The
New York Times discusses the strategy talks within the White House, as continued debate swirls around the McChrystal strategy paper. I haven't really discussed the strategy paper because so many other people have, but I pretty much share
Marc Lynch's point of view.
I must confess to finding the entire exercise baffling. The "strategic review" brought together a dozen smart (mostly) think-tankers with little expertise in Afghanistan but a general track record of supporting calls for more troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy. They set up shop in Afghanistan for a month working in close coordination with Gen. McChrystal, and emerged with a well-written, closely argued warning that the situation is dire and a call for more troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy. Shocking. Were it not for the optics of a leaked "strategic review" amidst an intensifying public debate, I doubt this would dominate the front pages.
What are we to make of this document? Suppose that this had instead been called a "think tank report of reports," or a "collective think tank report" or something like that. Its participants were mostly smart, honest, experienced security analysts (including several much-respected friends including Exum and Biddle) who clearly worked hard, surely have something to contribute despite the absence of Afghan or South Asian expertise, and whose final project would have been an important contribution under any name. In Iraq, the military regularly invited selected think-tankers to come to Baghdad for high-level briefings and carefully guided tours, which then led to op-eds and reports which either reflected or drove policy changes (as you like). This one sounds a lot like one of those on steroids. A great "red team" exercise, a good exercise in building elite foreign policy community support -- but a decisive "strategic review" under the name of the commanding General?
Then I saw this paragraph in the Times article:
Among the alternatives being presented to Mr. Obama is Mr. Biden’s suggestion to revamp the strategy altogether. Instead of increasing troops, officials said, Mr. Biden proposed scaling back the overall American military presence. Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics.
The Americans would accelerate training of Afghan forces and provide support as they took the lead against the Taliban. But the emphasis would shift to Pakistan. Mr. Biden has often said that the United States spends something like $30 in Afghanistan for every $1 in Pakistan, even though in his view the main threat to American national security interests is in Pakistan.
Mr. Obama rejected Mr. Biden’s approach in March, and it is not clear that it has more traction this time. But the fact that it is on the table again speaks to the breadth of the administration’s review and the evolving views inside the White House of what has worked in the region and what has not. In recent days, officials have expressed satisfaction with the results of their cooperation with Pakistan in hunting down Qaeda figures in the unforgiving border lands.
Now before you reject Biden's idea as not feasible, think about it. The original strategy was to GET al Qaeda, not create Afghanistan into a Garden of Eden. The COIN strategy hasn't worked in Afghanistan, because you can't succeed in COIN operations with a corrupt, weak government, an ineffective security force, and a population who doesn't support it. So instead of trying to prop Afghanistan up with increases of US troops - as LBJ tried to do for Vietnam in 1965 - why not stick to the original script?
I'm in the last ten pages of "Best and Brightest," and I was really struck by something in particular - that LBJ knew that if he significantly increased the number of US troops, changing the mission from just advising the Vietnam troops to conducting combat missions, that this meant a new policy was in play. He deliberately changed the policy from COIN to "search and destroy," which meant the war was changing from a civil war to an American war. But he refused to tell the public, he refused to consider the implications of not fully resourcing the new strategy, and he had forgotten that the North Vietnamese had a vote.
Let's bring the lesson to the future. If McChrystal gets his troop increases and continues to engage the Taliban in Afghanistan as the primary mission - protecting the civilians and all - then he's not doing COIN. Doing COIN implies that the Afghani government is in charge of security, that its forces are doing the heavy lifting, and we're just supporting. That's not what's happening. So if Obama listens to Biden, we get to continue working COIN with Afghanistan and push CT in Pakistan - which when you think about it, is what we are supposed to be doing. We don't need the troop increases, but if you want to support the argument that failing to increase troops in Afghanistan will mean "more Americans will be put at risk" - Republican politicians - then just increase the authorization to 500,000 troops now, because the incrementalist approach is just insanely stupid and repetitious of the logic used in 1965 that lost the war.
I thought maybe I was off-base in believing that Biden had a good plan, but when Col. Pat Lang endorses the plan, then I think maybe Biden is onto something. There are right-wing rumors of McChrystal threatening to resign if he doesn't get his troop increases. I think that's bullshit, honestly - we don't have generals like that today (because if we did, they would have resigned between 2004-2008) - but really, if that's the case, let him walk. We need generals who will carry out national strategy with well-thought out political goals, not an endless chant of "more troops" to boister failing governments. We don't need to repeat 1965 again. We know where that leads.
UPDATE: McChrystal says he has not discussed or considered resigning his command.
Recent Comments