Building a Better Military

I had nearly forgotten my desire to comment on the Center on American Progress's "Building a Military for the 21st Century" report, written by Larry Korb and other analysts. In the interests of full coverage, I wanted to talk about it while the report was still fresh.

Pentagon planners have already begun to warn the incoming administration about the choices it will have to make. A Pentagon advisory group recently notified the president-elect’s office that the Department of Defense, “cannot reset the current force, modernize and transform in all portfolios at the same time. Choices must be made across capabilities and within systems to deliver capability at known prices within a specific period of time.”

In order to make these important decisions, the next administration will first have to evaluate the current state of the military; examine the current composition of the Defense budget; and define the threats, challenges, and role of the U.S. military in the 21st century.

This report is intended not only to serve as a playbook for a new administration and military planners. It also aims to guide policymakers and the general public about what a new administration will need to do to restore American military power while reorienting the military to more effectively and efficiently counter current and future threats. The next administration will inherit a vastly different military than the one bequeathed to President George W. Bush in January of 2001. After nearly six years of war in Iraq and over seven in Afghanistan, the next administration will have to contend with two wars, a military readiness crisis, recruitment and retention problems, mounting equipment shortages, and an out-of-control defense acquisition process.

The basis of this report is about money, because that is the central issue on the table. We can’t afford to reset the force and recover from Iraq, modernize the force with the current major acquisition projects, and continue combat operations at the current pace without massive increases in defense spending. The report suggests that one can adjust personnel policy, modernization plans, and operations and actually save $38.6 billion over the next four years.

Those savings will not be easily won. They include:

• Slow down, but don’t stop the Army’s Future Combat Systems project
• Continue the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and purchase more MRAPs
• Stop the production of F22 Raptors at 183 planes
• Continue developing the F35 Lightning II, and purchase more F16s and F18s to make up for anticipated shortfalls
• Cancel the MV-22 Osprey and purchase conventional helicopters
• Build more C17 cargo aircraft
• Cancel the Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 destroyer and LPD-26 amphib ship
• Build two Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 destroyers and one Virginia attack sub per year
• Cancel unproven missile defense projects (i.e., the Airborne Laser), continue R&D at a lower level, and pull the Poland and Czech projects out

You can read more about these individual ideas in the report - I don't want to look at each one individually. The basic message is that we need to invest in people first, hardware second, and the only way to do that is to get much more reasonable in the scope and size of DOD acquisition efforts. We also need to consider future operations rather than Cold War concepts of employing military forces. These statements are difficult to disagree with, but hard to implement with the inflexible military-industrial-Congress complex that we have.

There are a few items I do disagree with – I don’t understand the CAP's fixation with MRAPs for Afghanistan. Yes, the vehicles protect people, but do the systems allow us to complete the mission? Won't the Taliban merely increase the amount of explosives used? Or are there non-material ways of protecting our people (or cheaper material solutions)? The report seems to take the easy way out. Also, the report recommends repealing “don’t ask, don’t tell” and allowing women to serve in combat. Allowing homosexuals to work within the military is a no-brainer, but I’m unclear about the latter. If they mean allowing women military personnel who support combat operations to move into active combat zones, sure, that correction is long overdue. If the report means letting women into the combat arms of infantry, armor, and artillery, I’m not sure that there will be enough women volunteers to make a difference, in addition to ensuring that they meet the male soldiers’ current physical standards.

This report is chock full of numbers and details on its propositions at 70 pages, but fortunately there are a lot of figures and tables in there, too. There is no doubt that there are some solid ideas in here – but there are lots of smart people and organizations with similar reports. Again, the question is, how does the Obama administration actually implement these recommendations? Can they in fact transform the military in a way that the Bush administration was never able to? We’ll see.

Comments

[Belphagor1527]

Ok, I'm finally coming to realize that I can't use my experiences in Afghanistan to apply to the whole country (or even that they're still relevant given the amount of time that has passed) but MRAPs seem a bit unrealistic in at least some parts of the country. We couldn't use HMMWVS in many places because the 'streets' in many villages were just too darn narrow to drive through.

I guess in the more open areas of the country they might work, but this seems like an intentional mimicry of the Soviet tactics of avoiding as much interaction with world outside the firebases and cities as possible.

Is it really that hard to build a rugged, light tactical vehicle that offers some protection without making you feel like a 'bubble boy' and is smaller than a Landkreuzer P1500 Monster. Gratuitous big tank pictures may be found at: (http://www.vincelewis.net/ultratank.html)

[Galrahn]

I've been unimpressed with the work put out by most of the think tanks, including CAP. Only CSBA and CNAS have been impressive in my opinion. After reading this, I wasn't surprised to hear CAP lay off a bunch of staff; they need to reorganize if they ever want to be influential in the new administration.

The issue is, the size of the defense budget now during 2 wars is a lot bigger than it was before the Bush administration, and yet defense analysis from the think tank community hasn't evolved any.

Korb is a good example. I really like Korb, but he has been focused on the 2 wars since 9/11, and is somehow able to keep up with the ins and outs of every other services long term view at the same time? His work has suffered because he doesn't stay focused.

When someone tries to be a specialist at everything, they end up being a specialist of nothing. CAP reads to me like most think tank reports during the transition, like a generalist’s laundry list of what works and what doesn't absent the intellectual rigor or complex strategic view for each service, and rarely do we find an attached joint grand strategy.

I guess my expectations are higher because I noted CSBA and CNAS both pooled experts unique to services then fielded a grand strategy vision that begins above the platform level, while everyone else is playing with defense acquisition like it’s a game of musical chairs or a trip through the drive thru window.

The big loser, all of us, because it gives Congress nothing to work with and the new administration a laundry list of issues without any real thought provoking data to work with. For an administration transition the whole world saw coming for years, the think tanks have mostly produce a load of crap in their urgent moment of need and emerging moment of relevance post Bush. Very disappointing.

[Sven Ortmann]

The military spending needs to be reduced by much more than a few billions. They need to cut hundreds of billions. A return to inflation-adjusted 1996 spending level, for example.
The present budget is far, far away from being sustainable - and was so even before the crisis.

The most important reform to do is to create an accounting system that works. The present Pentagon accounting is not functioning according to GAO and several leagues worse than Enron's accounting was. Many generals would go to jail if the Pentagon was a corporation (or if this world was just).