I had the chance to finish Professor Barry Kellman's "Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime" this week. Kellman uses the term "bioviolence" to address both bioterrorism and biological warfare, and offers a framework to address what he sees as a dangerous world of potential biological incidents. I had mixed feelings about this book - he's clearly done a great deal of research and understands the biological sciences, but he overreaches in his attempts to solve a very complex challenge. I thought there was good, bad, and ugly aspects of this book.
The good - in the second section of this book, Kellman covers the breadth of the biological sciences and medical community. If you want to truly understand how challenging it would be to attempt to offer a solution to stopping bioterrorism and pushing back nation-state attempts to build a biological warfare program, he shows the overall process. It is daunting.
His prevention strategy is a four-part, first by complicating the efforts of bioterrorists by denying access to pathogens and interdicting those biological organisms that are being transported. Part 2 is improving resistence through educating researchers and supporting what he calls "translucency" - transparency is an arms control term where arms control investigators get to see everything in an effort to prove that nothing's going on. Translucency is where a nation provides enough information to deter and detect illegal behavior, but not enough information to allow other countries to gain insights on weapons applications. Part 3 is increasing public health preparedness; this is a common suggestion, but Kellman goes further by discussing biosurveillance, vaccination, and quarantine challenges. The last part is supporting international nonproliferation, and it's very interesting. He addresses the issue of non-lethal biological agents, how biodefense programs might hide offensive efforts, and disarming the Soviet BW program.
There's much to be learned by examining this second section, especially us non-medical experts. It really aids the discussion of biodefense policy, which is what pains me to illustrate the bad aspects of this book. My biggest itch is the term "bioviolence" itself, which Kellman states as meaning "the infliction of harm by the intentional manipulation of living micro-organisms or their natural products for hostile purposes." By defining this term, he deliberately blurs the difference between bioterrorism and biological warfare programs. Although I understand his intent, I don't buy into the idea that both efforts are inherently the same level of threat, nor is the solution the same to both challenges. We really, really don't need another term, after we have biowarfare, bioterrorism, biodefense, biosecurity, biosafety, and biopreparedness. ENOUGH.
In the first section in this book, Kellman uses three chapters to discuss the biological organisms (the usual suspects) and outlines a short history of biological warfare, to include the "Islamic Fundamentalist Interest." I get the feeling that he was trying too hard to impress the reader as to the potential danger of BW agents so that the rest of the book would justify the need to act upon the threat. It really is not the best supported part of the book.
The ugly part of this book, however, is Kellman's solutions to the problem. He suggests in the last 20-odd pages the creation of a United Nations' BWC Global Commission, a Bioviolence Prevention Office, and a Bioviolence Committee. This framework is to address the various policy, political, and scientific challenges identified throughout the book. It is, to say the least, overly ambitious and would never work to prevent bioterrorism or push back covert BW programs. Throughout the book, Kellman talks about how we must take certain measures to stop people from committing "ever more horrible bioviolence." The rhetoric is a little too heavy, and his solutions are just not realistic.
Overall, Kellman does us a service by demonstrating what an awesome challenge it is to try to tackle the challenge of reducing the proliferation of BW technology and material today. The challenges are myriad and complex. His book is worth a read just to get that appreciation, especially if you're a layperson or not medical-oriented. I learned a great deal about the complex issues. But I don't need the new terms or the exaggerated level of BW threats.
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