toward a particular set of goals, and that the logistics support those operations - and his operations must support the overall national strategy for that region. If your tactics and operations don't align against the strategic goals and expected outcome, then you're doing something wrong - even if you're General McChrystal.

Now under the Bush administration, strategic goals and outcomes changed every Friedman unit (six months), which made it difficult to effectively plan operations or execute tactics. But one thing that was certainly clear was that conventional tactics that destroyed the Taliban in 2002 and that took the Iraqi army out in 2003 didn't support the post-conflict goals. You can't prosecute military operations with a conventional frame of mind when what one really needs is an approach to irregular warfare. That's why we failed in Lebanon in 1983. 

Greg Jaffe is a good journalist, and I look forward to reading his book. On the other hand, making a statement like "War is war. And we waste far too much energy trying to categorize it" is a remarkably stupid statement. Nuclear war is not the same as conventional war. Conventional war is not the same as irregular war. Our military needs to be able to operate across a range of different operations, and needs to be equipped properly to execute its operations quickly and efficiently. But what we really need is national leadership that understands the nature of war, that knows how to develop a strategy that is executable, and that knows when it's time to go. From Sun Tzu:

All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

Thus ends the lesson.

Comments

[YT]

J:

Just outta curiosity, dude. What translation are you readin' from?

[J.]

I am embarrassed to say that I cheated and took these quotes from BrainyQuotes.

[tammy swofford]

"The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools."

Thucydides

I cannot emphasize enough the need for greater investment in the IB (Intellectual Battlespace). Our lack of understanding of the Arab street continues to plague us. Beyond that, observation and interaction involve two separate dynamics. Observational skills work in the laboratory. Interaction skills, work in theater.

*Great piece, J.

Tammy Swofford

[J.]

Nice quote, Tammy. I'm going to save that one.

[NVH]

I think all of this is just sitting here waiting to be taken hold of though J. With Bush it was an execution thing, they knew they had to do it, didn't plan well for it and screwed up the execution when Bush decided to transition after mission accomplished. I think the conventional ops and tactics would work if you could just manage the transitions. While Thucydides quote applies, I think we've got the warrior scholars right in front of us, the problem is they've quite fighting and gone to the thinktanks. And we've got plenty of smart people who can't think about war the right way to make their 90lb brain bombs fit the paradigm.

[zenpundit]

"Greg Jaffe is a good journalist, and I look forward to reading his book. On the other hand, making a statement like "War is war. And we waste far too much energy trying to categorize it" is a remarkably stupid statement."

Amen. Sort a knee-jerk autopilot Clausewitzianism. Or maybe an autistic Clausewitzianism. Regardless, it represents an impatience with complexity and a desire to say one size fits all.

[YT]

Tammy: Good luck with "Intellectual Battlespace". What lil' I know 'bout armed forces personnel (at least in the continental U.S.) is that most of 'em don't like readin'. At least articles on the psyche of other cultures.

J.: No worries, dude. I'm not done readin' Vom Kriege either. I do cut-&-paste as well (unwisely). I do recommend you read 'em 13 chapters though. :)

Zen: "knee-jerk autopilot Clausewitzian" sounds like some form of intellectual premature ejaculation. Then again, maybe that's what most journalists are good at.

[Ray]

But underlying it all is President Obama's strategy for buying time?
See www.stratfor.com

[NVH]

Nice link Ray, very thought provoking

[tammy swofford]

YT,

I believe I "coined" (play on words here...) the term Intellectual Battlespace several years ago and have been an active voice for an IB military unit, beyond the research lab, military intel and other outstanding units already functioning within our military institutions. Although now in the IRR with the (dreaded) secondary need to churn out correspondence courses, I love my Navy and USMC. Tactical poetics are still lacking, and that is my current area of personal research.

You speak of a "premature ejaculation" and I had to smile. When discussing the IB with a fellow analyst he commented, "Scholars having wet dreams about fighting over books." Yep. May they have a few more whilst being properly funded. Arabic, Persian and Urdu literature is now found on ample scale (with translation) on the internet, including things culled from manuscripts.

Our troops: Within my Det, prior to moving into Iraq there was an interesting dynamic. There was intense interest in service abroad but negligible interest in cultural intelligence. Sad.

This problem was also noted on entrance to Vietnam and programs were set in motion to educate our troops on basic customs, traditions of the Vietnamese.

As far as "warrior scholars", a few within this class remain from a different strategic era, that of the 20th century. Flexibility and transitional thought may prove difficult for some. But thought precedes action. May we act on our best thoughts.

Tammy

[YT]

Tammy,

thanks for replyin'. Must be great servin' in the USNR (least you've got somethin' to look forward to other than your paycheck).

Re: "Flexibility and transitional thought may prove difficult for some."

I think it was Machiavelli who said the followin': "It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."

Habits & thinkin' processes which are almost second nature are indeed difficult to overcome. Much less tryin' to introduce new paradigms.

"Scholars having wet dreams about fighting over books." LOL! Good thing I'm not exactly an academic. I pity those dudes livin' in their iv(or)y towers. :)

May you have a blessed week.

YT

[tammy swofford]

Thank you.

I see our fearless leader has again posted more than I can manage to read. Does he ever sleep?!

Tammy

[YT]

Tammy,

Maybe he's got a ninja with special powers. They're believed to "split into multiple bodies. The "real" him can rest while his manifestations do all the work.

YT

[J.]

Behold, as a wild ass in the desert, go I forth to my work.