You may have heard of this attempt by a Georgian smuggler to sell some highly enriched uranium to an undercover Russian agent. It was only 100 grams, but it got lots of people excited, primarily because he said he had more taken from a Russian facility.
The Russian was carrying 100g (3.5oz) of uranium, but had offered more. A US test confirmed it was highly enriched.
Experts at the US Department of Energy examined the sample and concluded it was powerful enough to fuel part of a nuclear weapon.
The man was able to transport it in a plastic bag in his pocket, the Associated Press reported, because uranium has a low level of radioactive emission.
The Center for Nonproliferation Studies has a nice follow-up on the issue.
For many years, nonproliferation experts have tried to direct more attention to separatist regions, where the smuggling of arms and narcotics is widespread, as possible smuggling routes for WMD materials. The newly released information suggests that this concern is well-founded. Although it is unclear whether the material indeed came from a Russian facility and when it was originally obtained, the incident certainly indicates that the control of nuclear materials in the region remains inadequate.
So far the greatest enigma is the fate of the approximately 2 kg of HEU that the perpetrator allegedly kept hidden in Vladikavkaz. Although efforts to recover it should have been at the top of the agenda of all countries involved, it is unclear what, if any, action was taken.
The poor state of cooperation between Georgia, Russia, and the United States on the latest smuggling incident results in part from the continuing crisis in Georgian-Russian relations. Seen from the Georgian perspective, the incident demonstrates the need to urgently reintegrate the breakaway region of South Ossetia into Georgia. Russians, however, consider the fact that the incident was publicized a year after it actually occurred as proof that Georgian leaders are using it as political leverage. Regardless of the merits of each claim, the atmosphere of mistrust is bound to negatively affect the investigation.
Furthermore, despite the existence for over one decade of various cooperative agreements between the United State and Russia to counter nuclear terrorism, including the most recent Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism at the 2006 G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, little intelligence sharing has occurred relating to illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. If Moscow and Washington are serious about fighting nuclear terror, cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies on nuclear smuggling cases is essential.
This is the weird thing. If we were to believe all the rhetoric about terrorist dirty bombs and improvised nuclear devices, we might see a lot more attempts by both governments to lock down nuclear material. But you don't see that - heck, you hardly hear anything about Yucca mountain and the need to store all the US nuclear waste. If we're serious about dirty bombs, it would take very little resources and time to lock up the basic materials.
Dirty bombs and terrorist nukes are in all reality, just a scare tactic of the Security Branches.
Sadly, this Onion piece probably captures the reality of a terrorist nuke or dirty bomb better than any Official statements.
http://www.theonion.com/content/node/43012
Posted by: jsf61 | 02 February 2007 at 04:08 PM