The Washington Post had a pro and con editorial discussion on the wisdom of giving DOD too much power in foreign affairs and placing retired and active duty general/flag officers into positions other than in the Pentagon. On the con side, Tom Schweich formerly of the State Department, who says that DOD mission creep into other areas is bad.
While serving the State Department in several senior capacities over the past four years, I witnessed firsthand the quiet, de facto military takeover of much of the U.S. government. The first assault on civilian government occurred in faraway places -- Iraq and Afghanistan -- and was, in theory, justified by the exigencies of war.
The White House, which basically let the Defense Department call the budgetary shots, vastly underfunded efforts by the State Department, the Justice Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to train civilian police forces, build functioning judicial systems and provide basic development services to those war-torn countries. For example, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Justice Department and the State Department said that they needed at least 6,000 police trainers in the country. Pentagon officials told some of my former staffers that they doubted so many would be needed. The civilians' recommendation "was quickly reduced to 1,500 [trainers] by powers-that-be above our pay grade," Gerald F. Burke, a retired major in the Massachusetts State Police who trained Iraqi cops from 2003 to 2006, told Congress last April. Just a few hundred trainers ultimately wound up being fielded, according to Burke's testimony.
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As military officers sought to take over the role played by civilian development experts abroad, Pentagon bureaucrats quietly populated the National Security Council and the State Department with their own personnel (some civilians, some consultants, some retired officers, some officers on "detail" from the Pentagon) to ensure that the Defense Department could keep an eye on its rival agencies. Vice President Cheney, himself a former secretary of defense, and his good friend Rumsfeld ensured the success of this seeding effort by some fairly forceful means. At least twice, I saw Cheney staffers show up unannounced at State Department meetings, and I heard other State Department officials grumble about this habit. The Rumsfeld officials could play hardball, sometimes even leaking to the press the results of classified meetings that did not go their way in order to get the decisions reversed. After I got wind of the Pentagon's dislike for the approved interagency anti-drug strategy for Afghanistan, details of the plan quickly wound up in the hands of foreign countries sympathetic to the Pentagon view. I've heard other, similarly troubling stories about leaks of classified information to the press.
I think Schweich is a little off in his review of military officers in leadership positions. I don't have any doubt that retired general/flag officers can get the job done without bowing to the Pentagon. Active generals, such as General Hayden working as the Director, CIA, I'm not so sure about. On the pro side, retired General Wes Clark, who recommends that Democrats take the opportunity to show that they do in fact love the military and its leaders:
Above all, don't think that we are anxious to "use our toys." Forget
about the Hollywood dramatics: Soldiers are the last to seek war. We
know its personal and professional consequences painfully well. Those
in uniform would prefer that President Obama use every other tool and
method -- diplomacy, sanctions, calling in the allies -- before sending
troops into combat. You're better off leaving political and economic
development to others, too. As for crisis response? Please, let the
diplomats work their magic first.
But the military will have to show some understanding as well. We
don't have a monopoly on knowing what the nation's best interests are.
National security now involves such spheres as law enforcement, the
economy, the nation's industrial and scientific base and even such
matters as health care and civil liberties. The military is just one
voice among many.
Nor are our military plans and proposals beyond questioning. There's
a lot of judgment involved in strategy and operations, and not a lot of
certainty. The military is a cautious institution, and plans and
options sometimes reflect just the opinion of the most senior person in
the room. Even hard military "requirements" should stand up to public
scrutiny. So when new members of Congress, Hill staffers and political
appointees question tactics, techniques, troop levels and programs, we
have to continue to treat these questions seriously and answer them
with respect and diligence.
They're both right, to a degree. Schweich - a former Bush administration official - gripes about how the Bush administration overemphasized the military aspects of foreign policy, but it sounds like it was the civilians in DOD and the White House who were the problems. I don't think the military volunteered to do this extra work, nor do the military leaders want to hold back the State Dept. Gen. Clark points out the obvious - many military leaders make for good leaders through their practice, so it's natural that they might be selected to work these issues. They get stuff done, which is always a good thing. But certainly, military leaders have no lock on those skills, and certainly they can miscalculate and make bad decisions, if not engaged by counterpoints.
Certainly we are in a time where the balance can be adjusted (that is, starting on January 21st). If we can fix the State Dept and use its diplomatic tools effectively, we ought to do so. Let the overstretched DOD get back to its main function of preparing for future conflicts and stop trying to use military forces as generic "all-purpose" tools.
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