Small Wars Journal brought attention to the Army's latest Field Manual, FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations. Most of it isn't too extraordinary, but this definition caught my eye on page 1-2.
Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, also called weapons of mass destruction. Possession of these weapons gives an enemy the potential to inflict sudden and catastrophic effects. The proliferation of related technology has made this threat more likely than in the past.
DOD defines weapons of mass destruction to include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The definition does not include radiological devices or high-yield explosives. For some reason, people have a really hard time understanding this basic point. It bugs the shit out of me. It bothers me that the Army (and other services) has such a hard time getting simple facts straight in a topic area that is supposed to be a big concern to DOD and US govt officials.
Back in 1999, RAND consultants to the Gilmore Commission suggested that "CBRN" could be a more accurate term to discuss terrorist use of particular unconventional hazards. They thought, and the commission agreed, that the term "terrorist WMD" was technically incorrect and did not adequately describe the true capability of terrorists. That is to say, because terrorists used improvised equipment and (relatively) small amounts of common industrial materials, the term "terrorist WMD" didn't work for them. Unfortunately, the Bush administration didn't follow that logic after 9/11.
So now we're stuck with the stupid people who think "CBRN hazards" and "WMDs" are equivalent terms to use in discussions on defense issues. And I don't think many people inside of DOD really care, other than us few analysts who actually try to make sense of these things. They don't even try to care, other than to match wording with whatever the latest OSD mumbo-jumbo is. You see, you can have Army training but still lack professional education.
I didn't know William Kaufman - a nuclear defense analyst who died recently - but I think I would have liked talking with him.
Among his MIT students were Kaplan, former federal counterterrorism adviser Richard A. Clarke and Charles A. Duelfer, a retired defense and intelligence official who was the CIA's top weapons inspector in Iraq.
"The most powerful thing he instilled and promoted was the notion that analysis, rational analysis of defense policy and posture, was something that could be done and applied," Duelfer said.
"The government spends vast quantities of money to buy defense stuff," Duelfer said. "What he would do was try to tie those allocations to defined purposes."
Reflecting on his career in 1983, Dr. Kaufmann criticized the defense policy world, likening it to a deep pit. "It was easy to get caught up in the whole nuclear business," he told Kaplan. "You could eat and breathe the stuff. . . . Then you move away from it for a while, look at it from a distance and think, 'God that's a crazy world.' "
It is a crazy world, all right.
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