Air Power Theories Never Die

I wasn't planning on commenting on the Israeli ground invasion of Gaza - I'm sure many others will comment on the various aspects of this futile and stupid conflict. However, I did catch this tidbit in the Washington Post about the idea of just letting air power solve all of Israel's problems.

Some analysts said that a ground invasion was not necessary if the goal is to destroy Hamas's military capabilities. Israeli airstrikes have destroyed tunnels used to funnel weapons and supplies, and demolished the houses and offices of Hamas leaders, killing two senior officials.

"The war in Kosovo was won from the air," said Hirsh Goodman, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a journalist for many years. "Here, Hamas has got nowhere to go and nowhere to get supplies from. They're firing whatever they can, but they've shot their wad.

"By punching into Gaza in several places, you can cut it into parcels, make it impossible for Hamas to govern, and exert a lot of pressure that way," he added. "But there will be burning tanks and human sacrifices, and it's not going to be pretty."

Others were more blunt. "What's wrong with the air war? Do you prefer ground forces moving into the Gaza Strip and finding themselves encircled by one and half million Palestinians?" said Shlomo Gazit, a retired major general who was in charge of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1974. "It's a guaranteed catastrophe for the people in Gaza and for us."

Yes, General Douhet's theories of strategic air power winning wars without ground troops still lives. If Israel does want to ensure that the rocket attacks cease, occupying the ground from which they are launched and destroying the workshops where they are built does make sense. Of course ground offensives are more dangerous - but that's the only way to finish a conflict that you started. At the least, Israel gets to say, "see, we learned from our last idiotic adventure - Lebanon 2006."

Meanwhile, European leaders are engaging the two sides as our leadership (present and future) remains silent. Lovely. We really didn't plan on being the leaders of the free world, anyway - that was just all rhetoric. Maybe we could take some of the $3 billion annual military aid to Israel to help rebuild Gaza after they're done demolishing it. Lord knows we can't afford to move cash from the Treasury right now.

Comments

[Ralph Hitchens]

It's a reflex, axiomatic -- somebody uses airpower first and everyone cries "Douhet! Mitchell!" Yessir, the Air Force is running wild again, claiming the ability to win a war without a ground campaign. Setting aside the cases where this actually happened -- Kosovo, the first Gulf War (look it up: 3 weeks into the air campaign, before a single tank stirred, Saddam called for a cease-fire & agreed to withdraw from Kuwait IAW the UN Resolutions; the Coalition declined his offer, but it WAS made) -- the fact is that airpower is a military tool of some worth these days, with the advances in precision-guided munitions. If you can identify specific buildings that could usefully be destroyed, furthering your policy objectives, why not use airpower? Yes, there might be collateral damage, but as we have seen in Haditha and many other places, such attends ground campaigns as well. By now, of course, you realize that the Israeli bombing campaign against Gaza was merely a precursor to a full-up ground campaign, so I will generously accept your apology for flying off the handle about airpower.

[J.]

Ralph, I fully support the use of air power IN SUPPORT OF ground offensives or national strategy objectives. I don't think I flew off the handle at all, just pointing out other people's comments. As for Kosovo, I don't think air power contributed significantly to Milocevic's surrender and in fact hastened his ethnic cleansing campaign. Here's a good analysis of Kosovo by an "air power advocate." As for Gulf War I, come on, the air power softened up Saddam, but certainly any claim by Saddam that he was willing to leave certainly wasn't backed up by action, even with 500,000 ground troops and tanks at his front. Took that 100 hours of ground offensive to push him out (granted, the air power made it easier).

And let's not even talk about Afghanistan and Gulf War 2. "Shock and awe" bought an opening, but in both cases, again, took ground troops to seal the deal. I suppose if one has limited national objectives that are more inclined to encourage cooperation from adversaries than close the deal, air power is fine. But especially with 4GW and counterinsurgency, airpower seems to be an albatross rather than an eagle.

[J.]

Here's">http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_24_04_5_0.pdf">Here's another good "Kosovo and Air Power" article.

"This article argues that the current air power debate is fundamentally flawed. The classic question—can air power alone coerce?—caricatures air power’s true contributions and limits, leading to confusion over its effectiveness. In Kosovo the use of air power was a key factor in Belgrade’s decision to surrender, but even here it was only one of many. U.S. and coalition experience in Kosovo and in other conflicts suggests that air power can make a range of contributions to the success of coercion, including: raising concern within an adversary regime over internal stability by striking strategic targets, including infrastructure; neutralizing an adversary’s strategy for victory by attacking its fielded forces and the logistics upon which they depend; bolstering the credibility of other threats, such as a ground invasion; magnifying third-party threats from regional foes or local insurgents; and preventing an adversary from inflicting costs back on the coercing power by undermining domestic support or by shattering the coercing coalition."

[Minnesotachuck]

Air Power Theories Never Die

I direct your attention to the recently published, in both cellulose and downloadable ether editions, America's Defense Meltdown. The whole thing is gold, but especially pertinent to this discussion is Chapter 7.

[Jonathan]

Sorry J., saying that your leadership is remaining silent is a lie. President Bush has backed our operation against the Hamas from the beginning, rightly identifying their launching of rockets against our civilians as the true cause and justification of Operation Cast Lead. Anyway, your blog entry is obsolete as the IDF's ground operation has been underway for over 24 hours.

During difficult times, it's always good to know who your friends are.

[J.]

Ah, Jonathan, Jonathan. Sometimes friends and family need to stage an intervention when people they care about commit acts of bad behavior. So when Israel's government (and a large part of its public) believes it's okay to kill 100 Palestinians for every dead Israeli and wound 400 Palestinians for every injured Israeli your friends and your">http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3650771,00.html">your family want to speak up.

Here's a clue - Bush and Rice have never been Israel's friends. If they were your friends, they would have actually worked over the past eight years to avoid this kind of a conflict. Unfortunately, they were... distracted. Better luck with the next administration.

[Jonathan]

I'd like to see what you'd do if someone was shooting rockets at your home. You'd scream bloody murder for your government to stop it, and you'd be right! And you wouldn't be squeamish about the enemy casualties either.

The numbers involved are not really relevant. Most of the Palestinian casualties have been armed terrorists. Anyway, maybe Hamas should have thought about their responsibilities to the civilian population before they attacked Israel with rockets fired from a densely populated area.

We here in Israel will always be grateful to President Bush for standing with us in these tough times. Your comments show a vast lack of knowledge about the Middle East. As if there was anything Bush could have done would have changed the murderous nature of Hamas and similar groups. We can only hope that Obama and Clinton will be as supporting.

[Sven Ortmann]

"Of course ground offensives are more dangerous - but that's the only way to finish a conflict that you started."

I believe you forgot to write "chapter" after "conflict".

And by the way; giving up your demands in negotiations is technically another method of how to end a conflict.

[Ralph Hitchens]

Well, J, as I said, you could look it up if you don't believe me. About three weeks into the 1991 air campaign Saddam requested a cease-fire in order to comply with the UN Resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait. (The Russian Foreign Minister served as his intermediary, I believe.) But the Coalition was apparently determined to further reduce Saddam's military power so they did not grant a cease-fire -- simply told Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait first and THEN maybe they would agree to a cease-fire. The Iraqis knew it would be suicidal to pull out of their fortified positions and clog the roads with masses of troops & vehicles without a suspension of the bombing, so they had no choice but to stay put. Still, why did Saddam accept terms in early February, after three weeks of bombing, that he had defiantly rejected earlier? How did the Coalition ground forces eject the Iraqis from Kuwait after what amounted to a four-day live fire exercise with fewer than a hundred battle casualties? Sorry, folks, that one belongs to airpower.