Bacevich Misfires on the Joint Staff

I was surprised to see Andrew Bacevich's attack on the Joint Staff in Monday's Boston Globe. He seems to believe that the Joint Staff has turned into a useless organization of "yes-men" (and women) to the OSD leadership and the White House. And not only that, he says that this continues a tradition of limited usefulness over the past two decades, despite the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986.

Having learned from Powell's tenure that a talented, high-powered JCS chairman can produce big-time political headaches, the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have opted for officers who could be counted on not to make waves. They have done so by selecting anti-Powells to serve as JCS chairmen -- officers who, whatever their other admirable qualities, have possessed few of the attributes that made Powell so formidable. Since 1993, the position of JCS chairman has been filled by a succession of colorless, compliant generals -- honorable and good soldiers to the man, but none demonstrating anything approaching Powell's smarts, flair, and shrewdness. Mediocrity can be a cruel word, but as a description of those who have succeeded Colin Powell as the nation's top military officer, it is apt.

When Donald Rumsfeld served as defense secretary, silent assent became an absolute requirement, as army chief of staff Eric Shinseki learned, to his chagrin. When Shinseki testified, during the run-up to the Iraq invasion, that occupying the country might require many more troops than were available, Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz went out of their way to humiliate and discredit the general for having the temerity to venture an independent opinion. The message to the senior officer corps was clear: those interested in getting ahead were expected to toe the party line.

Pace exemplifies this breed. Only once during his time as chairman has Pace asserted himself -- and that, somewhat bizarrely, was to express his view that homosexuality is immoral. Apart from that uncharacteristic outburst, he has loyally accommodated himself to whatever the boss has wanted, even to calamitous policies that have done immeasurable harm not only to the country but to the armed services to which he has devoted his life.
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The armed forces deserve top-notch professional leadership. Civilian policymakers need expert military counsel, offered clearly and candidly. Yet to charge one small group of senior officers with fulfilling both functions makes it unlikely that either will be adequately performed. The dismal saga of the Joint Chiefs has demonstrated this in spades. At the highest levels a line should exist between the senior officers who advise on matters of national security policy and those expected to implement policy decisions. One way to draw that line might be to select advisers from the ranks of retired generals and admirals, independent-minded "wise men" no longer involved in running their services.

Secretary Gates has described Pace's successor as an officer of "vision, strategic insight, and integrity." No doubt similar words were spoken when Pace himself was appointed chairman, perhaps with equal sincerity.

Yet whatever personal attributes Admiral Mullen may possess -- even if he ends up being more like a Powell than another Pace -- the real problem lies with the institution over which he will preside. Six decades of trying to fix the Joint Chiefs of Staff have produced little positive effect. Further tinkering will only waste more money and, alas, more lives.

The JCS lies beyond salvaging. Before you build a new house, you tear the old one down. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it's wrecking-ball time. A chairman possessing vision, strategic insight, and integrity ought to be the first to acknowledge that.

Bacevich has completely missed the point here. I certainly will not argue that both Generals Richard Myers and Pete Pace have failed in the execution of their roles as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But it's not the organization, dedication, or loyalties of the 1500 people in the Joint Staff who are at fault here. Is the Joint Staff a perfect organization? No, of course not. It is made up of competent, aggressive leaders from the four services (and Coast Guard) who, during a two-year tenure, focus on immediate and upcoming military issues and who attempt to address challenges that come up before the combatant commands. There has been a great deal of analyses, doctrine and concept development, operational plans and strategy, and logistics executed from this organization that has been top-notch.

The problem has been the constraints under which the Joint Staff has had to operate. First of all, you have OSD agencies sending their staff down the hall with new taskers, new "great ideas", many of which are politically motivated and which lack fundamental understanding of military concepts or strategy. I know you find that hard to believe, but it happens. Rumsfeld set the azimuth and his staffers followed it to the letter with their behavior. Second of all, the Joint Staff is just that... a staff. Maybe the Imperial Staff (as it is gently mocked), but they are not the decision makers. Again, I know you will find it hard to believe that the senior civilian and military leadership would ignore sound recommendations by the Joint Staff, but again, it happens.

Last, the decision-makers themselves - the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is made up of the four Service chiefs. At the end of the day, service parochialism will rear its ugly head, frustrating the ability to correct chronic defense problems. And every active duty military person in the Joint Staff recognizes that, at the end of his or her two-year tour, it's back to the respective service. That kind of perspective can color one's actions, especially if one is an ambitious colonel or brigadier general.

The Joint Staff is far from perfect, but it is a capable and well-functioning organization. Bacevich takes aim at the Chairman's position and its interaction with the White House and mistakenly attacks the organization that is trying its best to develop professional and timely recommendations for keeping the military running smoothly. I think he knows better, but he just used too wide a brush to paint his commentary. 

Comments

[James Atticus Bowden]

I think you are missing the fact that for almost 5 years or so Rummy approved all 3 star and above nominations or was it down to 2 stars? That matters.

[J.]

With respect, the political selection of 3-4 stars certainly had an effect on the military but not on the Joint Staff rank and file. If you're suggesting that the Directors of the Joint Staff's elements (J1 thru J8) are tainted by that process, well, maybe you have a point. But again, I suggest that the organization as it exists is pretty good for near-mid-term operations. The pace of action in the Joint Staff may preclude their far-term vision, but it doesn't need excessive reform. The OSD and White House (and the four Service chiefs) merely need to let the Joint Staff work and seriously consider its products.

[Robot Economist]

I would characterize the Pentagon over the past 7 years in the opposite way. Rumsfeld and his political cronies ran rough-shod over the Joint Staff for 2 and a half years, up until about 6 months after the invasion of Iraq.

Then they took an extremely passive role in operations, leaving the JS to fill the gaps on Pentagon strategy. Since soldiers generally "don't do strategy," the Staff and the Chairman were left to drift.

This drift gave off a strong appearance of "yes-manness" when no one was really asking questions for them to say yes to.

[Grandjester]

J. you surprise me. The JCS is moribund, can't we find a org chart a little more up to date than the Prussian model? 1500 people? That is f'ing ridiculous, no wonder not much good ever gets done. A corporate model such as Apple or Microsoft (granted, these have issues all their own, but stick with the underlying premise for a minute) that has a strong chair (your Gates, Jobs, etc.) with Strategic and Tactical VISION, surrounded by a core of advisors that share that VISION. These are then surrounded by the most competent MANAGERS and ADMINISTRATORS to implement same.

Finally, if we MUST continue to have separate services (a totally redundant waste, IMHO), then how about a new uniform for 3-4 stars to indicate their commitment to WHOLE FORCE integration (something fetching, how about black, brings a touch of the Prussian back into it). Unity of purpose, unity of command. Would you like to know more?

[J.]

GJ, RE, I will admit that I haven't been intimately familiar with my Joint Staff brethren in the past two years. I was more familiar in the exciting first 2 1/2 years that RE references. Nonetheless, I will still say that, as a staff, it is the best way to coordinate issues between the services and the combatant commands and OSD and get an 80% solution on any topic within two weeks. Then there is the joint concepts, the budget analysis, etc etc.

The fault is not the organization or the people. Yeah, you can tell me that the Prussian model is outmoded, but I'll tell you that putting former CEOs in the SecDef and SecArmy, SecAF, and SecNavy roles hasn't been a real successful model. You cannot run defense on a business model. I'll tell you the most frightening thing to me was when they redid the DOD 101 brief on DefenseLINK and they said that Bush was the "CEO" of the Defense Department. Holllley crap.

As long as we have four independent services (and now the NG wants to be a independent service), and as long as OSD screws with the JCS and Services, the Joint Staff is the only thing standing between the president and utter chaos. When we get the four Services to stop playing politics and make the combatant commands more important than the four Services, and whenever someone reforms the broken DOD acquisition process and its arcane record-keeping procedures, then you can talk to me about reforming the Joint Staff.

[Grandjester]

Perhaps, I didn't make my point.

The corp examples I was trying to use were those that encourage innovation, within a clear direction/vision.

The type of Halliburton/Wall St/Think tank guys we have ended up with in the SEC offices don't really fit within my suggestion.

Perhaps the ideal ChairJCS I am looking for cannot exsist today. Powell was good, but perhaps the Moltke, Fisher, Mitchell, Guderian, Rickover types are once in a generation phenomenon and more often than not marginalized in their own time.

[morinao]

Here's a topical two part article by Mark Perry, who literally wrote the book on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also asserts that the weakness of recent chairmen has been deliberate:

Since the retirement of Colin Powell, four generals have served as JCS chairman. All have been weak.

"This has been a purposeful policy," a former senior army commander said. "Bill Clinton quietly advised George Bush that the last thing he wanted was to have a strong chairman, as Colin Powell was able to dictate military policy to Clinton because of his prestige."

Perry goes on to dish about the new Secretary's decision to replace Abizaid and Casey:

"Gates was particularly disturbed with Abizaid," a Pentagon official says. "His [Central Command Regional military] staff had ballooned, it was way out of wack. There were 3,800 officers in the region, sitting at their computers in their little cubby holes. That was more than [president Dwight D Eisenhower had in Europe in World War II. Gates came back to Washington and said, 'What the hell are these people doing? Why aren't they in the front lines'?"...The rap on Casey was different: "He was simply indecisive, like [former president] Jimmy Carter. His commanders would come to him with options and he would look around the table and say, 'Well gentlemen, what should we do?' Damn, why was he asking them? He was the one who was supposed to be in charge," the Pentagon official says.

The claim is that Gates was perfectly happy to keep Pace on, but Bush and Cheney caved in the face of Senate opposition:

...President George W Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were told by Senate Armed Service Committee chairman Carl Levin that Pace would have difficulty getting reconfirmed for a traditional second two-year term as JCS chairman. "Bush and Cheney were told that Pace would just be shredded," this official says...Bush and Cheney told Levin that they would pull the Pace nomination.

Lots more about the evolution of the war czar position. Good news for J.: some of the army still has some influence; apparently the President listens to GEN Keane and the Secretary listens to GEN Joulwan.

[Eric]

Please note that the Chiefs of staff are not in the chain of command. (see title X, USC)
As I have been taught, the chain co command goes from lowest to highest; squad leader/tank commander, platoon leader, company commander, battalion commander, brigade commander, division commander, corps commander, unified command commander, Secdef, President. Gee, the joint staff aint in the mix.

[J.]

Eric - I think you're mixing things up a bit. For the Army, I suggest that the command chain goes division - corps - army - major command (FORSCOM) - Chief of Staff of the Army - SecArmy - SecDef - President. Yes, the Joint Staff isn't in the mix, neither is the unified command. But I don't think you want to tell the CSA that he's not in the chain of command.

The issue of the CJCS is that he's supposed to be an independent advisor to the President (bypassing the SecDef if necessary). Rummie didn't like that, so he changed the rules. But as for the Imperial Staff, no one who ever worked on the Joint Staff would suggest that they were "in charge" or anything other than advisory.

Morinao - thanks for the links, enjoyed the Perry article. By my experience, that's exactly how Casey worked. Abizaid was a master though, don't know why Gates was upset about a big HQ. It's a complex situation...

[Grandjester]

So, Rummy=Bismarck?

[a517dogg]

To me it seems the Joint Chiefs have been asked to do two core jobs, and are good at one and bad at the other. They've been good at doing doctrine, integrating operations, etc. They've been bad at their advisory role because nobody listens to them - the President listens to his political appointees instead. No system will work perfectly if the people in that system don't want it to work.

[John of Argghhh!]

J, I disagree - the CSA *isn't* in the chain of command.

Eric is correct. And it's one of the problems with the higher organizations.

But units stateside fall under FORSCOM, unless assigned to a COCOM...

The Chief has influence, certainly, especially in the selection and assignment of GOs, but he doesn't give 'em orders.

That is one of the frustrations of the job - the COCOM commanders can ignore you. They have their own budget, and they have the title Commander.

[J.]

Oh come on, John. Just the opposite is true. The Services can - and do - ignore the COCOMs. Routinely. They own the people, the doctrine, and the equipment. The COCOM commanders, while "joint," do have to come back to the service that made them, and they only own the units on a temporary basis. And while four stars can ignore other four stars, their subordinates know who's "in charge" of their careers. And it ain't the COCOM, yahnowhadimean?

The Chiefs don't have to give orders, they know that any conflict is temporary (well, except this current one, maybe) and that they're the institution that endures, not that two-year COCOM commander. That's why the Joint Staff is supposed to represent and support the COCOMs, while coordinating issues with the Services and OSD. But in the end, the JROC makes the joint decisions on major acquisitions and allocation of forces in support of combat operations - again, that's the service chiefs - and the chiefs aren't making those decisions without thinking what's in it for their side.

[Retired Army guy]

"As long as we have four independent services (and now the NG wants to be a independent service), and as long as OSD screws with the JCS and Services, the Joint Staff is the only thing standing between the president and utter chaos."

J, your own words belie your thesis about the efficacy of the JCS and the joint staff. If we don't have chaos now, what exactly would you term it?

And then you dig yourself further into the hole by citing the JROC. Boy, what great things those guys have done, eh? F22, FCS, you name it. The JROC is all about "you scratch my back...."

IMO, Bacevich has a very valid point. The reality is that we have a failed national security paradigm. Our government doesn't seem to be able to do a particularly good job. Unfortunately the JCS and the entire joint staff process have contributed greatly to the failure.

Or would you cite Iraq as an example of the splendid work of the JCS?

[J.]

Well, you have a point there. What I meant to say (I think) was that the Joint Staff is/can be a tool for good when the services and the OSD and the JROC let it do good things. The organization itself is not going to get any better because of reforms. I think Bacevich should have focused solely on the leadership and not the Joint Staff, which I think was his intent, just the words didn't come out right in his critique.