Show-offs...

The British army commandos think that they're such bad-asses. Given a task to get some artillery support, they haul up a 105-mm howitzer up a steep mountain. And then they haul up all the ammunition by hand. What show-offs...

The 105mm gun was dismantled and rebuilt at the summit of a rocky outcrop, known as the Roshan Tower, using techniques traditionally demonstrated at the Royal Tournament. Gunners from 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, normally based in Plymouth, faced a logistical challenge because the cliff face was riddled with deep cracks that threatened to crumble under the weight of the gun.

Major James Vigne, commander of 8 (Alma) Commando Battery, said: “The ammunition boxes, each weighing nearly 100lb and containing high explosive shells, also had to be manhandled up the 400-metre track which couldn’t take vehicles.

“The move was done at night to keep the gun secret from the enemy, with Gurkhas providing close protection on the hills and cliffs around. Once in place, the gun was camouflaged to prevent the enemy realising the new threat to them.”

Actually, that's pretty damn amazing, but next time? I suggest the 120-mm mortar. Much easier to move and support, and still pretty good range.

UPDATE: Kotare pours cold water on the "Gun of Doom" story.

Comments

[Ray]

Field Gun Drill at the Royal Tournament was carried out by the Royal Navy crews. This was an extremely tough process. Few out of the hundreds that applied made it to the display teams; it was basically a competition between ports (Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham ). The obrect was to carry dismantled field guns over obstacles, reassemble the guns after passing through these and firing the gun before the other team. My brother was in the Portsmouth team.
Historically, The RN ran many miles over very rough terrain rough terrain with a field gun and relieved the Siege of Mafeking. something the Army would rather forget... Show offs ? Yeah pride it to the top, brother.

R.

[Ray]

Also, the Navy Brigade (as it was then known) were prominent at Siege of Ladysmith- don't want to rub it in, though...
R.

[Sven Ortmann]

"The gun, which was installed in mid-January and is capable of firing 35lb shells, is so accurate that it can engage and hit a target 1.8 miles away within five seconds.

“The Dragon is the most feared weapon in our area by the Taliban - they are genuinely frightened by it,” added Vigne. “The Gurkhas operating from Musa Qala have been astonished by its speed, pinpoint accuracy and power.” "

You cannot do this as well with a 120mm mortar. The muzzle velocity is too low and direct aiming is more difficult to to the angle of descent.

I saw the story first on a German blog, and that blogger focused on the effect of the gun in that area. All English-language blogs with this story seem to focus on the hauling instead.

[J.]

Not suggesting that the 120-mm mortar would be a direct replacement for the 105 in terms of hitting power and awesomeness, only that it would be easier and more practical to implement. During WW1, the Army Chemical Warfare Service man-handled the 4.2" (107mm) mortar around the trenches and hand-carried HE and WP rounds to the weapon sites. During WW2, they advanced to jeeps and donkeys during the Anzio campaign, where the Chemical Corps provided chemical mortar battalions to the US troops in Italy as hip-pocket field artillery. Worked very well in the mountainous terrain. Same for Korean Conflict, where the 2d Chem BN provided counterfire to Chinese 120mm mortars.

[Nick (atacms)]

Sven, interesting comment, but I guess English speaking blogs are focusing on the hauling because it seems like the more interesting headline. Also I'd have to agree because to use a weapon in a normal fashion just makes tactical sense, however to deploy it in an "unconventional" or highly unexpected fashion is maneuver warfare at its best.

[FDChief]

Makes no sense.

First of all, a single piece of artillery is like a one-rifleman squad. What's the point? Are they "sniping" with a 105? What does this cannon gain from it's gee-whiz location, other than celebrity? For one thing, the angle of site calculation must be truly vicious, and the peculiar met effects from this rock knob or pinnacle less than desirable. The notion that a single artillery piece "scares" the Talibs, well, let's just say that the only person saying that is the battery commander. Duh. Of COURSE he'd say that. Otherwise his battalion commander would be asking what the hell he's playing at immobilizing one of his cannons on a logistical nightmare of a militarily useless piece of high ground.

Second, one main point of "field" artillery - the thing that separated us from coastal and fortress artillery back when those still existed - is mobility. Why turn this thing into a Fort Douaumont now? They can't get the same effects by just hauling a gun section around to shoot at the bad guys?

Third, not since Napoleon's day have we redlegs forgotten that defilade is our friend. Nobody likes picking off gunners like the infantrymen we so enjoy shredding. Put me up on a high place where everybody and his muj can snipe me?

Nuh uh.

Frankly, this seems like a) a cute stunt for the press, b) something that a battalion staff officer things will impress the dumbass wogs, and c) the sort of things guys in quiet sectors do because they're bored off their ass.

From an FA perspective, this firing position is mediocre at best and outright tactically stupid at worst.

[Ray]

Thing is- did it do well?
R.

[FDChief]

"The gun, which was installed in mid-January and is capable of firing 35lb shells, is so accurate that it can engage and hit a target 1.8 miles away within five seconds."

Thing is, this is only about 3,000 meters. 3,000 meters is practically a Charge 0 for a M119A1. A mortar section - not as accurate, true - could plaster the hell out of a target at 3,000 meters. Don't see why you couldn't do this with a mortar, and you'd sure reduce the logistical tail.

Sniping with 105 is, as the Brits would say, "breaking windows with guineas".

[Ray]

Not a good idea to use a steamroller to crack a nut, but on the whole, it was a one-off good deal.
Has wider implications.
Showed the men that they could do things against the envelope- the commando's job.The project had it's faults, but had experiential training advantages too. Teamwork in unusual circumstances was one of these. Some of those men may themselves be instructors one day. Not a bad thing for them to remember a practical lesson, like theirs.
Not often good policy to stray from the book, but you never know for sure that some day your men may have to do something that isn't in it.

Hope they brought it down (just kidding).Almost as difficult (perhaps more) as taking it up.
Got to be fit for that. Some of you ex military fellows may remember how fit you were then... Ah, well; good armchair, though.

R.

[FDChief]

No argument that this was fun training.

But.

If you're trying to sell me "Afghanistan is a real, super-duper, important war and I need to give you my tax dollars to throw more troops into it", this doesn't impress me. Like I said above, it stinks of a PAO press gimmick and makes me think that the squaddies are hurting for work. Busy redlegs shooting fire missions don't have the time to fiddlefuck with stuff like this...it makes me think of busy staff weenies desperately searching for missions to justify their budget for the next FY.

Good training? Sure. But these guys aren't SUPPOSED to be training, they're supposedly caught up in a desperate death-struggle with the Talibs. This stunt, when you think about it, seems to argue the opposite.

[Ray]

Good morning, FD Chief.
I don't think that any war is good, super-dooper or not. I've experienced it in childhood, and as an adult. I have lost friends and enemies.
Like you perhaps, I have seen dead bodies, and injuries, and been in combat, but I'm not a dyed-in-the-wool pacifist however.

It isn't a good way to spend taxpayers money, but, arms dealing aside, that's sometimes unavoidable.
I think you are wrong to suggest that troops in pauses between combat can't use that time for battle-readiness. Training, in it's advanced state, should always continue. Morale sometimes needs a stunt to keep it up and running, and to instil the sense that the men can feel superior.They should never feel that they are machines.
As for a Public Relations gimmick, it didn't get a wide enough publicity for that to work.
We differ in this viewpoint, but respectfully, that's my opinion.
R.

[FDChief]

R: No argument that innovative training can help keep the guys' peckers up. Your point re: the effect on morale of doing seemingly-impossible stuff like this is well taken. And if this looked to me like a militarily useful activity I'd be all over it.

But...

...it seems to have some pretty troublesome aspects from the technical FA perspective, and, as you point out, it didn't work as a PAO's sales pitch. So instead of coming off as a feel-good story about our guys' ingenuity and toughness, like the Rangers at Point de Hoc, it just seems like a stunt, complete with the whole "oooh, scary dragon" talk making the Afghans seem like Stone Age primitives afraid of the dark.

I think there's a worthwhile low-intensity war/economy of force mission in the 'Stan, keeping the AQ and allied Talib guys off balance. But I'm not sure if this story helps make the case for that.

But there's room for disagreement on that, and you're opinion is a valid one.

Like everything involved in war, we'll have to wait and see what happens to see who was right. Frankly, I hope you are. I'd hate to think of these guys, and the Afghan villagers they're working with, as havign done all this work for nothing...

[Ray]

Hello, FD.
Yes- a case of wait and see.

It all seems so complicated.
R.

[Brian Dooley]

I have tried to post a comment but you wouldn't accept it. Why would that be?

[Brian Dooley]

3000 metres is twice the range of your usual sniper rifle. If you want to do a sniper's job then what else would you use?

[Brian Dooley]

So the next question is, 'Why would you want to do a sniper's job?'

[Brian Dooley]

And the answer is, 'To put the fear of God into the guys you are shooting at, either because they don't know where you are or, as in this case, because they know where you are but they can't get at you.' So they keep their heads down where they can't do any harm. In making them do this you fulfill the requirement for British field artillery, which is not, as you might think, to destroy the enemy but to suppress him.

[Brian Dooley]

Perhaps the logic of my last post has overwhelmed the critics here - and so it should.

The British Army was having a problem in Helmand with Taliban encroaching where they should not but which was outside the range of the Brits' snipers.

Rather than endangering the troops by engaging in futile patrolling they placed a field gun where it commanded the area where the hostiles had to gather to mount an attack and whenever one of them stuck his head up he got it shot off.

If any one of you smart-arses can think of a more efficient and elegant way of dealing with the problem, let's have it.

Disabuse yourselves of the thought that the Brits don't know what they're doing.

To close this I have to tell you that many years ago I was a member of the Royal Artillery in a regiment, 40 Field, shooting the 25 Pounder, the progenitor of the Light Gun, and that my old regiment has now replaced 29 Field in Helmand.

Which is why I can read between the lines and you guys can't.

[Brian Dooley]

This is how the Brits do it.

In Korea the British, Canadian and New Zealand regiments of the Commonwealth division typically responded to division targets in about 70 seconds. In about 1970 a US review team visited Vietnam and found US batteries generally took about five minutes from receiving a call for fire to firing the first round (battalion FDC centred procedures had be found impractical in Vietnam). They then visited the Australian and New Zealand batteries using British procedures, they had plotters, used full prediction, had gun rules for their 105-mm M2A2, and found them never taking more than 90 seconds to be ready to adjust fire, usually delayed by the need for air clearances. This was consistent with the training exercises in Europe by the national batteries of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. And in March 2003 a UK battery in Iraq reported taking 45 seconds from receiving a call for fire to the 'splash' of the adjusting shell, but a more interesting and historically consistent comparison was at Al Nasiriyah. A UK 105-mm battery under control of a US marine's FDC was reporting 'battery ready' on average 1.75 minutes after the call for fire, the US 155-mm batteries were averaging 8 minutes.

Posted by: Brian Dooley | Monday, 20 April 2009 at 05:04 PM