Fanning the Bioterrorism Fears

The Washington Post has a two-part series on bioterrorism (see here and here). They must have felt that it was a slow newsweek, and maybe they needed to fan the flames of bioterror a bit. Actually, I exaggerate, the articles aren't all bad, but they do mix a bit of sensationalism in with the ernest reporting on what our government is doing to develop defenses against potential biological terrorism. The first article covered the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), which will eventually be housed in a complex being constructed at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Although the center won't be ready until 2008, the Army's Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (MRIID) is hosting the DOD-DHS-DHHS-DOJ consortium. But questions still come from the worried media as to the secrecy of the work conducted there.

In an unusual arrangement, the building itself will be classified as highly restricted space, from the reception desk to the lab benches to the cages where animals are kept. Few federal facilities, including nuclear labs, operate with such stealth. It is this opacity that some arms-control experts say has become a defining characteristic of U.S. biodefense policy as carried out by the Department of Homeland Security, NBACC's creator.
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The few public documents that describe NBACC's research mission have done little to quiet those fears. A computer slide show prepared by the center's directors in 2004 offers a to-do list that suggests the lab will be making and testing small amounts of weaponized microbes and, perhaps, genetically engineered viruses and bacteria. It also calls for "red team" exercises that simulate attacks by hostile groups.

NBACC's close ties to the U.S. intelligence community have also caused concern among the agency's critics. The CIA has assigned advisers to the lab, including at least one member of the "Z-Division," an elite group jointly operated with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that specializes in analyzing and duplicating weapons systems of potential adversaries, officials familiar with the program confirm.
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"De facto, we are going to make biowarfare pathogens at NBACC in order to study them," said Penrose "Parney" Albright, former Homeland Security assistant secretary for science and technology.
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Current and former administration officials say that compliance with the treaty hinges on intent, and that making small amounts of biowarfare pathogens for study is permitted under a broad interpretation of the treaty. Some also argue that the need for a strong biodefense in an age of genetic engineering trumps concerns over what they see as legal hair-splitting.

"How can I go to the people of this country and say, 'I can't do this important research because some arms-control advocate told me I can't'?" asked Albright, the former Homeland Security assistant secretary.

Now there are two sides here. Certainly the U.S. government requires the capability to research BW agents and potential future hazards, and it's nice that the federal agencies are actually collocating together to do this instead of creating independent research centers. On the other hand, this secrecy is overkill. It's not "legal hair-splitting" to suggest that international arms control agreements, developed to ensure that everyone remains honest in the area of biological weapons development, has some value here. The Congress ought to insist on a degree of transparency here. We don't need to know the BW formulas or the findings of vulnerability assessment reports, but we do need to know the general nature and amount of research going on. After all, we're paying for it, and it would actually do a lot to diminish the "it's evil bugs released from a govt lab" conspiracy theorists out there.

The second article also nudges the "let's get hysterical" line in the area of future genetically modified organisms and viruses made from scraps in the lab. The question is, will any degreed microbiologist be able to whip up a dangerous and potentially lethal virus or bacteria and release it on the world? Yes, it's the "Andromeda Strain" argument...

Five years ago, deadly anthrax attacks forced Americans to confront the suddenly real prospect of bioterrorism. Since then the Bush administration has poured billions of dollars into building a defensive wall of drugs, vaccines and special sensors that can detect dangerous pathogens. But already, technology is hurtling past it. While government scientists press their search for new drugs for old foes such as classic anthrax, a revolution in biology has ushered in an age of engineered microbes and novel ways to make them.

The new technology opens the door to new tools for defeating disease and saving lives. But today, in hundreds of labs worldwide, it is also possible to transform common intestinal microbes into killers. Or to make deadly strains even more lethal. Or to resurrect bygone killers, such the 1918 influenza. Or to manipulate a person's hormones by switching genes on or off. Or to craft cheap, efficient delivery systems that can infect large numbers of people.

Now the journalist spins the story on how easy it is to become a bioweaponeer for the first three pages (electronically speaking) until we get a counterview on the fourth page.

"The capability of terrorists to embark on this path in the near- to mid-term is judged to be low," Charles E. Allen, chief intelligence officer for the Department of Homeland Security, said in testimony May 4 before a panel of the House Committee on Homeland Security. "Just because the technology is available doesn't mean terrorists can or will use it."

A far more likely source, Allen said, is a "lone wolf": a scientist or biological hacker working alone or in a small group, driven by ideology or perhaps personal demons. Many experts believe the anthrax attacks of 2001 were the work of just such a loner.

"All it would take for advanced bioweapons development," Allen said, "is one skilled scientist and modest equipment -- an activity we are unlikely to detect in advance."

Thank you, Mr. Allen! Unfortunately, the journalist lets the nutty doomsayer (who happens to work for a consulting firm on biosecurity) have the last word.

In a biological attack, waiting even a few weeks for new drugs may be disastrous, said Tara O'Toole, a physician and director of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.

"We haven't yet absorbed the magnitude of this threat to national security," said O'Toole, who worries that the national commitment to biodefense is waning over time and the rise of natural threats such as pandemic flu. "It is true that pandemic flu is important, and we're not doing nearly enough, but I don't think pandemic flu could take down the United States of America. A campaign of moderate biological attacks could."

Oh, bullshit. This is the problem letting scientists and doctors talk about bioterrorism. They don't know squat about terrorism motivations or the potential vulnerabilities or how a BW terrorist event would actually play out, so they all become "Tom Clancy" wannabees. Milton Leitenberg had a much more reasoned and calm approach to the subject. Yes, we do need to increase our understanding of what's possible and what's going on in academia, but at the same time, the likelihood of a BW terrorist incident is incredibly lower than a chemical or radiological incident. I'd rather our tax dollars focus on the probable incidents, not the worst case scenarios.

Comments

[CKR]

Thanks for pulling out that quote on how difficult it really is, J.

For those of us who have actually worked in laboratories, it's extremely frustrating to read the continuing intimations that, yeah, anyone can whip up enough of a deadly bug (or chemical) to kill all of New York on a sunny afternoon in their kitchen.

It's hard to make things work in a fully-equipped laboratory. They usually don't the first time. There's a process of learning how to do it that I can't explain easily in a few words; maybe I'll blog on it sometime. It's harder if a pinpoint of what you're working with can kill you.

Could I or someone with equivalent experience, a fair bit of money, and a lot of spare time whip this stuff up in my garage? Maybe, but chances are I'd kill myself or the cops would find out first.

ANFO rules.

The secrecy thing hit me in that first WaPo article. An alternate model might be to make everything public except the dirty details (the exact amounts, times, temperatures, and the subtler parts of that learning process), which should be kept entirely secret.

If the bad guys know what we have defenses against, that limits their options. It also tells them where they might find an opening, but if there's an opening, it's because it's very difficult to get there. And if we "direct" their efforts in this way, it's easier to monitor who's buying the supplies that give away what they're doing.

And the world would be satisfied that we're sticking to the CWC, and the public could debate the wisdom of what we're doing.

Aaaah! Too early in the morning! I'm fantasizing!

[Urinated State of America]

" Certainly the U.S. government requires the capability to research BW agents and potential future hazards, and it's nice that the federal agencies are actually collocating together to do this instead of creating independent research centers. On the other hand, this secrecy is overkill."

Actually, I'd say the secrecy is a *good* thing. Having most of the workers' there subject to the clearance process and having the center at Fort Detrick is a lot more reassuring than having it at Random University X whose congressperson managed to pull down that little piece of pork.

We all know that the biodefense bucks are going to go away, and biodefense workers and researchers will have to find another way to pay the mortgage: in which case I'd rather have as many of the workers with BW pathogens having been subject to the clearance screening process, because of the risk that one of them would they do like the Amerithrax terrorist did.

[J.]

Don't get me wrong, "USA." I agree that the workers have to be cleared, that we need biological agent surety guidelines for govt, industry and academia, and the exact nature of their work and lab processes/reports need to be classified as appropriate.

However. That requirement does not make "everything" that goes on in biodefense as classified. There was reference that the entire NBACC building was going to be a SCIF - this is required for Top Secret work and storage. Working in a SCIF does not mean that everything you do/report is TS however. The US government has a responsibility to the taxpayer to account for what they're doing, a responsibility to inform Congress that they have an effective program, and a responsibility to the international community to assure our allies that we aren't investing in offensive BW capabilities. There are ways to ensure this transparency and still maintain close-hold on bio agent development.

This administration in particular, driven (I believe) by Cheney and some particular people on the NSC, are petrified of BW agent outbreaks. They need to loosen up, be realistic, and be open with the purposes driving their agenda and how the NBACC effectively supports the homeland security.

[Urinated State of America]

"There was reference that the entire NBACC building was going to be a SCIF - this is required for Top Secret work and storage."

And you actually think they'll succeed in reconciling the requirements of a SCIF with the requirements of a BL-3 or BL-4 lab?

I'd expect to be collecting the dismal successor of whatever replaces social security before that sucker gets certified.

[J.]

Building a SCIF is easy when you work the requirements into the construction of the center. It's retrofitting old buildings that's tough. My bet is that the BL3/BL4 lab will be an independent center within the "SCIF" building. Lots of alarms and security guards in the main building, lots of filters and negative pressure flow inside the lab. It could be done. Maybe take them 3-4 years to build, and until then, USAMRIID is hosting the work in existing buildings.

[Walt Livezey]

Dr. Keneth Alebeck said "You don't need a vacine for this and a vacine for that.
What you need is a formula that fights bacterial and viral (bioterrorism) weapons".
I found such a formula.
Yes I have run some tests in real life.
If you get yourself in a jam playing biological warfare try this:
Take 6 mg of melatonin with a large glass of water (if possible
distilled water). Keep vitamin "D" to a minimum in diet. This
is important. After taking melatonin very little light in room
for ~3 hours. This is important.

After you take the 6mg of melatonin WAIT ~5 MINUTES, THEN; TAKE
A 1/2 MOUTH FULL OF COLLOIDAL SILVER (30-50ppm) AND SWISH IT
AROUND IN YOUR MOUTH, GARGLE THEN SWALLOW. Buy colloidal
silver in dark glass bottles only. Store colloidal silver in
a dark area as light will weaken it.

[J.]

Uh huh... see counterpoint on colloidal silver here