Biosecurity - Who Gets the Hot Potato?

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released a report titled "High-Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is Needed," discussing the growing concern over the growth of bio research labs and parallel lack of oversight of said labs. Given that we have the story of Bruce Ivins, government bioresearcher turned terrorist, in our recent past, there's a good chance that this concern is justified.

 The National Security Advisor, in consultation with the Secretaries of Health and Human Services (HHS), Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), and Homeland Security (DHS); the National Intelligence Council; and other executive departments, should, as deemed appropriate, identify a single entity charged with periodic governmentwide strategic evaluation of high-containment laboratories that will (1) determine (a) the number, location, and mission of the laboratories needed to effectively meet national goals to counter biothreats; (b) the existing capacity within the United States; (c) the aggregate risks associated with the laboratories' expansion; and (d) the type of oversight needed and (2) develop, in consultation with the scientific community, national standards for the design, construction, commissioning, and operation of high-containment laboratories, specifically including provisions for long-term maintenance.

When the GAO releases a report, usually one sees a congressional meeting next, and this one was held by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. It included testimony from Jean Reed, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical-Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization (DATSD[CBD/CD]). He's in favor of having the NSC to work out this issue among the various government agencies conducting or sponsoring biodefense research within the United States. He doesn't suggest using the DOD's biological research regulations as the standard, since the DOD has this practice of being overly cautious in its safety procedures associated with working with and/or handling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Another witness to the meeting, Michael Greenberger, a professor who works for a homeland security academic center, thinks the Department of Health and Human Services should just take over now and start working on the subject. I understand his point of view - certainly HHS is the right government agency to be in the lead, but because there are other executive departments involved, it ought to be a "whole of government" approach in developing solutions to this problem. That means leadership from the NSC - if they're not too busy with other competing issues (which has caused them to ignore WMD-related issues in the past).

Anyway, check out the report and the testimony. It's interesting stuff and remains an important issue to be addressed, sooner rather than later.