The "Generals' Revolt" Isn't New - Part 2

As I was saying yesterday - Dale Herspring, a Navy vet of 32 years and a (former?) member of the Council on Foreign Relations (no shrinking violet here) - has written a very interesting book titled "The Pentagon and the Presidency" in which he examines the sometimes rocky relationship between the two groups. He does lambast Bill Clinton for failing to understand the military at all, and having questionable decisions in both Bosnia and Somalia. But let's talk about Rummie and his generals.

Two provisos - Bobby pointed out to me yesterday that the retired generals speaking out are not saying that the invasion of Iraq was wrong, and they should not be viewed as new members of the left. He's absolutely correct. I have no doubt that not one general disagreed with the idea of using military force to get rid of Saddam. I might think that they may have questioned the whole "WMD is a big threat" story, but they understood the president's order and were willing to carry it out. Second, the author notes in his conclusion that "The Chiefs understand that the president is the commander in chief and that he is the one who issues the orders. The key point, however, is that a president has the power to decide how much conflict he or she wants in the relationship." True words. On to the Rumsfeld analysis - some key points:

Pg 381 - Rumsfeld also believed that he and his civilian advisors understood military strategy, doctrine, structure, and weapon systems better than the generals and admirals he encountered. Indeed, one four-star officer who worked with him called him an "egomaniac cleverly disguised... a hip shooter who gives the impression he is not."

Pg 382 - Rumsfeld had little respect for officers like [General Hugh] Shelton. He considered them to be dinosaurs who did not understand the new world into which the U.S. military was moving. They were obstacles who would fight his effort to transform the military, especially the army...

Pg 383 - But what was most important about both Myers and Pace was that their selection "made it clear that the administration wanted obedience, not officers who might make waves." ... during a meeting in March 2003, President Bush turned to Myers "with a pressing question: How long would the war in Iraq last? But before General Myers could respond, ... Rumsfeld put a hand on his arm and said, 'Now, Dick, you don't want to answer that.' "

I'll skip over the long - very long - discussion about Shinseki vs. Rumsfeld and the constant worsening of relations between the Army Secretariat and OSD.

Pg 397 - As Ralph Peters, a former army officer and distinguished commentator on national security affairs, put it, "You look at Rumsfeld, and beyond all the rationale, spoken and unspoken, he just dislikes the army. It's just palpable. ... You always have to wonder if when Rumsfeld was a Navy lieutenant junior grade whether an Army officer stole his girlfriend."

Pg 398 - When CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks was first told to begin planning for a possible invasion of Iraq in November 2001, he was stunned. According to Woodward, "Franks was incredulous. They were in the midst of one war, and now they wanted detailed planning for another. Iraq? 'Goddamn,' Franks said, 'what the fuck are they talking about?' "

Pg 399 - According to two different sources, the plan originally proposed by Franks called for ... a total of 250,000 troops, including three divisions of heavily armored forces ... Rumsfeld, however, desiring to forgo the Powell Doctrine's use of overwhelming force ... wanted the military to fight a different war with smaller forces - 50,000 to 75,000, according to one source. ... Rumsfeld was reportedly involved in every military decision. ... Rumsfeld had to approve each unit (or, as the overwhelmed secretary soon decided, batches of significant units), including reserve units.

Pg 408 - It is also worth noting that the army in particular had no problem making its complaints against Rumsfeld a matter of public record. Indeed, if there has been one change that has taken hold since the end of World War II, it is that the Chiefs will take their complaints to the Hill. Rumsfeld has neutralized the Chiefs by finding two officers to head the JCS who are pliable when it comes to being "team members."

Just a fascinating read. I should point out that Herspring states that the military had (has?) no problems with George W. They like his use of the bully pulpit to promote the military, and he stayed out of their decision-making for the most part. It's Rumsfeld with whom they have a problem. Last word, there's an article in the NY Post by Ralph Peters with the observation that most, if not all, of the retired military generals/admirals who support Rumsfeld are either Air Force (he's been very good to them) or tied to big defense firms or media consultant gigs (having trouble finding the link). But this is a very, very interesting and well researched book.

UPDATE: Just wanted to put in the Ralph Peter's quote - still can't get the link. Again, not a fan of Ralph's and Ralph isn't a fan of Rummie, but I just find it interesting when the right and the left side of the Army actually agree on things.

Generals such as John Batiste, Gregory Newbold, Paul Eaton and Tony Zinni have something else in common, too: They're leaders respected by their peers for flawless integrity. Their reputations within their services - the Army and Marines - could not be higher. They are not and never have been political generals.

And these men have much to lose by going public with their criticism. They'll never get the lucrative defense-industry jobs in corporations whose profits depend on the favor of the Pentagon. They're not going to be offered plum appointments in any future administration, Republican or Democrat. They'll be frozen out of the Washington-insider's club. They face organized political attacks upon their personal reputations.

Who are the retired generals rallying to Secretary Rumsfeld? Check their credentials, please. When you see those "dead generals" pontificating on cable or network news, the crawl at the bottom of the screen doesn't tell you their corporate affiliations or explain their relationships with the Pentagon. If it did, you'd find that few are objective commentators.

As for the generals who rush to defend the SecDef - using those OSD-disseminated talking points - they fall into three categories:

* Pathetic, aged retirees who desperately want to believe they're still Washington players and who will do anything for a scrap of official attention.

* Air Force generals - while the Army and Marines fought, Rumsfeld funded all of the Air Force's toys and can count on its support.

* And, most troublingly, serving officers selected by the SecDef for the military's highest offices.

Comments

[CKR]

You made the Boston Globe today.

[Vincente]

Ralph Peters is a world-class "Toad" (my co-worker's word) who has an incredible accomplishment under his belt: the ability to infuriate both the more conservative (his constant trashing of the AF and sometimes the Navy hasn't endeared him to the blues) and liberal sides (he also harps the old canard on journalists for not telling the "real" story in Iraq) of the war/military debate.

However, his recent column on the Generals is the most lucid thing I have ever read of his (I believe it ran earlier in the week) in which he basically calls the Pipe-Hittin' Rove Republicans to the mat for not paying attention to what these men have to say -- while at the same time excoriating Pete Pace for constantly putting rehtorical PR lipstick on his boss, when he doesn't have to (civilian rule of the military goes both ways, he argues... the uniforms should not be used as political puppets... then again, politicians shouldn't take dirty money as well).

V

[davod]

Is there a disconnect here somewhere. If everyone hates Rumsfeld, why do I see and hear from others saying they think he is doing a good job?

Oh! I can answer my own question - they are suck-ups and the naysayers are bravely speaking out against the man.

Before placing the halo on these generals the least we should ask is why none of the interviewers is the least bit interested in asking them why their previous comments may have differed from what they say now. Or why the recent military records have not been reviewed.

I can understand why the MSM is not interested but why would anyone who takes the time to comment on a blog not take the time to do a little research.

[Bobby]

According to two different sources, the plan originally proposed by Franks called for ... a total of 250,000 troops, including three divisions of heavily armored forces ... Rumsfeld, however, desiring to forgo the Powell Doctrine's use of overwhelming force

This is really what I was getting at in my earlier comment, J. There's this deliberate attempt to pretend that just having "250,000 troops" would have been the answer to all of our problems. They think they're invoking the Powell Doctrine, but conventional metrics suggest that even their estimates would be WAY off base.

If we apply simple math to the equation, we know that even in the least insurgent of cities (New York City, for example) a ratio of 4 "security" (law enforcement / military) personnel for every 1,000 civilians in the population is needed to enforce law and order and defeat an insurgency. The 1965 US occupation of the Dominican and the modern Punjab currently require a ratio of 6 for every 1,000. And during the Malaya Emergency or the Philippine War, the ratio was on the order of 20 for every 1,000. But, critical to understanding this ratio, is that it only counts the guys actually providing security; the numerous combat support and combat service support units don't factor into the equation because-- you guessed it-- they're not actively and continuously patrolling the streets. (All these ratios come from Saving Lives With Force, by the Brookings Institution's Michael O'Hanlon).

Iraq has a population of 25 million. That means-- even if we apply the low-end Dominican/Punjab model (which critics would probably criticize as Wolfowitzean fantasy)-- the Coalition would have needed some 150,000 troops providing security. Since we know that US Army deployments require two Soldiers in the tail for every one in the tooth, that number gets extrapolated to 450,000 for a single deployment... And that was using a Dominican/Punjab model which, again, critics would probably dismiss as neocon fantasy. If we used the median of that type and the more widescale Malayan/Philippine insurgencies, the requirement quickly approaches a MILLION.

And that's where the General Critics fall short. They want to invoke the Powell Doctrine and say we needed overwhelming force and more troops, because that's their comfort zone-- that's what they've always been taught. But by their own doctrine, deploying the entire US Department of Defense would only have been enough to sustain their troop levels for one single year (and that's after taking everything out of Afghanistan, Korea, Europe, TRADOC, USAREC, etc.) Clearly, that's a ridiculous assertion.

AND those conventional metrics fail to account for simple comparisons like Iraq-to-Afghanistan, where-- again-- a force of just 20,000 has managed to have superior effects than a Coalition of 140,000 in Iraq. The reason for that is because of the strategy we implemented in Afghanistan and the tactics which we were executing-- things like Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Regional Development Zones, DDR programmes, embedded training teams, national reconciliation, etc. etc.

If the Coalition in Iraq would have adapted those kinds of operations and tactics (as they have only come around to over the last few months or so), they would be doing far better than they are now. But they didn't. And one of the reasons for that, I think, is because they had 150,000 troops in theater, trained to seek military solutions to political problems through kinetic operations and the application of violence; that is, paradoxically, having so many troops and so much firepower was counterproductive to the types of operations and tactics need to secure American objectives in Iraq. It was the same kind of arrogance that failed us in Vietnam when we had half-a-million Americans on a backwater Southeast Asian Peninsula.

I know that sounds counterintuitive-- military doctrine has long preached that numbers are the primary factor in determining success (you attack with a 3-to-1 advantage, regardless of how you attack or who you're attacking, etc.) I've said this very thing at numerous conferences with my peers from OIF and they invariably get upset at me. But the simple fact is that the strategy and the tactics are far more important than the number of boots on the ground-- and the General Critics don't get that. They don't understand it. Unfortunately, that's not to say that the SECDEF and his crowd understands it either. There are those who do (the aforementioned Col. Hammes and LTC Nagl are only two of them), and the Coalition in Iraq has indeed adapted quite a bit over the last year or so, but the critique of the General Critics alone is incomplete and misleading. Although they don't realize it.

[Alex Urevick-Ackelsberg]

"This is really what I was getting at in my earlier comment, J. There's this deliberate attempt to pretend that just having "250,000 troops" would have been the answer to all of our problems. They think they're invoking the Powell Doctrine, but conventional metrics suggest that even their estimates would be WAY off base."

Bull shit. As I said in the previous post- read a book: The Battle for Peace : A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose
by Tony Zinni, Tony Koltz . I swear, it won't hurt you. Do you prefer mustard or ketchup when you eat your words?

[Bobby]

Like I said in my comment on the other thread, I ordered the book days ago, haven't yet read it, but am quite certain it doesn't say everything you think it does. When I've finished reading it, we can arrange a virtual debate if you're so inclined, but I do reserve the right to postpone it if my circumstances-- i.e., if I'm going through pre-deployment training or already deployed again-- warrant it.

[J Thomas]

Before placing the halo on these generals the least we should ask is why none of the interviewers is the least bit interested in asking them why their previous comments may have differed from what they say now.

That's easy. They're media guys who go for whatever story they want to go for, which is often not the story you want them to go for.

But if one of those generals was trying to spin his results instead of just honestly saying what he thought, and he wanted me to tell him how to spin the answer to this question, I'd probably suggest something like:

"I did the job instead of resign and let a less experienced man take my place. Rumsfeld interfered and made my job harder. That was his right. We still performed the mission. Rumsfeld kept interfering and my men took unnecessary casualties. When my team could not perform their mission under his control I resigned, and now I'm doing the best I can for the men I commanded."

Too long, but it's a start.

If it was an honest general wouldn't this be pretty much what he'd say? An honest general who was doing what they're doing would have had something like this happen to him, right? That's what it would take to get him to do this....

[Ymarsakar]

Bobby gives a good outline of the problems with trying to fight an asymmetrical guerrila war with symmetrical army units. The Special Forces "ran" Afghanistan, and the regular army "ran" Iraq. Obviously there are differences in how the SF runs a war as compared to the mickey mouse crap used by the army.

It seems a weird argument, you know, to say that the Generals supporting Rumsfeld are AF wannabes, but that the Marines Peter Pace and what not, are "team players". Well, are the people who support Rumsfeld wannabes or not, what's up with this extra classification to cover his ass?

Admiral Kimmel had the decency to wait until after the war before publishing his book. And Kimmel was stripped of his rank, so he had plenty of "axes" to grind. The comment about Rumsfeld having a gf stolen by an army is indicative to what lengths people will go to say that it is Rumsfeld with an axe to grind, not the Generals with "impeccable" reputations.

I tend to doubt any General has an impeccable reputation, because even the best admirals and genearls (Admiral Kimmel) can have their reputations tarnished.

[J Thomas]

There's this deliberate attempt to pretend that just having "250,000 troops" would have been the answer to all of our problems.

I think that entirely misses the point.

Of course, maybe some of the critics also entirely miss the point.

But the way I read it that makes sense, is that we couldn't expect to have it work without 250,000 troops. A number that we did not have and could not get in a reasonable time with our current administration.

Now, if it turns out that the real number needed was not 250,000 but a million or 2 million or 5 million, it doesn't matter to the argument because the key point was -- we should expect big troubles unless we used more troops than we had or could get.

And the obvious conclusion from that is not "Get 250,000 warm bodies and everything will magically work out fine?. The obvious conclusion is "Don't make this mistake. Do something we *can* do. If we absolutely have to invade iraq, come up with some rational plan to get around the problems."

And that was not done. The response to the criticism that went "This operation will take more soldiers than we have" was "Shut up, Rumsfeld knows better than you and he says it's all going to work out cheap, fast, easy, and good."

[Alex Urevick-Ackelsberg]

Bobby-

you've got a deal. J.- care to join the reading?

If you don't mind I also would like to invite some more folks- other blue force folks, maybe some more conservative folks, etc.

I'm completely flexible as to a time frame for doing this.

[J.]

Alex, I have a stack of unread books I'm trying to go through. I'll try to get Zinni's book, but right now I'm trying to skim through the rest of "The Pentagon and the Presidency" - J.T., Bobby, you'd love this too - and then I have "The Assassin's Gate" waiting next.

When's summer vacation and leisurely book reading time? Too far away...

[Bobby]

J. Thomas,

"The obvious conclusion is "Don't make this mistake. Do something we *can* do. If we absolutely have to invade iraq, come up with some rational plan to get around the problems."

And that's actually what we did in Afghanistan and "got around the problems." Why the Coalition in Iraq couldn't adapt as quickly as we did or behave with the same amount of strategic and tactical innovation is a matter of opinion, of course. But we didn't need 250,000 or more troops-- we didn't even need the 150,000 that they had-- and that was because we were using counterinsurgency doctrine and implementing asymmetric responses, while they were stuck in a kinetic, conventional model. Even if they would have had one million troops, I submit to you that they (the generals in charge) wouldn't have ended the insurgency without changing their strategy and tactics-- which has been my point all along: it's not about the troop levels, it's all about the strategy! (And the good news is that with Chiarelli in charge of MNC-I, and Khalilzad in Baghdad, we have been seeing some of those changes.)

Alex and J.,

Reading time is slow going for me once the baseball season starts, and like J., I also have a stack of half-finished books that need tending. But I'm a fairly quick reader, so it probably won't take me more than a week to finish it.

I don't have a problem with expanding the reviewer panel, but I really don't know that many conservative bloggers (or any bloggers, really). I could probably find two or three around the blogosphere that would be interested, but I don't know if I want to do more than that.

I think the terms of the debate should be limited to the ideas and points that Zinni raises in his book relative to a clearly-defined field-- say, the War in Iraq, the Global War on Terror, or US defense/foreign policy in the Middle East. But we may want to wait until every one has read the book before we set the parameters, since I personally don't know what it says and might find something else in there that's far more interesting. I'd say it's fair to bring in outside sources specifically to refute or support his argument, but the debate should be limited to his arguments-- I don't think it's fair to get into his personal agenda.

I don't know the best method for structuring it, either. In academia, we usually setup panels with each person on the panel presenting a paper, there's a discussant to highlight some key points (sometimes there's a discussant for each presenter), and then a Q&A session for the audience to ask focused questions about the paper. That method allows each of us to write about topics of our own particular interest-- not simply one person saying "Zinni was right" and someone else saying "Zinni was wrong," but rather each person saying "This is what I thought Zinni got right, and this is what I thought Zinni got wrong." (Forces independent thinking on our part). The danger of that method is that we may find ourselves writing past one another, and I don't know the virtual platform that would support it.

[J Thomas]

Bobby, of course you want to take credit for the relative noncatastrophe in afghanistan, but the geography and cultures surely have a whole lot to do with it.

When we first moved into iraq people were naturally concerned that we'd want to grab the oil. But Rummy's plan called for most of us to be gone in a few months, and it waa only after we showed no sign of pulling out and Bush etc refused to say we were ever going to, that the insurgency got any significant support. But the afghans have a poor country among poor countries. They know perfectly well that we're going to get tired of being there and leave. In the meantime we bring in money.

Iraq had an authoritarian regime and the majority of iraqis lack experience with anything else. A weak occupation force gave them a great chance to rebel. But afghans all along have had a rough democracy. One gun, one vote. We sent in 10,000 first-class voters with lots of ballots (bullets), and they respected that. They were all ready to bargain. "What do you want? Here's what we want. Make a deal?" Totally different mindset. Taliban at their peak had a loose alliance that included a decisive majority of armed voters. And they got money and supplies and ballots from pakistan. But then the pakistani money got cut off. And then say you were a taliban ally, but not a core member. You could declare you weren't taliban at all and the americans would pay you to be their friend. Or you could say you were still taliban and the americans would pay their friends to kill you. Kind of a no-brainer.... There are three distinct reasons to have Taliban fighters proclaim themselves out beyond our reach. One is that the ones we don't want on our side have to be *somewhere*. A second is that they want to brag about still being alive in spite of us. And a third is that it helps make sure we don't get bored and go home.

Iraqis expected us to repair the infrastructure, or at least let them repair it. But we were in charge and we gave that job to US companies who spent a year figuring out how to replace french and soviet capital equipment with american brands. We didn't look serious. In contrast, afghans mostly don't have infrastructure.

The situations are so different that strategy might not be one of the major factors.

[Bobby]

I'm curious where you're getting this information that the Afghans think we're eventually going to pack up and leave, while the Iraqis think that we intend to plant our roots for oil. We've made no secret of our desire (if not intent) to build permanent US military bases in Afghanistan, and J. blogged about that very story on this very blog a year ago. Now I'm not saying the Afghans have a rational reason to think we would want to lay down permanent roots-- you're right that they have very little to exploit-- but their own experience teaches them that, despite their poverty and lack of resources, they have been the subject of numerous invasions and occupations during their wretched history-- from the British to the Russians to the Pakistanis (whom they believe controlled the Taliban, which isn't quite true, but it's what they believe). So your point just isn't accurate from my experience.

I do agree that the Coalition in Iraq behaved in a manner far more like an occupying force than a liberator-- Bremer's decision to disband the old Iraqi Army, for example, was only one such incident in their minds. But I think that was a deliberate result of having so much Coalition firepower-- they truly felt they could impose their will on the Iraqi people. That was never an option for the much smaller Coalition in Afghanistan that had to seek less decisive, more nuanced solutions to our problem sets. If you've read LTC John Nagl's excellent Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, he suggests that as a partial reason why the British Army is better at fighting limited wars that we are-- because overwhelming force and total war was never really an option for their more limited resources, they had to develop more sophisticated, asymmetric strategies that align better in an unconventional war. In any case, I remain convinced that fewer troops-- not more-- was what was needed in Iraq.

This isn't to say that we didn't sometimes act in a very high-handed fashion-- not for nothing was Zalmay Khalilzad nicknamed "the Viceroy"-- and in fact, it is common to hear the Panjshiris (Jamiat Tajiks who claim to have fought alongside Massoud for decades) wonder how they "won the war, but lost the peace"; in their lore, they were the decisive force that defeated the Taliban, but have since been supplanted by the Westernized technocrats (Karzai, Ghani, Ahady, Jalali, Wardak, et. al.) in the positions of power.

None of this is to say that geography and culture weren't factors, or that we could have simply taken plans and policies in Afghanistan and applied them to Iraq and expected equal results. But it's hard to look at the two theaters without seeing distinct differences in the strategies and tactics of the Coalitions involved.

[Alex Urevick-Ackelsberg]

"Reading time is slow going for me once the baseball season starts, and like J., I also have a stack of half-finished books that need tending. But I'm a fairly quick reader, so it probably won't take me more than a week to finish it."

Well, even though I finished the book in a few days it's pretty dense- maybe it would be best to look at a few chapters at a time (and as time permits) and then have a general discussion at the end?

"I think the terms of the debate should be limited..."

I definitely agree. The areas where I would like to focus: Zinni's alternate vision of transformation (including his experiences that shaped this vision), Zinni's "liberal" worldview and how this relates to modern liberalism (not necessarily in the partisan political sense that you seem inclined to pigeon-hole actual liberal thinkers, in the classic sense of the word, into), and non-traditional security in general. I'm sure that there are other areas that I will want to focus on as I reread the book and as our conversation evolves, but these are the ones that I think I'll devote the most time to.

This is my suggestion for how we structure it. Similar to academia we should each submit our own thoughts- either addressing certain chapters or the entire book- as blog posts on our own sites. We could then post links to the other pieces and respond to the other bloggers in the comments sections. Then what I suggest we do is each pick 1-2 subjects we'd like to further discuss, or allow commenters to decide, and create a forum for the debate. The great thing about using a web forum, as opposed to a normal academic conference, is that people can come and post their thoughts at any time, even if they don't get a chance to join the conversation at first.

Anyway, those are just some thoughts...

(And btw- what exactlly is, and has been, Zinni's "personal" agenda? Other than, of course, looking out for the best interests of our nation, as he has done for his entire life. And yes, I know that his idea of what is best is not the same as what other people's ideas of what is best, but that is different from a personal agenda.)

[J Thomas]

Now I'm not saying the Afghans have a rational reason to think we would want to lay down permanent roots-- you're right that they have very little to exploit-- but their own experience teaches them that, despite their poverty and lack of resources, they have been the subject of numerous invasions and occupations during their wretched history-- from the British to the Russians to the Pakistanis (whom they believe controlled the Taliban, which isn't quite true, but it's what they believe). So your point just isn't accurate from my experience.

Well, each of their invaders except us has packed up and left. Often fairly quickly. It makes sense they'd believe we'll go too. I'm not sure what they actually believe. It makes sense they might be kind of circumspect about what they'd tell you, too....

I think that was a deliberate result of having so much Coalition firepower-- they truly felt they could impose their will on the Iraqi people. That was never an option for the much smaller Coalition in Afghanistan that had to seek less decisive, more nuanced solutions to our problem sets.

So here's a mistake that wasn't available to you guys in afghanistan. If the ones in iraq could avoid that mistake even with enough troops, then they could perhaps accomplish even more.

But it's hard to look at the two theaters without seeing distinct differences in the strategies and tactics of the Coalitions involved.

Yes, definitely. They were facing very different circumstances.

Apart from the generally better tactics (which are certainly extremely important when they're needed) we do better when our role is a very rich player among a bunch of other players, than when our role is the authoritarian force that everybody else must either submit to or rebel against. One of the advantages is that they don't hold us as responsible....

[Bobby]

J. Thomas,

Well, each of their invaders except us has packed up and left. Often fairly quickly. It makes sense they'd believe we'll go too.

Each of their invaders packed up, because the mujahideen, supported by large numbers of the people of Afghanistan, waged successful insurgencies against the occupying forces. Right now, at least, that's not the case in Afghanistan. There's an insurgency, to be sure, in the South (Kandahar, Helmund), Southeast (Paktika, Paktia, Khowst), and increasingly in the East (Nangahar, Konar), but by no metrics is it nearly as widespread or supported as it was against the Taliban, Soviets, or the British-- and it's currently a threat only to the areas in which those insurgents operate, and not to the central government as a whole. If the people of Afghanistan expected us to leave (like others in the past) and felt we eventually would leave because the insurgency would make our position untenable (like others in the past), they're doing a lousy job of supporting it.

If the ones [Coalition] in iraq could avoid that mistake [over-reliance on kinetic operations] even with enough troops, then they could perhaps accomplish even more.

Oh, almost certainly. That is, of course, a failure on the military's part, because we have an enormous and historical resistance to fighting unconventional wars. No Administration is going to be able to change that culture overnight-- not this one, certainly not the Clinton Administration in Somalia, even JFK had enormous resistance to the options he needed the military to perform under "Flexible Response."

Adding more troops who are conducting the right kinds of operations would have been a positive development; as would having fewer troops than the present, but those executing the right strategy. Simply adding more troops who were only going to execute more conventional tactics would not have a solution-- despite what so many critics desperately want to believe. But your argument is hypothetical, because we couldn't even get the troops we had to execute COIN strategy and unconventional tactics-- we weren't going to get it by adding more.

Apart from the generally better tactics (which are certainly extremely important when they're needed) we do better when our role is a very rich player among a bunch of other players, than when our role is the authoritarian force that everybody else must either submit to or rebel against. One of the advantages is that they don't hold us as responsible.

You may not even know it, but that's actually the thesis of John Newsinger's British Counter-Insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, in which he examines why the British were more successful (he doesn't even grant them that they were just plain successful) than other colonial/imperial powers in fighting an insurgency. Simply put, leveraging indigenous factions and playing "divide and conquer" served their policies well.

[J Thomas]

If the people of Afghanistan expected us to leave (like others in the past) and felt we eventually would leave because the insurgency would make our position untenable (like others in the past), they're doing a lousy job of supporting it.

I don't feel like I can speak for any afghans, not even the lady down the street from me. But I can easily imagine them feeling like they might as well humor us as long as the money we bring in is worth more than the aggravation we cause.

Simply adding more troops who were only going to execute more conventional tactics would not have a solution-- despite what so many critics desperately want to believe.

I present an argument how it might possibly have worked in "The "Generals' Revolt" Isn't New - Part 1" below. We didn't start out with much of an insurgency, though it appears the Ba'athists had some plans. If we had done the political things right it's possible we wouldn't have had much of an insurgency for the conventional military to fight. Like, the insurgency probably got a lot more Ba'ath support after we announced they couldn't compete in elections. If we'd let them compete on an even footing, with criminal trials for the ones who'd committed atrocities etc, they might not be so dedicated against the iraqi government.

The main things I'm certain were necessary related to the US military were first to replace the combat troops with fresh occupation troops. And second, announce that we really did want to leave as quickly as we reasonably could.

When iraqis heard lots of stories about edgy US troops shooting at innocent families they thought might be terrorists, that caused trouble. Then when we got asked when we were leaving and we talked about how we were still in germany after 60 years and iraqis would learn to welcome us the same way, that made a bad combination. Keep the combat troops away from the civilians as much as possible and announce we do plan to leave soon. And do the rest of the stuff right -- the stuff that wasn't the military's responsibility.

We *might* not have had enough of an insurgency to be a problem. Lacking the chance to do it over and see, I don't really know. If you assume that there would be a serious insurgency then all your conclusions follow. We'd need better tactics to fight it, and we didn't have the mindset, and a larger number of traditional troops wouldn't help much.

That's true in the short run. But look at the various problems (like iraq) that they left us. Various hellholes might not be hellholes today if they hadn't leveraged the local factions. On the other hand it was mostly existing resentments they fanned, and maybe things wouldn't be much better if they hadn't.

[J Thomas]

Simply put, leveraging indigenous factions and playing "divide and conquer" served their policies well.

oops, this quote should have gone in that big blank spot near the bottom.