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12 December 2006

Back Away Slowly...

President Bush had some special visitors last night in the form of traveling Wise Men - Eliot Cohen from John Hopkins University, noted military author Steven Biddle, and retired Army generals John Keane, Barry McCaffrey, and Wayne Downing. In all, an interesting and somewhat balanced group of individuals, but the interesting thing is none fo them liked the Iraq Study Group report. Cohen and Downing both downplayed the option of diplomacy with Iran and Syria, and at least three of the group don't like the idea of downsizing the force in 2007.

Overall, they were coy about releasing any details to the news last night, insisting it was a "private meeting. The retired generals all stressed to the president the need for a larger Army and Marine Corps, which was good. What bothered me was this note:

During yesterday's White House meeting, Bush asked all the questions, except for one at the end from Cheney, a source said. But Cheney took copious notes throughout, filling several pages, he said. "They didn't really reveal their own views" in their questions, said retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, one of the five participants.

As a whole, the group of retired generals and academics who met Bush tend to be skeptical of the Iraq Study Group's proposals, and so were able to give him additional reasons to reject its recommendations.

Okay, first of all, Cheney taking "copious notes"? What's that all about? Is this just a drill for Bush to "get advice from folks in the field" so that he can develop his own "new way forward" in Iraq? Sure sounds like it. I saw General McCaffrey on the NBC evening news - he was at Washington National Airport, going somewhere, and he had this to say (paraphrasing): "well we are getting a new secretary of defense, thank God, and that will help things..." These may not be the exact words, but the way he emphasized "thank God", I nearly got whiplash the way my head snapped up. The disgust in his voice was strong.

I'm trying to figure out why the Wise Men think that we need to stay longer in Iraq with larger troop strengths. The only reason I can think of is that they believe that we can still achieve some degree of "success" - don't use the "victory" word - in that we might be able to stave off a civil war and avoid the coming bloodbath that will happen if we "stay the course." I found this March 2006 interview with Steven Biddle that might help explain.

I think, given that rather limited option set, the option that makes the most sense, given the nature of the underlying conflict, is our troops are going to have to stay for longer than we would like; we need to slow down the process of building up the Iraqi military in the meantime because the way out of this conflict, the ultimate solution to the real problem in Iraq, is a constitutional power-sharing deal; and if we build the Iraqi military up too fast and it becomes highly capable before we get the constitutional deal to allot power among the parties, that military instrument undermines our prospects for getting the constitutional deal.  Because the Sunnis believe that a constitutional deal with a national military that constitutes essentially a massive militia in the hands of their ethnic rivals, ethnic and sectarian rivals, means that a deal involves giving up their weapons in exchange for a paper guarantee backed up with a tool of violence that’s exclusively in the hands of their enemies.  And I think it’s unlikely that they’re going to consider that to be a good deal.  I think it’s important that we get a strong Iraqi military, but it has to come after the constitutional deal, not before it, or it undermines our prospects of getting the deal in the first place.

It does make sense. Why train an Iraqi military when the Iraqi government is unable or unwilling to responsibly use it? If one assumes that the goal is a stable Iraqi government, that means the key is staying in Iraq until the ministries start doing their jobs right and the Sunnis feel like political avenues are a better way of getting what they want. And if we are intent on stablizing Iraq, that means more troops, not less, to protect the trainers and to conduct more counterinsurgency missions.

There's some level of irony here - the right wing talking heads are now saying "screw the Iraqis, pull out and let them all kill each other," and now the left side of the aisle is saying, "well, we're there and we have a duty to stop a potential bloodbath." But is Bush listening to either side?

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It seems to me that the basic problem remains the same as it's been for two years now. As long as American troops (and money) are in Iraq, the various groups struggling for power are going to use them as a crutch and try to jockey for more power, money, influence, etc. Why give up potential gains (or at least perceived gains) now for the chance (and perhaps not a very good chance) for a constitutional settlement?

"A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush (Bush?)."

I think the Kurds and the Shiaa feel they can win the prize and so what's the incentive to compromise? The Sunnis think compromise will be a death sentence or, at least, a one way ticket to poverty and oppression. (Of course, these are all generalizations...)

Sure we want a peaceful, constitutional settlement and an end to the conflict right now, but who in Iraq (that has influence and power) really cares what we want?

What incentives are there for these groups to compromise and reach a settlement? Well, an end to the huge cash flow into Iraq from the U.S. (and the opportunity to skim a percentage for those currently in power). An end to the U.S. military presence which guarantees Iraqi sovereignty from other nations (Iran, Turkey) and fights the insurgency while giving everyone political cover ("We didn't bomb that house and kill those civilians. It was the occupiers!")

I agree with you, Belphegor. I saw this blogpost in "History Unfolding" which I think nails it. The ISG authors (and others) can't imagine allowing Iraq to split up into three regions, while he states, how can we realistically expect to stop it?

"I do not see how anyone can read those paragraphs and conclude that Iraq can peacefully be held together, but that it is the premise behind the panel’s recommendations. Europe and the United States made no parallel attempts to hold together Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union—all states created at the same time as Iraq. I have become convinced (and the paragraphs above would do the trick, even if Peter Galbraith’s book hadn’t already) that Iraq is almost certain to be split up, and that the only issue is whether the United States is going to futilely oppose that process until we are driven out of the country or try to make it as peaceful as possible and get some credit out of it. The commission wouldn’t face up to the problem it stated so clearly."

Very insightful guy. Read the whole post.

Belphegor: that's fairly perceptive. Neither side seems very interested in engaging each so much as engaging the US. That's our punishment for being the middle. As long as we're there, their relationship with us is more important than their relationship with each other.

Right now, the only sensible argument for staying in Iraq has nothing to do with Iraq. It has to do with the rest of the region. Our new objective is to prevent the Iraq Civil War from becoming a regional war and it's hard to do that without staying and keeping a lid on things. But this is not a permanent solution to that particular problem. We're wearing out, financially, politically, and militarily. Hence the need to "engage Iran and Syria."

We have a new Iraq containment situation, and it's far more complex and difficult than the one we had in the 90's. Our strategic situation is worse than when we started. That alone makes it a defeat.

Sounds like Cheney is "as much in the thick of things" as he ever was....

this is ominious....

buzz...buzz...

I saw eliot cohen on meet the press or something. it reminded me that paul wolfowitz also once held a very prominent position in military academia. both of them are fools.

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