Nuclear Mondays

Graham Allison is a good story-teller when it comes to talking about nuclear terrorism. He likes to embellish, and then throw in a few tidbits. Just enough to make you want to panic. He's convinced, in this Newsweek article, that the key to stopping nuclear terrorism is having a nuclear forensics capability that will deter nation-states from supplying fissile material to terrorists. But there's a problem - we aren't there yet.

In 2002 a study inspired by 9/11 and commissioned by the National Research Council on the role of technology in countering terrorism concluded that "the technology for developing post-explosion nuclear attribution exists but needs to be assembled, an effort that is expected to take several years." By 2008 the American Association for the Advancement of Science was reporting that we are falling short of what we need. In particular, we lack a central global database of unique material signatures that countries can promptly access in the event of a nuclear detonation. According to the AAAS report, the Department of Energy has created a database of uranium compounds, and other government agencies and international partners hold "substantial data, but the consolidation of these data into an accessible nuclear-forensics database has not taken place and the tools to utilize the database have not been developed."

Even if such a database existed, states would not be prepared to take advantage of it after an explosion or other event. As the report asserts, "Neither equipment nor people are at the level needed to provide as prompt and accurate information for decision makers as is possible."

I think he's a little off. We do have a nuclear forensics capability in DOE and DOD, but as he says, the key is the database. I don't think that we need 40 nations to cooperate, necessarily, but rather just the ones that have nuclear weapons - at least for the first cut. As for the "prompt and accurate" part, sure, decision makers would like to know who set off a nuclear bomb within hours of an event, but unfortunately, we cannot change the laws of physics to allow this. But even if we did have this database and the equipment, I have a few questions:

1. exactly how do we get Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran to cooperate and give us samples? Do we send in covert SF teams?
2. What if the nuclear material is stolen? Say, for instance, from one of the more than a hundred US nuclear waste storage sites all over the country? Or from France?
3. What if the fissile material is from China or Russia, instead of North Korea or Iran? Do we threaten to nuke China or Russia if terrorists nuke New York City?

David Ignatius, in a moment of weakness I hope, thinks that nuclear terrorism - as unlikely a scenario that it is - is a good enough reason for President Obama to retain Bush's extreme rendition policy.

"Rendition is still permitted," said Leon Panetta, the new CIA director, in a Feb. 25 meeting with reporters. "If we render someone, we are obviously going to seek assurances from that country that their human rights are protected and that they are not mistreated." The CIA hasn't had any rendition cases since Obama took office, but when opportunities arise they will be cleared with the White House on a case-by-case basis.

In drafting the new policy on interrogation, Obama and his advisers recognized that there could be extraordinary situations -- say, a suspect with information about nuclear terrorism -- where the president could decide to waive the executive order banning harsh techniques. "Everybody understands that if the nation faces a severe threat, the president can do what's needed to protect us. But he has to explain it. The problem with Bush was doing it all in secret, which leads to abuse," argues Smith.

This is, of course, bullshit. As I understand the intent of rendition, it is to allow the US government to grab wanted criminals at overseas locations - not people who are suspected of thinking about a crime, and not people accused of terrorism based on a neighbor's gossip. That is, it is still intended to be conducted within open and transparent judicial processes, ideally without torture. To bring up the threat of nuclear terrorism as a serious rationale for rendition is going right back to pretending that episodes of "24" are legitimate data for US Supreme Court cases.