Counterpoint to "Abolishing the Air Force"

Rob Farley of Lawyers, Guns and Money has an article in The American Prospect making the case that the Air Force has not only overstayed its purpose, but it may be that it should never have separated from the Army in 1947.

But it's time to revisit the 1947 decision to separate the Air Force from the Army. While everyone agrees that the United States military requires air capability, it's less obvious that we need a bureaucratic entity called the United States Air Force. The independent Air Force privileges airpower to a degree unsupported by the historical record. This bureaucratic structure has proven to be a continual problem in war fighting, in procurement, and in estimates of the costs of armed conflict. Indeed, it would be wrong to say that the USAF is an idea whose time has passed. Rather, it's a mistake that never should have been made.

Rob asked me (and others) to comment on his article, and I was glad to do so. I don't believe that the Air Force should be abolished, but its record on the kinetic aspects of its "counterinsurgency doctrine" and the recent slip on its custodianship of nuclear weapons certainly weigh against it. I believe that the Air Force ought to retain its missions on air dominance (fighter/interceptors), strategic strike (conventional and nuclear), and space dominance. It could, however, return control of tactical air space to the Army and Navy.

The Air Force’s current position is clear – if the vehicle flies, it ought to belong under its control. Its move to become the executive agent and controller for all unmanned aerial vehicles, no matter what the purpose, demonstrates this desire. The Air Force’s failure to provide adequate close air support to ground units in Afghanistan (at least in the early years) and its record of collateral damage in urban areas of Iraq ought to concern the DOD leadership. Its desire to kill off the A-10 Thunderbolt and provide close air support through its fighter/interceptors may be other indicators. If the Army is to have close air support that is responsive, integrated into its operations, and affordable, yes, it makes good sense to let the Army take over that mission. The Army already has fixed wing assets for intra-theater lift and personnel movement; why not go the extra mile?

I do not, however, agree with Rob that the Air Force ought to give up its strategic strike capabilities to the Navy, either conventional or nuclear. I have no doubt in the Navy’s ability to operate carrier task groups and to significantly influence political and military operations anywhere on the globe. However, if we examine the first and second Gulf Wars, it was the Air Force that provided the overwhelming conventional “shock and awe” around the clock. The Navy has punch, but not sustainability. I don’t doubt that the Navy could, if tasked, take over the strategic nuclear capabilities of the Air Force, but frankly, I’m not sure that it wants that job. The Navy does nuclear subs, which, while ballistic missile silos in Montana may feature similar characteristics, the submarines are much more versatile. The Navy’s conventional strike capabilities are aimed at blue-water operations and not much more than a few miles of coastline. We need the Air Force to continue its strategic strike mission.

Similarly, we need the Air Force’s strategic lift capabilities. While I dislike the Air Force’s current fiscal strategy of budgeting for the modernization of C-5 planes and not for procuring new C-17 planes (rather, hinting that Congress should add $2.8 billion to its budget for that purpose), we rely on that capability to move and supply ground forces. The current strategic lift capability isn’t significant, forcing the DOD to charter commercial planes to augment these Air Force planes. We not only need this capability, we need to drastically increase it. But to ensure those planes get to their destinations, we need fighter/interceptors to clear the skies and take out air defense and command and control sites. Again, the Navy could do this, but perhaps not in the sustained fashion required for long-term combat operations.

Last, we need to look to the far future. Space will be the next battleground; it’s already being prepared by anti-satellite tests and an increasing amount of emphasis on instantaneous communications and intelligence services. I don't see the Navy or Army as significant stakeholders there. The Air Force is the primary agent looking to the stars. We need to retain and emphasize that focus.

The Air Force does need to transform itself to be a better partner, and that could happen by emphasizing its strategic strengths and disengaging its tactical responsibilities. That wouldn’t mean decreasing its size or influence, but it would mean creating better relations with its main customer – the U.S. Army. Abolishing the Air Force will, of course, never happen. If you read the biographies of the Air Force four-star generals, you’ll see a common thread – they’re nearly all fighter pilots. Four-star generals, active and retired, are incredibly powerful and influential. The Air Force Association would never let the service be dissolved, nor would the many Congressional politicians with Air Force bases in their districts.

But let’s forget the harsh political reality that denies our ability to see academic logic win over base parochialism. In this fantasy world of Rob’s, I would see a smaller, trimmer Air Force, with missions more designed to support the execution of fourth-generation military operations while maintaining a powerful capability to counter near-peer nations’ military air forces. I’d also like to see the Marine Corps give up their M1A1 Abrams tanks (and MRAPs) and return to their expeditionary roles, and while we’re at it, move all the services’ medical services, quartermaster, transportation, and judge advocate branches into a “joint service” command. But let’s just deal with the Air Force for today.

Comments

[Citizen Tom]

Hard to disagree with the general tenor of this piece. Look at the Marines. Because they do not trust the Navy to provide air support, they want their own Air Force. What is ironic, however, is that that Marines never bought into the A-10 either.

Exactly what the Air Force does not like about the A-10 is not hard to fathom. The Air Force does not like dirt divers. These aircraft compete for funds and their price exposes the waste inherent in its gold plated glamour jets.

The A-10 also has a few real problems. Although the A-10 is very practical, it is not fast. An attack helicopter can outfly it. Moreover, that big cannon on it fires depleted Uranium bullets -- not PC.

So the close support needs a strong advocate, but whether or not the Army will do better advocating close support fixed-winged aircraft remains to be seen. Keep in mind that such aircraft would compete with helicopters.

Will the Army like a plane that is cheaper but less mobile than heliocopters? How will the Army integrate fixed wing close support into its operations? Who will be the advocate?

[Alex]

Hey, I think the US armed forces should all be subsumed in the Navy; after all, what do you actually need and use?

Carriers and their kids for the worldwide sea control mission; carriers, SSNs, and amphibs for worldwide force projection; an expanded Marine Corps for fighting battles up to division strength and doing the peacekeeping/4GW/counterinsurgency stuff, at which they are better than the Army; SSBNs for second-strike nuclear deterrence.

Seabees for 4GW/foreign aid/home civil defence engineer support.

[J.]

Tom, we ground-pounders love the A-10. You ought to see a pair swooping over a live-fire range, chewing up the scenary and dropping their bombs. It's more survivable than an Apache and, when you consider that Apaches have to hover quite frequently, is definitely a fast-mover. And we don't care about any stinkin' DU myths.

Alex, Alex, Alex. I know you must be joking with me, since the British Royal Navy wasn't occupying Basra for the last few years. Marine Corps was never meant to be a general purpose force to fight long-term campaigns. And the Army invented amphibious assaults in WWII, the Marines just took all the credit for it later. As much as some accuse the Army of wanting to be more modular and expeditionary like the Marine Corps, I suspect that the Marine Corps often wants to be more like the Army in terms of heavy capability and involvement in campaigns. We ought to play to each others strengths instead of duplicating each other and developing "service-unique" capabilities.

[NVH]

J., well put sir, well put...

[Grandjester]

Good comments, I tend to agree with J. that Stratcom and Spacecom would remain in the AF baliwick, but I am sure that the Army would love greater control over lift/transport. Mating Tac air directly to ground units is clearly benificial, we could keep the AF structure for training/deployment/etc. but GROUND COMMANDERS should have the actual unit under command during ops.

[NVH]

There's some article in national defense this month about the need for ground guys to be aware of the battlespace from the perspective of the air guys, GJ, it makes sense to me, could only serve the joint world in the long run, and let the grunts direct surgical strikes with greater efficiency...no doubt.

[Minnesotachuck]

One of the main (among many) reasons the late, great USAF Col. John Boyd (http://tinyurl.com/cewxa) remains to this day little more than a footnote in official Air Force history is that he recognized air power should ultimately be under the control of the ground commander, since the latter is the one who directs those who will most directly determine the outcome of almost any war by taking control of the strategic ground. Boyd being Boyd he passed on this message to all who would listen, and many who would not. This from the guy who was generally recognized as the best fighter pilot of his (and perhaps any) generation, and whose intellectual achievements ranging from aircraft design to 'post-graduate' pilot training forever affected fighter combat for the better. He was also a viciously effective bureaucratic infighter. He had to be in order to be able to shove both the A-10 and the F-16 down the throats of an Air Force hierarchy populated by three and four stars who wanted nothing to do with them.

[Jonathan Baum]

I often find myself explaining to Israelis just how much the various American armed forces hate each other and how much time and energy they spend in conflict with one another. It leaves the locals scratching their heads. One of the things that really freaks them out is when I tell them that the USA has four air forces. I understand the reasons, but it's still stupid. Here, if it flies, it belongs to the IAF, even if it flies off a boat. The main difference is, of course, that the IDF is a unitary force with a single chief of staff - who commands in war - and is dominated by the ground forces. We also don't have a tradition of sending our forces around the world to fight, so the navy and air force have a mainly local reach. Still, it's fun to watch the rivalries and silly name-calling American military men indulge in. Will the rivalries ever cease? Probably not.

[Citizen Tom]

Jonathan Baum raises an interesting point. Why is the U.S. military divided?

Divide and conquer; it is a strategy that works. To keep our military forces under their control, our civilian leaders have divided our military forces into services. However, even these divisions do not suffice. Our various military services do not fight. Instead, they organize, train, and equip.

Theater commands conduct war fighting. For example, when CENTCOM was not doing anything, all the four-star in charge had was a staff. Only during exercises and actual military operations is a theater CINC given charge of military forces. Such is controlled by DoD via the Joint Chiefs.

While these divisions may seem rather arcane, in actual fact they are brilliant. The lines of authority and responsibility are clear. The competition that results helps to ensure our dollars are well spent. And the ambitions of would be military dictators are easily stymied.

[Ralph Hitchens]

I did my time in the Air Force, back in the last century, and have to agree that technology and geopolitics have completely changed the military landscape. We certainly need to preserve a residual "big war" capability -- tanks, artillery, CV battle groups, 4th generation fighter wings --but the size and composition of that force needs a lot more refinement. The rest of the time we're doing peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and a certain amount of 4GW against non-state foes. Who should own the transports, UAVs, and heterogeneous ground and naval assets we need for these new forms of military engagement? Tom Barnett thinks it should be a new sysadmin force, and he's got a point.

[ajay]

And the Army invented amphibious assaults in WWII, the Marines just took all the credit for it later

I have a suspicion that landing troops on shore from ships may date from a little before the Second World War.

Caesar did it, for one.

[ajay]

More seriously - what is the argument for having the Marines separate from the Army? Why not just roll them in together? The Army has lots of different units with different missions - air mobile, airborne, armoured, etc. Why can't it have amphibious units too?

And secondly, I think this may be overemphasising the importance of letterheads. The Royal Marines are nominally part of the Naval Service, not the British Army, but they operate as (effectively) another army formation, with army battlegroups plugging into 3 Cdo Bde without too many problems. If the USMC, USA and USAF won't play well together, that probably won't be solved by changing letterheads - it's a failure of leadership.

[Dude]

Just wanted to point something out about the Airforce. It is said that the Airforce should remain in control of space..

If you think about it, it is the Navy that is more suited to the role of Space Exploration, Colonization, and Warfighting.