Why We Need Nukes

DOD Buzz has an article discussing SecDef Bob Gate's support for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. I haven't had time to read the report mentioned in the article, but thought I should get it out here for discussion.

So far, most Democrats have consistently opposed the RRW program, arguing that building a new nuclear weapon might be provocative and isn’t really needed as long as the massive DOE program to model the performance of existing nuclear weapons without actually testing them continues to reassure that the stockpiles are sufficiently stable and reliable.

So when an interested party to the debate — a congressional aide who supports the RRW program — sent me a copy of the declassified version of “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” arrived in the mail two days ago, I was intrigued. The report was co-authored by Gates and Samuel Bodman the Secretary of Energy whose department designs, builds and maintains the weapons.

The conclusion about the way ahead is put pretty clearly in the report: “The RRW concept is both promising and fully consistent with U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments. Ultimately, a reliable replacement warhead will be needed to sustain nuclear force capabilities, revitalize the nuclear infrastructure, and reduce the nuclear stockpile in a manner that is consistent with U.S. security objectives, including alliance commitments.”

The report may reach a bit when it argues that providing the nuclear umbrella over US allies is actually helpful to limiting proliferation. “U.S. nuclear weapons deter potential adversaries from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies and friends. In the absence of this “nuclear umbrella,” some nonnuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear capability,” the authors argue.

But Gates is clearly committed to maintaining what the French wonderfully call the force de frappe and believes it is absolutely essential to American power and prestige. The technical argument for RRW is that confidence in the weapons stockpile will decrease “as the warheads deviate further from baseline designs which were originally validated using nuclear test data.” Since no one is likely to start blowing up new or existing nuclear warheads any time soon to validate those changes supporters of RRW say building a new design “would have advanced safety and security features, be less sensitive to manufacturing tolerances or to aging of materials, and be certifiable without nuclear testing.”

It's a debate for the next administration, but check it out.

Comments

[James]

If you start with the assumption that the existence of nuclear weapons is a guarantee of stability and security, then the RRW is a logical step. If, on the other hand, you believe that worldwide nuclear disarmament will enhance everyone's security, then the RRW is a step in the wrong direction.

This is an almost irreconcilable difference. The public, in general, supports disarmament but the support is soft. People have other priorities and those who oppose disarmament win by default, simply because those who support it are disinclined to expend much energy over it. In other countries disarmament is higher on the agenda. Thus, opposition to the RRW thus takes the form of a tactical move: it's unnecessary in the short term and other nations might make an issue of it, so why not let it slide until we see which way the wind is blowing, etc...

But the foundation of the argument over the RRW isn't short-term expediency. It's a serious disagreement about whether US security is enhanced by pursuing technical dominance in weapons design or multilateral disarmament. I would dearly like to see a genuine debate about pursuing disarmament as a prerequisite to funding new warheads. Win or lose, at least we would know where we all stand. The Democrat's opposition to RRW on technical and political grounds amounts to ducking the real issue.

CKR, over at Whirledview, calls this the "endgame phase" of the NPT process. Article VI calls for multilateral disarmament, but Gates and the rest of the national security establishment would prefer to maintain permanent nuclear superiority for a handful of states over the many. Legally, morally and, most of all, historically, this is impossible. My argument is that the NPT process will either lead to complete disarmament or it will crumble. In a multipolar world, emerging players will not remain under anyone else's umbrella. The US would not remain under anyone else's protection and it is delusional to believe that others would do so. The non-nuclear states have been patient so far, but their patience is not inexhaustible.