Why Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?

Cheryl at WhirledView has proposed a new blog tank topic - what would benefit a nation to develop just a few nuclear weapons (Iran) instead of, say, 150 (Israel)? Let's think about it.   

...what about a country's situation might induce it to develop nuclear weapons? What does it do with them after it's got them? Of what utility are nuclear weapons if a country can produce only a few? Thinking these questions through can give us insight into what sorts of incentives North Korea and Iran might respond to, which other countries might be in danger of going nuclear, and what we might do to discourage this pathway before nations get too far down it.

So I'm the ruler of a small nation with limited resources, and I have to think about whether I want to start a nuclear weapons program. There would be a few starting points - I'm not stupid enough to think that the few nuclear missiles I build could be a deterrent to a major superpower. If I can't ensure overwhelming devastation to multiple cities of said superpowers, then MAD theory doesn't apply. Building a nuke just for "national pride" is a secondary objective. If I have a few nukes, it will be to deter an adversarial nation who can't stop eyeing my land. Or maybe he keeps having "national military exercises" that stop at my borders. Damn so-and-so ...

Next, I will want to develop an indigenous capability. I won't let any Proliferation Security Initiatives stop valuable material shipments. My engineers and scientists will train in the best universities overseas as I develop my "nuclear technology" program, which will have the purpose of supplying my people with limitless, inexpensive electricity to power their homes. Now the United States and European nations will offer me low-enriched uranium, and that will do - for starters. Once I get the nuclear technology program, I'll build a second reactor and centrifuges for the HEU processing. At the same time, I'll have to invest in missile development. Hopefully this will allow me to get the necessary yellowcake in quantities required to make the weapons.

At this point, the diplomats will start bickering with me, so it's time to take my program deep underground. I'll need at least five nuclear missiles, just in case the United States offers my adversarial neighbor some Patriot launchers. Three of them will be in silos, two of them will be in mobile launchers, maybe a railroad platform. Probably will have to construct five dummy missiles to confuse the US satellites, keep 'em guessing which ones are which. Then the all-important "weapons test" - absolutely no room for error here, only have one shot. Hopefully I can pop the bomb in an underground test, no need to make "mushroom clouds" for the press.

Last thing I would do is to make sure I have a heavy strategic information operation, pushing the point that these weapons are needed to secure the nation against external foes. I'd point out how nuclear weapons have stabilized the Paki-Indo border conflict as well as the Korean peninsula. I'd point out how, even with the numerous nuclear dangers that the United States and the former Soviet Union caused, there have been no nuclear attacks since 1945. This is just... to secure the borders against unfriendlies. No threat to the world, really...

Comments

[ajay]

what would benefit a nation to develop just a few nuclear weapons (Iran) instead of, say, 150 (Israel)?

Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either. Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons. It doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either.

Just felt that needed saying.

[Ray]

Certainly there is no proof, yet. Why is it so difficult to find out, either way? Anyone with the Layman's Guide to Nuclear Weapons Programmes Confirmation?
R.

[ajay]

Ray, there's no proof because it's impossible to prove a negative, and also because Iran has been secretive about its nuclear technology... but it's still the case that pretty much every relevant organisation (BND, IISS, IAEA, and the entire US intelligence community) believes that Iran has no nuclear weapons, and that it doesn't have a nuclear weapons programme either.

A more interesting question is: why are so many people convinced that the opposite is true?

[J.]

I believe it would be more accurate to say that the prevailing belief is that Iran does not have an ACTIVE nuclear weapons program, that it does desire a robust nuclear technology program, and has been suspected of desiring nuclear weapons. As for why so many people think that, I would direct them to the ArmsControlWonk or other, more knowledgable people who track nuclear weapons programs. I don't usually do nukes, I'm a chem-bio guy at heart.

[Ray]

Ajay and J:
Acknowledged with thanks but, further,apart from running through ground tests, why bother to warn of a pre-emptive attack by aerial "testing" of a relevant nuclear missile before launching an attack, when, with help from some foriegn power/s (here to remain nameless- but why do it yourself when you can get others to do it for you) you know that these things will work, they having already been tested and tried elsewhere?

R.

[James]

I think, in assessing the usefulness of small numbers of nukes, analysts sometimes reduce the game to a two-sided confrontation between a superpower (the US) and a regional power (Iran).

But even a cursory examination of Iran's grand strategy shows that, while they regard the US as their primary adversary, they clearly recognize the board is full of players who have a hand in the game. I believe, for example, that Iran really doesn't give a damn about Israel one way or another. Their goading of Tel Aviv is simply a way to keep the shaky Sunni regimes off-balance by appealing directly to the Arab working class and highlighting the fact that Saudi Arabia's key patron is also the patron of Israel. Every time they poke at Tel Aviv the Americans turn red-faced and start sputtering threats, allowing them to associate their primary enemy with settlements and checkpoints in the collective consciousness of the Arab "street."

With this in mind, it would seem to me that having a few nukes does not deter the superpowers, but it does have an impact on the other regional players who may have a restraining influence on the superpowers. A war against Iran, for example, cannot take place without the assistance of the Gulf states that provide the air bases. The US might scoff at a single nuke getting through, but a single nuke would render the Emirates uninhabitable. Similarly, North Korea's trivial number of weapons isn't a threat to the US, but it does offer them the possibility of denying the US the use of Japanese bases in the event of a war.

In short, the nukes aren't there to threaten the superpowers; they are there to threaten the local allies of the superpowers. While the US can project a certain amount of power without local bases, carriers alone aren't enough to force a decision in a conventional military confrontation with a regional power.

That's how I see it, anyway. Ajay is right and there is no evidence that Iran is engaged in any kind of serious design work. My own view is that Iran wants the fuel cycle in hand for three reasons: national prestige; to expand their hegemony by acting as an alternative fuel source for nations who don't want to deal with the West; and as a contingency against the collapse of the NPT or the first-use of nuclear weapons by another party. Forever is a long time, after all.

[ajay]

I believe it would be more accurate to say that the prevailing belief is that Iran does not have an ACTIVE nuclear weapons program,

It has a passive nuclear weapons program, though? It's sitting there with a large box marked "Nuclear Weapons", in the knowledge that at any time there is a non-zero probability that the box will contain a nuclear weapon, and all they have to do is wait? OK then!

http://users.ox.ac.uk/~invar/lions.html

that it does desire a robust nuclear technology program, and has been suspected of desiring nuclear weapons.

Ah, I see. It's the arms control equivalent of Jimmy Carter committing adultery in his heart.

As for why so many people think that, I would direct them to the ArmsControlWonk

... who also doesn't believe that Iran has nuclear weapons, though they would add that Iran hasn't been as open as they would like.

[ajay]

James - you might also consider the issue of delivery systems, which isn't trivial. Even if Iran had a nuclear weapon (WHICH IT DOESN'T) it would still face serious difficulties in getting it to the US mainland. Iran has no ICBMs, no SSBNs and no long-range bombers. But hitting Qatar or Kuwait would be comparatively straightforward with Iran's existing missiles or aircraft. The same goes for North Korea and Japan. I think that's actually more important than the supposed insouciance of the US - "well, we'll probably only lose two or three cities, so no biggie" - in the face of limited nuclear attack.

There's also the idea of deterrence. The US has MAD. Japan and Qatar don't; and a supposed US "security umbrella" isn't quite the same thing. Several aggressors in recent history have successfully gambled that the US wouldn't keep even its costless promises to its allies when the chips were down. A North Korean aggressor could rationally assume that the US would be even less likely to keep its word if that would involve the risk of nuclear attack.