Biodefense Priorities

A recently released Congressional Research Service report warns us of the challenges inherent in the establishment of hundreds of biological research labs. Is there a future Bruce Ivins out there? USAToday covers the story:

"In an awkward and disturbing irony, the most significant bioterrorism incident in the U.S. to date — i.e., the 2001 anthrax attacks — apparently originated in a U.S. military laboratory that was engaged in biological defense research," writes Steven Aftergood of Secrecy News, which reported the analysis.  Despite the FBI linking the 2001 anthrax attacks to Bruce Ivins, a vaccine researcher at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for infectious diseases, Aftergood says, "the pursuit of such research, and perhaps the associated threat, has continued to expand."

The CRS report offers options for increased oversight of select agent labs, noting an estimated 12-fold increase in BSL-4 labs, those holding the most dangerous bugs, since 2004. Options include certifying facilities, standardizing training, expanding the select agent list, and forbidding further lab construction.

However, increased regulation may limit lab competitiveness and slow public health responses from labs, as well as add costs. "Regardless of U.S. domestic efforts, biocontainment technologies are widely dispersed around the globe and used by many scientists in many countries," concludes the report.

Well we certainly wouldn't want to limit US competitiveness in biotechnology, would we? Better get these labs up and running. But in all seriousness, one would hope that the Obama administration will take a hard look at the massive amounts of money that DHS and DHHS have dumped into the states for biodefense research. There needs to be some federal regulations here, and more importantly, some strict and regular oversight from either the states or feds - or both. The biggest bioterrorist threat to the United States isn't coming from overseas. It's already here.

Comments

[Sock Puppet of the Great Satan]

Plus, 15,000 . The total number of members of the American Society of Microbiology is 45,000. I don't know how many practicing microbiologists are members of ASM, but I'd expect most microbiologists are members. So, probably around a third to a fifth of all practicing microbiologists are approved for work with select agents.

This is nowhere near sufficiently rigorous a filter. About one in 4,000 people manifest clinical schizophrenia a year, and a quarter of schizophrenics manifest the disease after age 40. And that's only one type of internal threat.

The number of select agents needs to be stripped down to those agents of the most concern in terms of threats to human life. We should remove from the list those of purely economic impact, or else introduce a two-tier system, with more rigorous checks on those who work with the agents with highest impact.