US Nuclear Weapons Policy

Cheryl Rofer at WhirledView has started a collaborative effort to discuss the US nuclear weapons policy – what it is, what it should be, why the administration has had such a difficult time articulating one. I was fortunate enough to be contacted by her to contribute to this worthy effort.

I have heard some of the top nuclear weapons policy advocates talk on this subject, and if it is one thing that they all agree on, it’s that the US government lacks a modern, post-Cold War strategy for justifying the current nuclear stockpile. This has directly led to the unresolved debates over the need for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), the development of non-nuclear strike capabilities, and the DoE infrastructure supporting the nuclear stockpile. 

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review caused a direction to drop the number of active nuclear weapons and the development of the new “triad” strategy. This strategy changed from the old “triad” of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines to a new “triad” of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active/passive defenses, and a “revitalized defense infrastructure” as the basis for a strategic posture. This was a positive measure, in that it changed the dialogue from a Cold War “mutually-assured destruction” mindset to a more comprehensive and flexible strategy addressing the roles of air/missile defense and the DoE labs as well as decreasing the reliance on nuclear weapons as a global strike tool.

The strategy did not offer an explanation as to why the goal of 1700-2200 active nuclear warheads was the right number, why a new warhead design might be needed, or under what circumstances would a nuclear weapons employment be exercised. Naturally, discussions on these matters might be classified, but the fact remained that, absent a public discussion on US nuclear strategy, it becomes difficult to support resolution on the key issues identified above. In fact, one former DepSecDef suggested that we ought to zero out the inventory and justify every weapon system added to the US stockpile, if we are to have that honest debate.

I am not going to have a long discussion on the proper role of nuclear weapons. If you want that understanding, go read Thomas Schelling’s “Arms and Influence.” I do want to outline the broad brush strokes of a progressive nuclear weapons policy that has a few main points of departure: 1) the US government will always need nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent against other countries that have nuclear weapons; 2) the US government needs to minimize the possibility of a future nuclear conflict between other nations as well as between the United States and another major power; and 3) there is no such thing as a tactical nuke.

To go back to Schelling, one purpose of national strategy is to be able to communicate with and influence other nations on particular issues such as war and peace. There is no mistaking an intercontinental ballistic missile for its message – an intention to threaten another country’s infrastructure with massive destruction. As long as Russia and China have these weapons, we will need equivalent capability to ensure freedom of maneuver and freedom of the marketplace across the world. We probably need a number of nuclear weapons to counter current regional powers such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, as well as future nuclear powers such as Iran and North Korea.

This does not mean that “The more nuclear weapons the US has, the saver[sic] the world is.” This is ridiculous, as is the statement that “the US would not have won the Cold War if it didn’t have nuclear weapons.” The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not say that Russia and the United States must completely disarm their nuclear stockpiles; rather, it states that nuclear-owning nations need to “pursue negotiations in good faith” toward that end-state. It may be that we will never see a nuclear-free global community, but it is not a bad vision to pursue. Visions are important motivators because of their long-term and idealistic nature. As long as we’re negotiating, it’s progress. “It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.”

US policy makers need to stop the practice of “deliberate ambiguity” as a diplomatic threat against other nations who are doing something the US government doesn’t like. We ought not threaten non-nuclear nation-states with nuclear weapons, as we did against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Retaliating against chemical-biological weapons with nuclear weapons is not justifiable; this counters basic Cold War (Schelling) logic of rational deterrence. The message needs to be clear and simple: If you have nuclear weapons, you are now a target on our Single Integrated Operational Plan.

As for the second point, the US government needs to continue to pursue a strong nonproliferation strategy with both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Part of this strategy must include acknowledgement that Israel has nuclear weapons, and that they are a part of the problem within the Middle East. I fail to understand the coy game played by US and Israeli politicians on this point. Until open discussions begin, how can we expect Iran, Syria, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia to discard the ambition of becoming a nuclear power? It’s basic deterrence theory again. I’m not suggesting that Israel give up its nukes; far from it, I want Israel to openly declare that they have nukes and will use them as part of its national strategy. This tact hasn’t hurt relations between the US government and India or Pakistan so far.

The other part of nonproliferation is a strategy to address the concern over a “cascade” of proliferating states as the result of Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Japan, or Venezuela becoming a nuclear state. I am not steeped in the subtleties of diplomacy, but I would suggest that a successful strategy is possible through agreements of protection under the US nuclear “umbrella”, sponsorship of regional military/economic agreements, and expansion of programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort beyond the former Soviet Union. All of this requires the US government engage both allies and potential adversaries on an international, not unilateral, stage.

I will make just a few comments about non-nuclear strike capabilities, air/missile defense, and the DoE lab infrastructure. Non-nuclear strike capabilities are definitely worth investment, as they both reduce the need for nuclear weapons and retain an ability to place adversarial nation-state interests at risk. The push for US missile defense platforms in Poland and the Czech Republic is a foolish, transparent attempt to protect US global interests at the cost of alienating friends and further aggravating adversaries. And certainly the DoE labs need investment, but the RRW is not the answer to their deep-seated challenges.

To summarize: The current “new triad” strategy articulates a correct approach to retaining a strategic deterrence capability against adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear weapons should be adequate to 1) influence Russia, China, and two regional actors from considering first-strikes against US interests; and 2) protect US allies from nuclear attack. Plans ought to be realistic and avoid excessive multiple targeting of single sites to ensure success (standard AF target planning). This number will be classified, but the methodology needs to be articulated clearly.

We should invest in non-nuclear strike capabilities to the fullest extent possible, and maintain a minimal R&D effort in nuclear warhead reliability, safety, and efficacy (i.e., no RRW until it’s clear when current warheads will become unreliable). The DoE labs are an important resource that ought to be utilized to research both nuclear and non-nuclear global strike and defense capabilities. We ought to pull back on the idea of a global missile defense capability (specifically, plans for sites in Europe) and instead invest those funds into increased regional military/economic security discussions.

The US government should redouble its diplomatic efforts in nonproliferation and regional engagement. The NPT remains a noble vision toward which the US government ought to pursue, in that it will continue negotiations with nuclear states on reducing stockpiles and opening communications to reduce the chance of an aggressive action. Any ambiguity as to the US employment of nuclear weapons ought to be removed, to include articulating that non-nuclear states that attack US interests or allies with chemical or biological weapons will be engaged with non-nuclear strike weapons. Last, the US government must engage Israel, Pakistan, and India as seriously as Iran and North Korea on the issues of reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles and reducing the chance of a nuclear exchange.

Other points of view: Michael van der Galien, PoliGazette; Dave Schuler, The Glittering Eye 

Comments

[Dave Schuler]

Good post. Ping!

[zenpundit]

Hi J.

"We ought not threaten non-nuclear nation-states with nuclear weapons, as we did against Iraq in 1991 and 2003.Retaliating against chemical-biological weapons with nuclear weapons is not justifiable"

Why? If the threat of a nuclear holocaust causes Dictator X to keep his nerve gas and superbugs out of American cities and off of the battlefield, then our nuclear deterrent is working as intended.

I'm not high on giving unsavory world leaders a green light on using CB weapons by promising them no first use of nukes.

[Saheli]

Zenpundit, you ask "why" and then supply a positive answer for "why not":

If the threat of a nuclear holocaust causes Dictator X to keep his nerve gas and superbugs out of American cities and off of the battlefield,

but that is oversimplifying the situation. Is that what happened? Was that really the thing that kept "Dictator X" from doing ___ awful thing? Moreover, did anything else happen because of the nuclear threat, and what is the blowback from that? It seems that J's argument (via Schelling?) is that it muddies their use as a deterrent against nuclear-capable countries--which is where we really need them. It also encourages more countries to pursue nuclear capabilities.

[James]

zen: the point is that nonproliferation efforts will eventually fail; we are dealing with sixty-year-old technology, after all. We need to create a strategic environment in which the possession of nuclear weapons is a liability rather than an asset.

In J's proposal, those without nuclear weapons are immune from nuclear attack, while those that have them are fair game. Since newcomers are obviously at a disadvantage to the established states in terms of numbers, readiness, and accuracy, there will be a long window in which having nuclear weapons leaves you vulnerable both militarily and politically. If an "immunity clause" were built into the NPT non-nuclear states, even those who are avowed enemies of the West, would have a powerful incentive not to have any traces of weapons programs on their record.

Avoiding both proliferation and use of nuclear weapons should be at the forefront of US nuclear policy. Proliferation because it is an obvious threat to US security and the use because it undermines non-proliferation. The NPT will not survive a day if any nuclear state successfully uses nuclear weapons to threaten a non-nuclear opponent, no matter what the circumstances.

[Raymond Lee]

Hello,
I promised myself, being entirely ignorant of these technological matters that I wouldn't enter the debate on nuclear stuff, so here goes- with my pennies-worth:
For a start, nobody will warn the other side that they are about to launch Armageddon (what would be the point?). It will just happen.
Of course, the bottom line is: will defences against nuclear attack work? No: there are too many missiles on both sides. There are no defences.
On the other side of the coin is that, supposing the equally impossible occurs and we all decide to disarm, how do we safely dispose of all that nuclear stuff? We can't.

If I'm wrong (and I fervently hope that I am) someone with the patience to tell me could alleviate my fears for our future. Meanwhile, I'll have another mince pie, and a cup of tea.

Regards...

[J.]

zen - Both James and Saheli have more than adequately addressed my points of view. To directly answer your one question, no one in the defense policy world believes that chem or bio weapons - particularly in the hands of a nation-state - is equivalent to that of a nuclear weapon. You can't use nukes to threaten terrorists, so the idea of retaliating for a terrorist CB hit on a city with nukes is not logical. I defy you to map out a scenario where any nation might threaten an American city with CB weapons and avoid being destroyed with US conventional capabilities. Usually, it's when US troops are invading a country with CB weapons that there is the concern about being hit by such weapons (e.g., Iraq 1991 and 2003).

No one is giving any country the "green light" to use CB weapons against American troops or interests. It's just that there are lots of diplomatic options and conventional ordnance (in case diplomacy fails) to address those cases without resorting to the paper tiger threat of nukes.

[Raymond Lee]

Thanks for that.
Regards...

[zenpundit]

Hi J.

"No one is giving any country the "green light" to use CB weapons against American troops or interests."

I agree that CB are not in the same order of magnitude as nukes but neither are they regarded as strictly conventional weapons. And for good reasons given their lack of discrimination and the extended suffering they cause. This is hardly a new presumption on my part as it goes back to the end of the First World War

The Third Reich had enormous stockpiles of poison gas but even Hitler shrank from using them because the prospect of Allied retaliation in kind against German cities was too terrible to contemplate.

Conventional weapons, even high-precision munitions or bunker-busting superbombs are fully capable of flattening enemy cities; but flattened cities are an outcome that I would argue that leaders of states accept a priori if they choose to enter into a war with the United States. Having entered a war using that kind of calculus and having a "no-first use" guarantee of nukes, what then restrains their use of CB weapons ? Particularly if their use might make the difference between regime survival or defeat and removal from power ?

[J.]

"...lack of discrimination and the extended suffering they cause." Oh come on, zen, drop the arms control lingo and take a hard look at CB weapons. Ain't nothing special about them except their particular fill. Modern aerial bombs, cruise missiles, WP artillery, they all fit the discription you give.

We all thought that Saddam would use CB weapons in 1991 and 2003 as a "regime survival" tool, didn't happen. The fact is this - US conventional superiority guarentees a massive conventional attack against an adversary's infrastructure in the event of CB warfare. You don't need nukes. We only needed nukes as a retaliatory threat against the Soviet Union. Against modern small powers, that calculus doesn't work. Time to upgrade the policy.

[zenpundit]

Hi J.

No reliance upon lingo here. If Israel had used mustard or chlorine gas against Hezbollah in their last dust-up I'm sure that would have been regarded as beyond the pale ( and rightly so).

"Ain't nothing special about them except their particular fill. Modern aerial bombs, cruise missiles, WP artillery, they all fit the discription you give."

Then you are fine then, I take it, with the United States employing CB weapons against military targets or terrorists.

If not, why not?

[J.]

"Then you are fine then, I take it, with the United States employing CB weapons against military targets or terrorists."

As a matter of fact, yes, yes I am. I've stated so several times in this blog that I see nothing wrong with using CB weapons or having an offensive CB weapon program. Weapon systems aren't immoral, their use against noncombatants are. Using unconventional weapons against military targets (to include terrorist groups) is fundamentally okay with me, although I would use conventional weapons first as a general rule (just easier for conventional troops to use). It's just those damn pesky arms control treaties that prevent their use.

[SNi]

A major move would be to lean on the UK and France to denuclearise. Is there any reason for them to have nukes beyond reasons of prestige?? I've never heard a real case articulated.... Essentially they want them for the same reason that would-be proliferators want them, to be part of the exclusive club and because of perceived national pride, etc. Rather hypocritical, what?