JFQ Focuses on Land Warfare

The new Joint Force Quarterly magazine has some outstanding articles on land warfare topics. I'll leave it to you to page through them, but let me note what caught my eye. P.W. Singer has an article that mirrors his latest book, which I'm reading right now. In the ring tonight... we have a heavyweight competition. LTC (ret) John "COIN" Nagl takes on COL Gian "All-Purpose Forces" Gentile for the championship belt. Nagl takes the first shot:

The mission of the U.S. Army is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. When bullets are flying, Soldiers are in harm’s way, and the national interest is at stake, the Army must devote the last full measure of its devotion to winning the wars it is in. Future conflicts are important, but the present conflicts are critical: the United States is not winning a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and, at great cost, just managed to turn around another in Iraq that was on the verge of catastrophic collapse only 2 years ago. A continued American commitment to both campaigns is likely necessary for some years to come.
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Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.” He is not alone in his views.

Pow! Unabashed, Gentile comes in with some sharp jabs.

The result is that the Army has constructed a concept of the future security environment that precludes fighting as the Army’s core function and has instead replaced it with nationbuilding. This action is not simply dangerous; it potentially neglects key aspects of U.S. national security. Worst of all, this approach ignores the requirement to objectively and accurately answer the questions that must drive thinking, organizing, and modernizing inside the Army: What is the strategic purpose for which American ground combat forces will be required to deploy and fight? Whom and where do they fight? How should they fight? What are the joint operational concepts driving change in the way American ground forces fight?
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Retired Army lieutenant colonel John Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, is so cocksure of the efficacy of Army combat power that he believes it will have the ability not only to dominate land warfare in general but also to “change entire societies.” Reminiscent of Thomas Barnett’s Pentagon blueprint argument of building new societies on the Western model where they do not currently exist in the proverbial Third World is Nagl’s concept for reorienting the long-term strategic mission of American ground forces.

Bam! Of course, they both have good points. We do need a good COIN strategy to be successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, we do run the risk of losing the ability to think about the full spectrum of military operations, if all we do is talk about Iraq and Afghanistan. My personal observation is that, in the development of counterproliferation strategy and combating WMD concepts, the Army was absent from the discussions. The counterproliferation concept was largely set by Air Force military and OSD policy in the mid-1990s, with Joint Staff facilitation. After 9/11, the NSC and OSD policy heavily tweaked counterproliferation to create their combating WMD strategy. All the Army staff did (in both cases) was to nod and go along - it wasn't (isn't?) a priority to influence the strategies. We can't afford such blind obedience. What we need are people - like Nagl and Gentile - who can think about strategy and make intelligent arguments.

Then the hard part - getting the Army leadership listen to them and to actually step up to the challenge of developing future national security strategies.

Comments

[Lorelei Kelly]

Thanks for this article. These two are indeed excellent idea advocates. I'd like it if you would cover the inherent dilemma in the Army's upcoming choices more often....will it become a jack of all trades and master at none? If it sticks to a mostly kinetically defined mission, will the younger generations be satisfied? (those that grew up on COIN?) As a lefty and an admirer of the military, I find myself in the odd conservative position of being a purist on the role and mission of the military. I want it to stick to basics and I want the civilian elected leaders to come up with creative solutions or new institutions for the non kinetic stuff.

[J.]

I'm with you, Lorelei. I will endeavor to keep on top of the situation as it develops.