I have been watching the various discussions taking place in reference to the McChrystal strategy advisors, and have come to the conclusion that these advisors aren’t really offering anything new or helpful. Fabius Maximus has a good run-down on the participants in this strategy council (and oh my GODS did we really need Fred and Kim Kagan there? where’s Bacevich? where's Kilcullen?), and I agree with many of his points. My immediate impression on the advisors (more on that in a moment) is that they are all focused on operational strategy, and are assuming that the Bush administration's strategic objective to provide the Afghani government security while it considers joining the 21st century – regardless of the cost or time required – is still a plausible one.
As usual, COL (ret) Pat Lang hits it on the head:
Yesterday, I watched file footage of General McChrystal at his confirmation hearing. In it he clearly said that he intended to wage a “comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign.” (paraphrasing). … Implicit in his stated intention is the task of creating a new and grand Afghanistan that will be a stout hearted ally of the United States in our quest to make the world an unsafe place for takfiri jihadi folk.
As I have said before, this is an enormous task, an enormously expensive task that will take a long time. The American people will grow weary of the whole thing before transformation of Afghanistan is achieved. They will demand an end in one way or another and we will then leave.
General McChrystal’s “strategy review” is an interesting thing. Since McChrystal already knew what he intended to do before he left for overseas to take command, what are the conferees strategizing about? I suppose that it must be “the plan,” in other words, how much to ask for and how fast. McChrystal evidently assembled a group of COIN enthusiasts and a few strategery groupies from the think tanks to help him think this through. They have decided that all out COIN (nation building) is the answer. Surprise!!! He is going to ask for more troops? Of course he is. What else could he possibly do, given his intentions?
So is this “review” just an attempt to get buy-in from the Beltway pundits and elites a la Petraeus (as Laura Rozen suggests)? It sure looks like it, and that’s just an incredibly depressing thing to have to admit. The Obama administration has made no declaration of grand strategy that ought to be driving our military operations in Afghanistan (well, at the least, it’s made the political decision to set a hard deadline in Iraq – kinda sorta). We ought not forget the primary role of politicians – to provide the guidelines for developing military strategy in addition to coordinating other elements of national power. That is Clausewitz 101, people. That aspect is still absent from the US government's plans for Afghanistan, notably in Congress, where we now hear cries for another “surge” – like the one that was so unsuccessful in Iraq (note, the “surge” helped protect US forces, not achieve military success there).
Does no one remember Kilcullen's “The Accidental Guerrilla”? “The local fighter is therefore often an accidental guerilla – fighting us because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade ours.” So in the pursuit of addressing the challenge of Afghanistan, our military commanders, Congress, and elite think tankersall agree that we need to increase – perhaps double – the size of US forces in Afghanistan. Brilliant. Really, just spot on. One would desperately hope that the National Security Council isn’t as short-sighted as these people. Steven Biddle and Tony Cordesman clearly see the strategic challenges but they haven’t figured out how to tell (or he doesn’t want to tell) the powers-that-be that they’re not going to get to that desired end-state.
The only thing I can think of to explain Biddle’s and Cordesman’s lines of thought is that 1) they were told that the strategic objectives haven’t changed – that is, to secure Afghanistan from Taliban influence and establish its government as a strong, independent force (as far-fetched as those objectives are) and 2) overall war costs and public perception are not factors. Based on that, the two advisors’ opinions become almost – but not quite – defendable, turning the discussion into a calculus of sorts, where you just have to figure out the right number of troops to overwhelm the adversaries. As for Mr. Exum, whose blog I admire and whose ascension must be envied, I think this clearly shows his inexperience in addressing strategic aspects of military conflict.
What’s the way out of this box? You can play with all the COIN strategies you want, but the cost and time required to fix Afghanistan are going to be enormous, if you want to go that way. Will the US government be able to turn around this corrupt and inefficient Afghani government? Will the Afghani Army and police forces be able to stand up against the overwhelming drug industry with their low pay and poor leaders? Is Afghanistan worth the effort, given that al Qaeda has already left and is very happy in neighboring Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other parts of the world? If we can’t answer “yes” to any of these questions, then we seriously need to tell McChrystal and his band of merry advisors to get the hell out of this business.
We're not going to fix Afghanistan by military means until Pakistan decides it's in its interest to be a good neighbor, the Afghani drug culture is under control, the Afghani government decides to go straight, and some semblence of local government with honest police forces takes shape. Until then, our best strategy is to go with regional stability - address the diplomatic challenges of the Southwest Asia and try to contain the factional violence, gun-smuggling, and terrorist-narco gang connections in that region. Adding more troops and/or "staying the course" - not the answer.
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