The World At Risk

The Washington Post had a short article yesterday addressing the recently released report from the Graham-Talent WMD Commission. The formal press brief will happen this afternoon. The Post mirrors the grim assessment of the report.

The report, ordered by Congress last year, concludes that terrorists are more likely to obtain materials for a biological attack than to buy or steal nuclear weapons. But it says the nuclear threat is growing rapidly, in part because of the increasing global supply of nuclear material and technology.

"Without greater urgency and decisive action by the world community, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013," says the draft report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post. The Post reported excerpts from an earlier draft in Sunday's editions.

It seems terrorist use of chemical weapons is no longer a worry... the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway incident in 1995 must not count, I guess. The report identifies 13 recommendations (paraphrased here):

• Increase domestic biosecurity efforts
• Increase international biological nonproliferation efforts
• Strengthen nuclear nonproliferation efforts
• Develop a new global nuclear security strategy
• Stop Iran's and North Korea's nuclear weapons programs
• Work with Pakistan to reduce terrorist WMD threats
• Work with Russia to jointly address global nuclear and biological proliferation issues
• Designate a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism
• Reform Congressional oversight on intel, homeland security, and national defense
• Accelerate  integration of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and law enforcement community efforts
• Build a national security workforce for the 21st century
• Counter the ideology behind WMD terrorism
• Engage the public in preventing WMD terrorism

My two cents, based on a quick review of the report, is that there is a lot of unnecessary drama in these pages. It focuses nearly entirely on nonproliferation and increased international efforts, which would never have been possible under the current administration. These aren't bad recommendations, but they ignore military counterproliferation programs (billions spent on national missile defense, for instance) and do not address the need for consequence management at all. Most dramatically of all, I don't think that the commission considered the cost or time required to implement these measures. These are not trivial efforts to implement, and (in my opinion) the US government will have other priorities than this one to address in the near term. I suppose that's why they felt the need for such a flashy cover.

I need to read this more in depth before commenting more, but I can't get over the deliberate lack of mention of chemical terrorism. It may not be a capability to take out a city, but certainly chemicals are more available and easier to use than either biological or radiological hazards. For biological terrorism being such the threat that they insinuate, they do not assess the government's current biodefense efforts (which are collectively getting $5-6 billion a year). Also saw no mention of Yucca Mountain and its neglected mission to store radiological waste (it seems so obvious to just say, open the damn repository already). More tomorrow.

Comments

[ajay]

It seems terrorist use of chemical weapons is no longer a worry... the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway incident in 1995 must not count, I guess.

Yes, I'd go along with that. A few bags full of sarin left on the train in Tokyo, and twelve people die. A few bags full of explosive left on the train in Madrid, and over a hundred and fifty die...

[J.]

My point, ajay, is that compared to the Amerithrax incident in 2001, the Aum Shinrikyo case killed more than twice as many and directly affected nearly a thousand with short-term nerve agent effects. I do not dispute the impact of explosives as a much more immediate concern, but the commission's focus on bio and nuke appear to be myopic from my point of view.

[Maggie]

I briefed the Commission Staff in September both on why I considered chemical terrorism should be included and on my assessment of policies intended to reduce the threats posed by chemical weapons proliferation and improvised chemical terrorism. (Along with briefing on proliferation [not terrorist] threats from emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology and synthetic genomics, for both biological and chemical weapons proliferation and terrorism.)

While I can speculate on the underlying reasoning for choosing to focus solely on biological and nuclear terrorism, I disagree *strongly* with the choice. Nuclear terrorism is the only WMD that is likely to pose a threat to the Republic. By disregarding the threat of chemical (& radiological terrorism), however, a potential vulnerability is created. When I think about risk, I consider both the "probability" and "consequence" components. The probability of use of a chemical agent by foreign or domestic terrorists is the highest across the WMD spectrum in my opinion. Al Qa'eda-affiliated insurgents in Iraq used a chemical weapon, chlorine, in the Diyala province 2006 & 2007. It was effective for terrorizing the Iraqi populace in those areas and for complicating US military operations. Dismissing chemical weapons or improvised chemical devices as a "relic of history" or not considering their potential as terrorist weapons inadvertently creates a vulnerability.

[EcceNerdo]

I really fail to see the cost/benefit to a strong focus on chemical warfare. Yes, there is the Tokyo Incident, but how many more people have been killed via conventional terrorism or through just normal crime?

In fact, given the price, time, organization, and risk behind chemical weaponry beyond a basic chlorine or mustard gas, the opportunity cost versus the likely casualty rate just simply doesn't make sense. I think this is the correct prioritization for our policymakers to work with.

[protected static]

Could it be because generally there is an infrastructure in place to deal with chemical incidents? On the NBC spectrum, municipalities are more-or-less equipped to deal with (the most likely kinds of) C adequately. Major fire departments tend to have decent haz-mat teams, after all.

I know weapon agents are different from, say, an ammonia tanker car running off the rails, but isn't it far more likely that a terrorist would have access to the ammonia (or the rail switches that transport it) than something more exotic like sarin?

Just thinking aloud here... I certainly wouldn't claim to be an expert.

[J.]

Yes, PS, you are correct. More tomorrow.