Let's Buy More MRAPs!

Kings of War and Wings Over Iraq are both talking about this article in International Organization that suggests mechanized forces do not beat insurgencies; and in fact, they may encourage them. This trend is increasingly seen after the 19th century.

…this shift can be ascribed to the increased reliance of states on mechanized forces as the cornerstone of their militaries in the post–World War I era.   Nineteenth-century militaries were organized around “foraging” principles in which soldiers extensively interacted with local populations to acquire supplies in the conflict zone.   The collision of industrialization and World War I forged a new “modern” system of military organization, one premised on the substitution of machines for soldiers to increase mobility and survivability on contemporary battlefields.  Built for direct battle, mechanized forces struggle to solve the  “identification problem”—separating insurgents from noncombatants selectively—because their structural design inhibits information-gathering among conflict-zone populations.  Faced with “information starvation,” mechanized forces often inadvertently fuel, rather than suppress, insurgencies. (emphasis added; p. 68.)

Starbuck adds:

Not surprisingly to those of us in 2009, we know that "commuting to war" every day in up-armoured Humvees and returning to base  isn't the way to win insurgencies.  Buttoned up in the hatch of an armoured vehicle or flying above the battlefield in a helicopter shuts off your typical soldier from the subtle nuances of a counter-insurgency environment.  To paraphrase counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, the more secure you make your forces, the less successful you will be.  

In related news, a former US Ambassador penned an article in Foreign Affairs magazine discussing the same sense of risk aversion among the US State Department.  He noted that, since 1983, US embassies have turned into isolated "fortresses", "far from city centers" and are counter to efforts to improve American public diplomacy.

So, of course, what the US government is doing is buying more MRAPs for Afghanistan. BRILLIANT! Because the correct philosophy is to protect troops at all costs and extend the combat mission for as long as possible...  That's the only conclusion I can make.

Comments

[Sven Ortmann]

"Because the correct philosophy is to protect troops at all costs and extend the combat mission for as long as possible... That's the only conclusion I can make."

I'm not one of those who believes that the decisions made were great or good, but here are many forces at play - examples:

1)
Indeed, prolonging the war (participation of the West) is important for the brass and politicians. Many insurgencies of the past proved to be a test of endurance - who gives up loses. A long endurance might mean a long suffering till final defeat, but the only chance (or illusion) to win includes endurance-bolstering actions like keeping the KIA count "low".

2)
This is no all-out war of necessity, not war to protect our sovereignty - no matter how often politicians and generals claim that. Many soldiers and officers know that relatively little is to be won, but they value the lives of their own highly.
The effect is that they will protect themselves - either by reduced activity and risk-taking or by armor on the road. To give them armored vehicles may be the only promising way to get them (at least) on the road.
The patrol intensity and overall activity outside of secured bases suffers if the troops suffer a lot in attacks.

So yes, it's exactly about what you wrote: Protection and prolonging the mission.

We're not ready yet to admit (as majority and publicly) that the Afghanistan occupation was an extremely stupid and needless affair.

It's too late to use radical approaches like living in civilian houses and using hospitality as force protection. I mentioned that idea sometime in 2003 for the first time - but Western military forces are 99% unfit for such alien (but ancient) approaches.