Armchair Generalist

WMD Commission Report

It's out. Sucker is more than 600 pages. It's going to take a while to digest this beast, its topics are all over the map. I think this report is going to be scrutinized even more than the Duelfer ISG report was. Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Iraq (about 200 pages)
Chapter 2: Libya (about 10 pages)
Chapter 3: Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan (about 10 pages)
Chapter 4: Terrorism: Managing Today's Threat (about 20 pages)
Chapter 5: Iran and North Korea: Monitoring the Development of Nuclear Capabilities (deleted in unclass report)
Chapter 6: Leadership and Management: Forging an Integrated Intelligence Community (about 30 pages)
Chapter 7: Collection (about 30 pages)
Chapter 8: Analysis (about 40 pages)
Chapter 9: Information Sharing (about 15 pages)
Chapter 10: Intelligence at Home: The FBI, Justice, and Homeland Security (about 20 pages)
Chapter 11: Counterintelligence (about 10 pages)
Chapter 12: Covert Action (deleted from unclass report)
Chapter 13: The Changing Proliferation Threat and the Intelligence Response (about 30 pages)
Conclusion, Postscript, and Appendices (about 60 pages)

UPDATE: The Washington Post has an AP article from this morning on this issue and conveniently breaks out the chapters in separate pdf files. And over in the NY Times, Maureen Dowd hits the nail on the head about this report.

Happy 30th Birthday, BWC!

I was wondering if ArmsControlWonk was going to post about the Biological Weapons Convention's 30th anniversary. I wasn't disappointed. March 26, last Saturday, was the official date. The Global Security Newswire has a longer article discussing how the U.S. government - led by Under Secretary of State John Bolton - killed the verification process for the BWC in July 2001.

The United States, meanwhile, was criticized in 2001 for blocking an effort it previously led to strengthen the treaty by creating an inspections mechanism. A senior official said the treaty was “inherently unverifiable” because offensive and defensive biological weapons research involved the same kind of work, and that inspections could compromise U.S. commercial biotechnology and defensive research. A group of experts in November presented a report arguing the inspections could be effective.

Washington pressed instead for strengthening national laws to enforce the treaty and for a three-year series of meetings beginning in 2003 to discuss several issues prior to the 2006 review conference.

“The United States continues to attach importance to the BWC and the work we have undertaken in the 2003-2005 timeframe, which is already demonstrating its utility,” U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Implementation Donald Mahley said in a speech to treaty parties in December.

While the verification process may have been flawed, certainly any international regulations proposed in 2001 would have been better than the "gentlemen's agreement" that exists today. Would that the United States could improve our security against BW proliferation by getting our allies Egypt and Israel to sign and ratify the BWC. But then again, the U.S. government didn't agree with Britian and Russia on this particular statement:

“The convention was the first to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and is one of the first and crucial components in the nonproliferation tool-box. It remains as relevant today as it was when it was first drafted, although the threats we face have evolved. The international response to those new threats builds on the strong foundation of the existing multilateral disarmament framework of which the BWC is a part.”

The Bush administration position - screw the treaties, arm the torpedos, full steam ahead!

Information Operations

This diary by Tirge Caps over at daily Kos caught my eye - it references an article in Parameters by Kenneth Payne, a BBC news producer, on the uses of media during wartime. It's rare enough to find a pro-military post at daily Kos (no reflection on Kos, rather his audience), and it reminded me that I really need to check out the articles in Parameters more often.

Payne does a great job in outlining the very complicated relationship between the media and the military during combat operations. He notes that the international media, while acting in a noncombatant status, is hardly neutral when it comes to reporting. Events reported during conflicts, from Vietnam through current operations, have often been selectively biased toward and against the U.S. military (some might argue, more against than toward). So the question is, should (or perhaps more appropriately, how should) the military influence the activities and output of the media?

This isn't as cut and dried as one might think. Instinctively, one might bristle at the idea that the military might "spin" their stories to present a more favorable viewpoint of combat operations. Payne points out that there is another avenue other than lying to the media, which may or may not be justified as part of deception operations supporting an upcoming battle. More important is the desire to control the flow of information "so as to maximize the military and political advantage to US forces." I would note that authors such as Hammes have illustrated that adversaries (N. Vietnamese, Nicaraguans, Somalis) have certainly used information operations successfully against the United States - is it not logical, then, that US forces should defend themselves against such operations and ensure that, at the least, accurate information and a factual explanation of their operations is released through the media to the public?

Payne goes one step further and reviews how the media favored embedded reporting over the CENTCOM headquarter briefs - eschewing the "big picture" for "we were there" battle bites. And to be frank, the military probably liked it better that reporters were focused on the small-unit battles instead of questioning the concepts and strategies. Payne notes that the increasing importance of information operations raises the stakes on war correspondents by making their jobs even more difficult and more dangerous than before, with both sides trying to influence their stories.

This article is written from the point of view of the journalists - there are other sources out there looking at the military's point of view. The Army has this field manual - FM 3-61.1, "Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures" - to guide their forces in how to deal with the media. There's also TRADOC Pam 525-9, "Concept for Information Operations." No matter what side you're on, this is an important article for military strategists to read.

Defense Appointments

Two interesting bits of news going around about top-level appointments in the Defense Department - many new players may be moving in, and some old ones. The LA Times reports that Rumsfeld has recommended current SecNav Gordon England to President Bush as the replacement for Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense. While Rumsfeld refused to confirm the point, a "senior Pentagon official" confirmed the recommendation. According to this press brief, Rumsfeld has also made a recommendation to replace Doug Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, but not one for the Secretary of the Air Force.

I don't know England's work directly, but from his bio, he seems like another high-level defense business leader that got pulled in to help run DOD like a business. I don't see any indication that he's got the policy expertise to replace someone like Wolfowitz, but he has helped out Bush in getting the Department of Homeland Security going, and he's overseen the Gitmo detention center operations. We do know that this administration likes to reward loyalty before considering competence.

In the Washington Post, David Ignatius ruminates on who Rumsfeld might recommend to replace General Richard Myers as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The favorite leads seem to be the current Vice CJCS, General Peter Pace, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani (USJFCOM commander), and General James Jones (USEUCOM commander). The dark horse candidate is General John Abizaid, USCENTCOM commander. Ignatius hears from military officers that the man that ought to fill the Chairman's job needs to be someone who will stand up to Rumsfeld, as some feel that Myers has not done.

Abazaid would be a great selection, having shown his competence and independence in the past, but he won't be the choice. While he's done a good job for Rumsfeld, Army generals aren't popular these days. Jones is another great choice, and Pace had gone from being commander, USSOUTHCOM, to Vice CJCS, so there is the precedent. But I think Jones is too independent and has already served as commandant of the Marine Corps, so I'm betting he's going to retire. Giambastiani is a big supporter on the transformation train; he might be a safe bet, and it's been a while since the Navy had a Chairman position. But my money is on Pace - he's an insider, has been loyal to Rumsfeld, and would represent the first Marine chosen to be the Chairman. It would also track with the "loyalty first, competency second" rule (although I do have great respect for Pace and his leadership on the Joint Staff).

So we'll see - always interesting to see what new faces and trends might pop up over in The Building.

Dog Bites Man

Laura Rozen says, "where's the story?" in regards to the NY Times preview of the Commission on WMD intel's final report.

The final report of a presidential commission studying American intelligence failures regarding illicit weapons includes a searing critique of how the C.I.A. and other agencies never properly assessed Saddam Hussein's political maneuverings or the possibility that he no longer had weapon stockpiles, according to officials who have seen the report's executive summary.

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The report particularly singles out the Central Intelligence Agency under its former director, George J. Tenet, but also includes what one senior official called "a hearty condemnation" of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

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As early copies of the report circulated inside the government on Monday, officials said much of the discussion of Iraq went over ground already covered by the Senate Intelligence Committee and by the two reports of the Iraq Survey Group, which was set up by the government to search for prohibited weapons after the Iraq invasion, and came up basically empty-handed.

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One defense official who had been briefed on an early draft of the report said Monday that one of its conclusions was that "human intelligence left a lot to be desired" in the global war against terror.

And in other news, dog bites man, grass grows when it rains, and boys and girls have unprotected sex. More "news" coming? Maybe Cheney will finally admit that the alleged mobile bio labs are really hydrogen generators? Don't hold your breath.

Air Force Acquisition Woes

The AP reports that Michael Wynne, acting USD(AT&L) is taking direct oversight authority for 21 Air Force weapons program worth more than $200 billion combined. These programs would be overseen by the Air Force's leadership, except that there is no Senate-confirmed AF Secretary, Under Secretary, or chief of acquisition. Woops! This is a temporary issue, but must be annoying to the Air Force leadership nonetheless. Here the Air Force has been sitting pretty on Rumsfeld's transformation agenda, but events keep conspiring against them.

Much of this probably lies in the court of Senator John McCain, who's been hounding the Air Force for the recent Boeing KC-135 tanker issue and related acquisition issues, such as former AF acquisition chief Darlene Druyun and her sweetheart deal with Boeing. With McCain going after Boeing on the Army's FCS project, it's just not a good time to be a Boeing executive. Or a senior AF leader. Maybe they're not really worried - I haven't seen any real indications that the Joint Strike Fighter, F-22 fighter, or C-17 strat lift plane are in any peril of being cut back.

The ripple-down effect of Druyun's actions have been felt all through the DOD acquisition community. Everyone (and I do mean everyone) in or supporting an acquisition office has been directed to take additional ethics training classes, in the hopes to ensure this doesn't happen again. Even us lowly contractors are getting the evil eye from our clients, who are telling us to mind our P's and Q's or else. They seem to forget that it was a fed that stepped over the line. Or maybe they think we're going to offer them a sweet deal... Damn scumbag contractors...

Future Combat Systems Under Fire

The GAO recently released a report on the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, noting that it was an amazingly complex project with significant challenges in technical and managerial areas. That is to say, the desire to build vehicles that were smaller, lighter, and as lethal and survivable as current systems, with a net-centric intelligence/communications system and UAVs, was practically as complex as a navy aircraft carrier. Prior baseline life cycle costs of $92 billion have already grown to $108 billion and may reach $120 billion, due to the size of the project, number of immature technologies, slipping schedules, and contractor issues. Congress has laid into the Army for using an "Other Transition Authority" contract vehicle with Boeing, rather than a normal procurement contract.

Fred Kaplan lays into the Army, fearing that the FCS doesn't even address the more probable future military scenarios. He states:

The point of FCS is to "transform" the tools of warfare. So what about this transformation? Does it improve the U.S. Army's ability to deal with the threats of future warfare?

If your guide to this future is the first 30 days of the war in Iraq, then the vision of transformation that underlies FCS might seem appropriate. However, if your guide is the subsequent two years of combat, then the vision seems out of whack.

Kaplan notes that MG (ret) Bob Scales and others have pointed out that technology alone isn't going to win future wars; rather, it's understanding the enemy and engaging the enemy with low-tech and manpower-intensive tools. Kaplan sees a war between two factions, the procurement commands that develop and buy the weapon systems, and the operational commands that fight and win the wars. While Kaplan is right to a degree, this schism has always existed, at least since President Eisenhower's days. Combatant commands have always focused on the immediate here-and-now, with a window not much further than two years out. Meanwhile, someone has to address the 10-15 year development cycle that chugs out new systems. The real answer is somewhere between the Army's genuine need for an FCS construct and these pessemistic observations.

Many people probably see this like Kevin Drum, noting "It hardly seems conceivable that a military vision developed in the 90s would survive 9/11 virtually unscathed, and it seems downright lunatic that it would go on to survive our experience in postwar Iraq." I don't think that's the case at all. The Army (and other services) constantly review and revisit these major defense acquisition projects, because they know and anticipate the reviews and criticisms. Daniel Starr offers up a defense of the Army's project, noting that advances in technology will aid a small fighting force trying to operate in an environment such as current-day Iraq.

My two cents, without getting too deep into the technical details, is that the FCS is a necessary effort, but certainly it may be that the Army has allowed its enthusiasm to revamp the entire force with new capabilities get away from fiscal realities. In the early 1970s, General Creighton Abrams made a dedicated effort to modernize the post-Vietnam Army with five specific systems - the M1 "Abrams" tank, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache attack helicopter, the Blackhawk utility helicopter, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). These systems became the backbone of the Army that destroyed the Iraqi military in 1991. If you look at the graphic at the bottom of this GlobalSecurity.org web page, you see the same basic functions - a direct fire fuction, an infantry carrier, organic recon/surveillance assets, a sensor function, and indirect fire function, all connected with a networked command and control system. Certainly this is a necessary modernization program to move the Army out of the Cold War and into future military combat scenarios.

Now is the Army executing the acquisition program well? That's a different story. Managing 18 different systems within this project simultaneously must be a nightmare, and no doubt that the Army has overstated its desired requirements (resulting in betting on immature technology). I remember a number of articles written by the Army's FCS office and Army leadership that insisted the FCS was not just about new technology but changing institutional concepts. Well, when there's a multi-billion dollar war going on, these top defense projects get a lot of scrutiny, and going UP in cost doesn't help your case. The Army needs to reform this project if it is to survive, using spiral development processes, prioritizing which systems get modernized first, and as Daniel mentions in his post, maybe limiting the FCS to becoming the "cav units" of the Army instead of the main fighting force.

Above all, the public (and those critical bloggers) need to recognize that this is not an Army problem to stay on cost, schedule, and performance goals. It's a systematic DOD-wide problem - all the services hide their problems in developing new equipment, and they all have examples of multi-billion dollar wastes. Yes, the DOD acquisition program needs reform, and the DOD overall needs a better accountability process to track what it spends. But it also needs to stay on the cutting edge, as long as we are going into battles with fewer numbers than the other side. That means quality personnel and quality equipment, too.

The Absurdity of "Zero Risk"

I find myself in the strange territory of agreeing with George Will on something. Twice in one week, George has felt compelled to talk about the national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. On Thursday, Will noted the scope of the problem and the characteristics of the chosen location:

So far, preparing this nuclear waste repository has cost $5 billion, most of it from fees paid by customers of utilities generating electricity by nuclear power. The rest of the money is government payment for the military's waste.

Sculpting the mountain's interior -- carving 41 miles of storage tunnels and 16 miles of access tunnels -- and doing the science to gauge its geologic suitability is a challenge almost as daunting as the construction of the Panama Canal. It is supposed to solve this problem:

One-fifth of the nation's electricity is generated by nuclear power. Were that share substantially increased, that would reduce dependence on fuels (oil, coal, natural gas) that have large environmental and geopolitical drawbacks. Also, 40 percent of the Navy's fleet is nuclear-powered. Nuclear power plants have created almost 50,000 metric tons of spent fuel, with more produced daily. Once solidified, today's 100 million gallons of nuclear waste from past reprocessing activities will also be placed in the repository.

On Sunday, he added comments about the desire of Nevadans for zero risk in the transportation and long-term storage of the waste:

Union Pacific freight trains rumble less than a half a mile behind many of the 75,000 hotel rooms on the Strip. Some tank cars contain chlorine gas and other hazardous materials. An industrial society uses, and hence transports, vast quantities of them, weighing their benefits against their risks and trying to reduce the latter.

Mayor Goodman, relax: Very little nuclear waste will come to Yucca Mountain by truck. Most will come by rail, on a line not yet built, that will loop far around the metropolitan area's 1.6 million residents. In the past 40 years more than 2,700 shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been transported more than 1.6 million miles. Four highway and four railway vehicles were involved in accidents, but no container of nuclear materials failed.

Las Vegas is farther from this mountain than 161 million Americans are from 125 nuclear waste storage facilities in 39 states. These sites are much less secure than Yucca Mountain would be, with the material 1,000 feet below ground and the mountain located next to the Nuclear Emergency Support Team at Nellis.

This issue was played up during the past 2004 presidential election, as it was President Bush that approved the site in 2002 and Senator Kerry that told Nevadans he would shut down the $5 billion site. It would appear that Nevadans handed Bush a "mandate" in their 51%-48% vote in his favor to continue the project. I jest in part, but only because I think Kerry was blatently playing a political card and not seriously addressing the urgent need for this national repository and the risk management rationale behind the decision.

Let me move adriotly to the DOD chemical demilitarization program - tomorrow (all things remaining the same) Pine Bluff Arsenal will start disposal operations, the fifth site to use incineration technology to destroy chemical munitions and materials. The fourth incineration site at Anniston is moving along well with no issues of public hazards or environmental challenges. Meanwhile, DOD and activist groups battle before Congress on the issue of constructing disposal facilities at Colorado and Kentucky using more expensive alternative technologies that have never been operated on such a large scale and that will create much more waste than the incineration technology.

All of those people involved in nuclear waste disposal, nuclear technology, public or environmental safety, or related public policy issues, take note. If you want to triple the costs and time to resolve a recognized public hazard, do what the DOD did for chemical weapons disposal - argue about technical merits of varied approaches and let activists control your agenda while Congress uses you like a chew-toy. Or you can do the more logical, less risky and overall sensible course of action - Pick one site, move all the waste there, and watch it carefully. For once, Will gets it right.

WMD Commission Preview

I'm on pins and needles... The AP says "Report to Blast U.S. WMD Intel"

A presidential commission investigating weapons of mass destruction is highly critical of U.S. intelligence agencies' performance on Iran, North Korea and Libya, according to individuals familiar with the findings.

None of the 15 agencies is expected to be singled out as doing an exemplary job collecting or assessing intelligence on weapons of mass destruction.

More details here through the Military.com site. So it's not Bush/Cheney's fault that they listened to the intel experts and invaded Iraq, right? Sing it all together, FoxNews, MSNBC, CNN...

What She Said

A very strong point of view about how the left should view the Schiavo case. I completely agree, and that's all I'm going to say about it till this whole sordid affair is over and the nutcases go home. These protestors have some serious anger management issues. So do Georgie's Angels.

UPDATE: Okay maybe one more thing. THAT'S IT.

Casual Fridays

As a change of pace, I wanted to recommend some professional reading sources for those of you interested in keeping tabs on military issues. I subscribe to (probably) too many magazines and newsletters, but even skimming them can tell you a great deal of what's going on, at least at the surface level.

Armed Forces Journal International is a great magazine, headed by John Roos, that examines multi-service and international defense issues. Unfortunately, they do not have an online edition, as DefenseNews and others do. GEN (ret) Barry McCaffrey is a guest columnist there, and the "Darts and Laurels" insert is always amusing to read to catch up on what's going on in Congress. Last month's edition had a great pair of contrasting views on "net-centric warfare" and the transformation agenda, written by MG (ret) Bob Scales and VADM (ret) Arthur Cebrowski.

On Point is the quarterly magazine of the Army Historical Foundation. Again, there is no online link to the articles, but this magazine is a great repository of historical articles about the Army, current issues, and book reviews. See the Winter 2004, vol 9, no. 3 for a great article on the Army's Chemical Corps, for instance. The AHF is the lead organization driving the effort to build a national museum for the Army at Fort Belvoir, VA, and they host superb staff rides in the area with retired general officers as the tour guides. If you're an Army supporter or just a military history buff, consider joining.

The Armchair General magazine (no affiliation) is a colorful and entertaining journal for both wargamers and military history enthusiasts. The articles are a little light on content - I am swayed to suggest this as the "USA Today" of military history journals, compared to others on the newstands - but there's nothing wrong with getting a really good hamburger and fries instead of an 8-oz Porterhouse steak for dinner every now and then. I like the "we put YOU in command!" articles, where the article outlines a historical combat scenario, offers you three options, and wants you to call the play.

Let me highlight some fellow bloggers out there that should be getting more attention from you (assuming you like my stuff).  If you don't already go to read "Arms and Influence," the only question I have is why are you still reading this? GO! He's a very insightful commentor on current military affairs and strategy.

"WhirledView" is a blog by three women that offers unparalleled, constructive reviews of US politics, foreign service, and national security issues. They have a good track record of smart and thoughtful posts, and they ought to be getting more reviews and comments than the few of us that are over there now.

New Kids on the Block: keep an eye on these new military bloggers - "Alexander the Average," "Bobby's World!", and "Draft Zinni!". While I'm still relatively wet behind the ears to be talking about "newcomers" (blogging since Dec 04), these guys are coming out with some interesting posts that aren't the run-of-the-mill variety.

National Security Democrats

Jamie Kenny's looking at a NY Press article discussing the pros and cons of Democrats getting tough on national security, based on an article written for the New Yorker by Jeffery Goldberg, not to be confused with Jonah Goldberg at the National Review Online. Goldbert (of the New Yorker article, which doesn't appear to have a working link) notes that the Dems are in the process of developing a new position for the 2008 race, one in which the Dems will be more favorable toward active pre-emption and use of military might.

In the midst of all of this, the Democratic Party is preparing its shiny new 2008 position on Iraq and terror. Described in Goldberg's New Yorker article, the political plan is centered around a new faction that calls itself the "National Security Democrats" (a term coined by that famous liberal, Richard Holbrooke) and is led by revolting hair-plug survivor Joe Biden. The position of the "National Security Democrats" is that the party should be "more open to the idea of military action, and even preemption" and that the Democrats should "try to distance themselves from the Party's Post-Vietnam ambivalence about the projection of American power." Additionally, the Democrats ought to reconsider their traditional stance as an opposition party and learn to embrace Republican heroes like Ronald Reagan.

"Everyone knew 'Reagan is dangerous,' remember?" Biden says. "He talked about freedom, and what do we do? We say it's bad speech, dangerous speech." Democrats, he says, "are making the same mistakes again."

It would be easy to dismiss the Biden revival as a cheap stunt by a discredited party hack with all the national appeal of the streptococcus virus, except for one thing. Biden's "national security" camp includes all four of the expected main contenders for the Democratic nomination—Biden himself, Hillary Clinton, Indiana senator Evan Bayh, and John Edwards. New Mexico governor Bill Richardson, another outside contender, is also a member of this camp. We are going to be hearing a lot about "National Security Democrats" in the next three years.

Like MIke Tabbi, I would despair if the best we can attain is to become more like the Repubs on national security issues. But maybe there are some new ideas floating around out there... At the DLC's New Democrats Online is an open letter highlighting the need to bridge the gap in confidence people may have in the Democrat's national security stance. It explains the Dems position on Iraq and attacks Bush's dangerous bleeding of the current military force, and offers up four important platforms for consideration.

• Strengthen the U.S. military by increasing and balancing out the force, and adding specialists to address post-conflict reconstruction operations
• Revitalize strategic alliances and reform NATO and the United Nations to focus better on terrorism and proliferation issues
• Commit to a reduced dependence on Middle East oil and increase the use of clean energy technologies
• Apply the values of individual liberty, human rights, and democracy equally - not selectively - around the world

I like this letter as a good, sound top-level policy paper on where the Dems ought to promote. Obviously there are some details that need to be elaborated upon, but I think as a philosophical statement, it rings better than the unilateral and strident tones of the Bush National Security Strategy. Let's see if the Dems can actually hold onto this and articulate it in a manner that demonstrates we can be tough, securing the homeland through engagement of other nations. And I mean honest collaborative defense effort, not a President and SecState canvassing Europe and Asia in an attempt to lock in votes for a buddy to get his World Bank position.

UPDATE: I realize that there is a vocal counterpoint to this issue, that many feel that the DLC does not reflect the position of many Dems that believe neither the war in Afghanistan or Iraq was justified. I don't fully understand the politics between the many factions of the Democratic party, and I don't care to, either. Having been stationed in the Pentagon during 9/11 (but across town during the attack), I have no qualms about what we did in Afghanistan, but continue to question actions that got us into and staying in Iraq. But it's important we don't do the Repub's work for them by getting hung up on the past; we need to craft a better solution that will demonstrate to the public that, yes, you can trust Dems with your nation's future security.

UPDATE II: Atrios spells it out in plain English:

I don't actually disagree with the general proposition that the Democrats need a bit of piss and vinegar in their foreign policy, but they have to figure out where to aim that piss. Peter Beinart and Joe Biden and the rest of the gang didn't aim their piss, they let George Bush grab their dicks and point them towards Baghdad. And, now, two years later, they want to lecture the rest of us on how to be perceived as "strong."

The way to be perceived as strong isn't to let George W. Bush tell you where to point your dick.

John McCain - Bush Shill or Just Misguided?

In a previous post, I issued the lament that the Dems do not have a vocal speaker on defense issues such as Sen. John McCain. Let me clarify that statement by noting that this does not mean I admire the man or endorse his views universally. What I find especially abhorrent is the man's unswerving support for President Bush's transparent agenda on Social Security and on the issue of WMDs in Iraq. I know others have commented about the mystery that is McCain - why does a decorated veteran and former Vietnam POW kiss up to the man that not only dodged the Vietnam War but whose political staff and allies tore his presidential aspirations apart?

Case #1: The commission to investigate US intelligence capabilities on WMDs is nearly done with its report. McCain's a member on the board, and is already laying the stage for the report that cost $10 million to deliver to the President.

Sen. John McCain said Tuesday the conclusions of a commission investigating intelligence failures on weapons of mass destruction should not lead to new questions about whether the Iraq war was justified.

"America, the world and Iraq is better off for what we did in bringing democracy," McCain said.

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Though he did not directly say it, he suggested that there are other factors that trump the now-discredited claims of weapons in Iraq that were a primary reason Bush cited to go to war.

"You're going to hear a lot in the future about weapons of mass destruction, including next week," McCain said.

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"I think questions had to be answered as to why we were so wrong," McCain said. "We needed to have recommendations as to how to prevent something like this from ever happening again."

Yeah - like not politicizing intelligence reports to justify a preventive war against a nation that doesn't represent a clear and present danger to the United States. But we're not going to hear about that point from this commission.

Case #2 - McCain's barnstorming with the Prez on how wonderful the non-existent Bush plan to reform Social Security is. Oh, if only those silly Dems would come to the table and negotiate with the Repubs!

"Some of our friends who are opposing this idea say, `Oh, you don't have to worry until 2042.' We wait until 2042 when we stop paying people Social Security? That's not what this is all about," he said. "Please urge our Democrat friends to come to the table and sit with us and do this for the greater good of the United States of America. ... This issue isn't shouldn't have anything to do with partisan politics."

I guess it would be easier to believe McCain had not the town halls been so carefully orchestrated and screened to prevent any Dems from coming into the "open and public" functions...

Case #3 - Never rat on your GOP buddies... no matter how bad they look.

So to recap: McCain - good on defense, lousy on social issues, and a real suck-up when it suits his presidential ambitions. It's just sad to see this distinguished man go down this path.

Homeland Insecurity

Jane's Defence Weekly has an article that highlights Paul McHale, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD[HD]). He's just completed a strategy for domestic defense, to be briefed to Rumsfeld in the next week or so. His strategy emphasizes fighting as far from US borders as possible, pre-empting the threat, rather than continuing a focus on port and border security and critical infrastructure protection.

"As we began to explore the strategy ... we realised that to defend the hilltop at the point of your concertina wire is a defence that is doomed to failure because of its last-minute capabilities," he notes. "We should see homeland defence not as a distinct and separate requirement but rather as an integrated element of a global strategy, carefully designed to defeat not only hostile nation states but ... transnational terrorist organisations prepared to attack the US in unconventional ways."

The US developed a sophisticated air-defence system under the North American Aerospace Defense Command during the Cold War. The Ballistic Missile Defense System, which was declared operational last year, provides defence against intercontinental missiles. However, the US still remains vulnerable to short-range missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from ships off the US coast, McHale says, noting that it requires air-defence capabilities analogous to those that US bases overseas have. In addition, the combat air patrols over US airspace that have been conducted since the attacks of 2001 will continue indefinitely, McHale says.

In the article, McHale expresses his concern that the greatest threat is coming from the sea - primarily that a nuclear bomb or similar high-explosive threat will be smuggled in on a commercial ship. To counter this threat, he's calling for increased monitoring of ships enroute to the United States, more searches with radiation monitors, maritime intercept operations, and developing UAVs that can fly out to ships and detect radiation sources that may be a weapon of mass destruction. To which I say - enough already with the paranoia, guys.

I still remain unconvinced that the greatest threat to the homeland is a terrorist group armed with a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device. Greatest impact? sure, maybe - and least likely scenario to happen. Much more deadly and probable would be a terrorist group deciding to blow up a natural gas tanker in a major port. I have great sympathy for the NORTHCOM and ASD(HD) planners - there are so many potential scenarios and so little guidance on what DOD's role is in homeland defense, it must be rough to decide what to go after first. But nuclear terrorism? With due respect to Senator Nunn and the NTI, no.

I guess worrying about being invaded by Canada or Mexico is probably not a top issue, but worrying about terrorist infiltration might be, considering how we can't stop illegal immigrants from pouring over the border in increasing numbers every year. But any homeland defense strategy ought to address all the threats, to include ballistic missiles, piracy, drug smugglers, and terrorism. Instead, our military is worried about terrorists wearing scuba gear to swim into the country.

I continuously see parallels between the Cold War days when the military conducted homeland defense against Soviet nuclear threats. There were countless studies on how to conduct homeland defense then, which resulted in a strategy of counterforce, active defense, and civil defense. In the 1960s, counterforce meant sending nuclear bombers and missiles against Soviet military and civilian targets. Active defense measures included air defense missiles and interceptors on patrol. Civil defense meant preparing shelters and materials to cope with radiological fallout as well as chemical and biological warfare agents.

It makes sense to parallel that structure today, and guess what? DOD already has a manual on combating terrorism, which includes instructions on counterterrorism actions, antiterrorism (defensive measures), and consequence management (clean-up and recovery). I would expect ASD(HD) to stay more on the top of policy initiatives, to include coordinating with DHS, working with NORTHCOM on implementation, and assisting the four services in identifying and addressing critical homeland defense issues such as protection of its military installations from CBRN hazards. It just seems that the OSD office is way too much in the weeds. They need to back out, take a deep breath, and reassess what they can do against the more credible threats with the funds available.

One of the major lessons of the Cold War was that there wasn't enough money to do everything, so the priority was on intercepting incoming threats and retaliating against the adversarial nation. As a result, there was no national fallout shelter system, only an expedient shelter program using public buildings. I have no doubt that a similar strategy will eventually be worked out for homeland defense, where the focus will be on intercepting terrorists and retaliating against terrorist training camps overseas, with less and less money going to emergency responders at the state and local levels. I'm not arguing against this strategy - it may be the best one we can afford. I just would like to see the OSD leadership admit to a common sense strategy rather than continue this tired rhetoric:

"As we began to explore the strategy ... we realised that to defend the hilltop at the point of your concertina wire is a defence that is doomed to failure because of its last-minute capabilities," [McHale] notes. "We should see homeland defence not as a distinct and separate requirement but rather as an integrated element of a global strategy, carefully designed to defeat not only hostile nation states but ... transnational terrorist organisations prepared to attack the US in unconventional ways."

Yeah, whatever. That's the whole "1-4-2-1" strategy. But let's not lose sight on the point that the U.S. military is designed to meet, engage, and defeat the enemy, preferably overseas. DHS and Dept of State are supposed to be the leads on responding to terrorist threats, with DOD as a supporting agent. DOD wants to transform to address irregular, catestrophic, and disruptive threats, and now we see the services scrambling to explain how their traditional military systems like the F-22 fighter, Joint Strike Fighter, and DD(X) destroyer are really great for countering terrorist threats. Fiscally speaking, this next defense budget could get really messy, and at the end of the day, will we really have more protected homeland?

A Progressive Plan of Action

At the risk of writing a "me, too"' post, I want to draw your attention to two good posts on the issue of helping the Democratic Party develop and maintain a progressive national security platform. Matthew Yglesias has a very insightful article in the American Prospect on why the Dems have been unsuccessful in convincing the American people that they are, indeed, serious about national security issues.

The problems in Kerry’s campaign reflected deeper structural problems inside Democratic politics. Despite a reasonably broad consensus among left-of-center security hands about what should be done, the party’s political operatives are unable to turn that consensus into a compelling political narrative. Democrats are reluctant to address security issues except when forced to do so, and, as a result, they discover that when they are so forced, they aren’t very good at it. Political failure breeds further reluctance, which breeds further failure -- no one develops the relevant ability to spin security for partisan gain, and because no one can win on security, no one learns how to campaign on it.

Matt notes that there are no shortage of good ideas from progressive thinktanks and pundits, rather it is the failure of the Dems to emphasize their national security issues as a coherent and sound platform that is the problem. The public all too often sees a party that either just agrees with the Repubs on national security or that is only railing against the Repubs because of rabid Bush-hating. Serious attempts to criticize Bush's policies are spun against the party as perceptions that we progressives are somehow "jealous" of Bush's "successes." There's too much talk and no action - no pattern of dedication to committing real time and effort to national security. Where are the progressive activists?

Matt makes the interesting point that Repubs pull their national security personnel from the ranks of partisan policy circles, making a clear and distinct connection between political vision and public policy. This includes past administration officials as well as Capital Hill connections and defense industry contractors. The Dems, meanwhile, look to more non-ideological consultants that don't mix politics and public policy. Therefore, the Dems are operating at a disadvantage right at the beginning. Matt concludes:

The upshot is that no one is charged with looking after a topic, like national security, that concerns everyone, rather than anyone in particular. There exists no major group in Washington that defines itself as both progressive and primarily concerned with the topics of foreign policy and security. Until this is changed, it will be hard for Democrats to engage with the subject as they must -- at every level, and not merely in presidential campaigns. It will also be all but impossible to build a broad, thematic case on security policy -- one that raises the way in which the right’s tax-cut jihad at home starves the government of resources needed to fight the real one around the world, and questions the fitness of a movement with an ambivalent view toward theocracy at home to combat it abroad -- rather than a laundry list of narrow, technocratic criticisms.

Praktike adds some observations on the issue at the Liberals Against Terrorism site:

This is not to say that the Democrats don't need to think hard about how to convince Americans that they will keep them safe, but rather that the best way to do so is to advocate policies that will keep Americans safe and point out where the Bush administration is failing to do so. Show, don't tell, I say.

And this is the real crux of the issue, really. Having individuals such as us out here preaching about progressive views on national security only gets you so far, and usually it's limited to education of the faithful. We're not convincing the masses that the Dems have a national security position - heck, we're not even convincing the moderate Repubs out there that we have a sound alternative. We need the Democratic PARTY to establish a no-kidding, national security platform and to start initiating serious actions at the state and federal legislative levels. We need the Party to get partisan about our views rather than fearing that any criticism of the Repub's actions - unilateral and naked aggression against the world - will somehow be interpreted as weakness. If we have positions, now's the time to push them.

We need a John McCain on our side - a military vet that is consistently going to the floor and pointing out the ridiculousness of the partisan pork in the defense bills and Congress's (and Bush's) failures to take care of military personnel and veterans. We need a speaker that points out that Israel's policies are a major factor in what's hurting our position in the Middle East, and that we need to get tough with Sharon about the Wall and the settlements. We need a no-kidding wrangler that will take Bush to the mat for not reproaching Putin for continuing slips in democracy. We need the Dems to demand every day that the United States government work with its allies on international treaties that are enforceable and add to the peace, instead of shelving and abandoning treaties as we do today. We need to recognize the value of soft power in supporting national security.

We all know the issues, and we all understand the stakes. We need to start to strengthen progressive national security issues with a partisan agenda and ACT.

Developing Military Strategies

Last week, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith announced the release of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NSS). The two documents were developed in tandum to ensure coordination between the development of defense strategy and concepts supporting the defense strategy. Both documents build upon President Bush's National Security Strategy, released in Sep 02. To understand the differences between the two documents, the defense news release notes: "The NDS defines DoD’s strategic objectives: securing the U.S. from direct attack; securing strategic access and retaining freedom of action; strengthening alliances and partnerships; and establishing security conditions conducive to a favorable international order. The NMS provides strategic guidance to the armed forces on how to support NDS objectives.  It sets forth three military objectives: protecting the U.S.; preventing conflict and surprise attack; and prevailing against adversaries." Both documents will be used in developing this year's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The QDR will be developed by the efforts of six panels through a series of workshops held between April and July. These panels include:

• Capabilities mix - chaired by DepSecDef Paul Wolfowitz and Vice CJCS General Peter Pace, focusing on countering Islamic terrorist groups, countering proliferation of WMDs, military role in homeland security, and threats from an emerging power.
• Joint capability enablers - chaired by USD(I) Stephen Cambone and AF vice chief of staff Gen Michael Moseley, looking at logistics, command and control, and intel, surveillance, and recon (ISR) capabilities.
• Manning and force balance - chaired by USD(P&R) David Chu and director, J-8, VADM Robert Willard, examining active/reserve balance, recruiting & skills retention.
• Roles/missions and organizations - chaired by USD(P) Doug Feith and director, J-5, LTG Walter Sharp, including homeland security and intel.
• DOD authorities - chaired by SecNav Gordon England and asst to the CJCS LTG Raymond Odierno, examining aspects of US code and what might be changed to allow for defense transformation actions.
• Business practices and processes - chaired by Director, PA&E Ken Krieg and director, J-4, Lt Gen Duncan McNabb, looking at acquisition procedures.

I intend to address both the NDS and NMS more carefully and in more detail, but want to hit on some general issues first. Some bloggers have expressed alarm that the language in these documents amount to an agenda for "global military domination." I think that's hardly the case. What the two documents do stress is that the U.S. military intends to protect the homeland, and part of that involves being able to reach out and touch individuals in far-off countries. If we can do that in cooperation with international allies, fine, if not, it will be harder but we will get them. You can dislike the unilateral message, but it's far from a claim to take over the world.

The NMS retains the four principle concepts in the last QDR - assure allies and friends, dissuade potential adversaries, deter aggression and counter coercion, and defeat adversaries. It also retains the force structure guidance of "1-4-2-1" without specifying specific geographical regions of interest. Feith tried to differentiate between preventive actions and pre-emptive actions, but he dodged the question of whether Iraq was a pre-emptive or preventive military action.

Q: Mr. Feith, would you please clarify what is the real difference between preemptive action and preemption measures? And tell me if I am right. The war in Iraq was a preventive action, and the war in Afghanistan was preemption measures.

And my question is: Is there any possibility for a preventive action, let's say, against Iran?

MR. FEITH: I don't think I agree with your terminology. What I was saying is one of the key strategic messages that the secretary is giving the department through the National Defense Strategy is that people should be thinking not simply how to react to events when those events have already become big problems or wars, but what kinds of actions do we want to take now to help shape an international environment so that problems are less likely to become crises. And through early action we can sometimes prevent a crisis from becoming a war -- I mean, the kind of intervention that was done in Haiti. The kind of early intervention that was done on the humanitarian operation for the tsunami was an example of doing something quickly so that a large problem doesn't get exacerbated because of the failure to act.

There are also things that we can do to shape the environment, like the Proliferation Security Initiative developing the capacity of other countries to do interdictions of shipments of weapons of mass destruction materials or technology is the kind of thing -- a sensible preventive action that can help prevent countries from proliferating weapons of mass destruction. I mean, it serves our interests to prevent problems from occurring or getting worse.

Q: Yeah, but what about the war in Iraq or in Afghanistan? It was -- I mean, the war in Iraq was a preventive action and the war in Afghanistan was a preemption measures after the attack of 9/11.

MR. FEITH: I mean, I don't want to get into academic debates about that, you know, how we label --

Q: -- about the war in Iraq, it was a preventive action I mean?

MR. FEITH: The war in Iraq was a way to take care of a threat that the United States tried for at least a dozen years to take care of through numerous other means, with resolutions of the Security Council and inspection measures and sanctions, and various other methods that unfortunately did not remedy the problem.

The NDS has some interesting concepts, to include its discussion about "weapons of mass destruction or effect" or WMD/E:

The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical "weapons". They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.

While I am delighted that the military is at least recognizing the importance to define WMDs by the mass casualty or disruptive effect they cause rather than their particular form of technology, I still think they fail to recognize the need to separate incidents of single, small scale releases of CBRN hazards by terrorists from the deliberate and sustained use of NBC weapons by nation-states. The current language seems to be overly exaggerated, in that any use of CBRN hazards would create such an impact on unprotected US citizens that any response is justified. Thus sentences like this: "The threat posed by adversaries, especially those that possess WMD/E, is so great that the United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise attack" (bold as per original text).

I acknowledge the need to avoid future 9/11 attacks and the right to self-defense, but at the same time I note that we have combating WMD and combating terrorism strategies, equipment, and organizations that lessen this risk without promoting full-scale military combat operations. Sometimes it appears that the DOD is defensively justifying its past actions against Iraq rather than really examining ways to better prepare for the future. More on these two documents later.

Trust Us

The U.S. government's credibility in stating the threat of "weapons of mass destruction" to the U.S. homeland keeps getting degraded by its inability to square with its allies and its citizens. Two interesting articles on Sunday, the first from London's Sunday Times:

Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, briefed Blair and a select group of ministers on America’s determination to press ahead with the war nine months before hostilities began.

After attending a briefing in Washington, he told the meeting that war was “inevitable”. Dearlove said “the facts and intelligence” were being “fixed round the policy” by George W Bush’s administration.

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[The BBC documentary] quotes from a leaked memo on the presentation of intelligence sent by Peter Ricketts, political director of the Foreign Office, to Jack Straw, foreign secretary, in March 2002.

The memo says: “There is more work to ensure that the figures are accurate and consistent with the US. But even the best survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years.”

The programme argues that Blair had signed up to follow Bush’s plans for regime change in Iraq as early as April 2002. It quotes Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary who resigned as leader of the Commons over Iraq, arguing that the threat of WMD was not Blair’s true reason for going to war.

The second article in the Washington Post details how the Bush administration failed to inform its allies and citizens that the uranium that traveled from North Korea to Libya traveled through an intermediary - Pakistan.

Pakistan's role as both the buyer and the seller was concealed to cover up the part played by Washington's partner in the hunt for al Qaeda leaders, according to the officials, who discussed the issue on the condition of anonymity. In addition, a North Korea-Pakistan transfer would not have been news to the U.S. allies, which have known of such transfers for years and viewed them as a business matter between sovereign states.

Rumsfeld released the National Defense Strategy last week, and the issue of "catestrophic threats" involving the "acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects" is a reoccurring theme. I continue to question if this administration really understands the difference between traditional adversaries that have an active WMD program and terrorists that have a capability to create single small-scale CBRN incidents. Nothing I've seen from this administration gives me any case to believe that they know what they are talking about in terms of realistic responses to the threat of WMD programs. Worse yet, they hide and obfuscate what they do know for short-term political gains.

I want to examine the new National Defense Strategy in more depth, but will save that for another post.

Culture Wars

Make no mistake, the Repubs have engaged in no-holds barred, thermonuclear culture war. It didn't start this past weekend, but what did happen just infuriated me enough to deviate from topics on military war to culture war. Here we have a bunch of smug bastards in the House and Senate that think they have the moral and legal right to intervene on whether Terri Schiavo's husband can make the decision to allow her to die, 15 years after she's been in a coma, seven years after the court cases began on her case. You see, when they say "federal government should not be involved in individual's lives" they mean if you're a CEO of a business or a rancher in the West living on federal subsities. It's okay for the federal government to interfere in social issues involving your family's lifestyles and sexual morals.

Digby's got a very insightful post here that gets to the bottom line - for all the posturing, the Repubs don't believe in an absolute right to life, they don't make it easier for us to afford health care, they don't make it easier to address these important life issues. It's about political grandstanding.

This issue gets to the essence of the culture war. Shall the state be allowed to interfere in the most delicate, complicated personal matters of life, death and health because a particular religious constituency holds that their belief system should override each individual's right to make these personal decisions for him or herself. And it isn't the allegedly statist/communist/socialist left that is agitating for the government to tell Americans how they must live and how they must die.

One of the things that we need to help America understand is that there is a big difference between the way the two parties perceive the role of government in its citizens personal lives. Democrats want the government to collect money from all its citizens in order to deliver services to the people. The Republicans want the government to collect money from working people in order to dictate individual citizen's personal decisions. You tell me which is the bigger intrusion into the average American's liberty?

I really want to know where Senator Frist got his medical degree that he can make a medical opinion on Schiavo based on a video tape. I really liked Senator Frist's call that you might get AIDS from sweat and tears. How does the man look at himself in the mirror each day? By thinking over and over again, "must win conservative Christians in 2008?" And how about Randall Terry along side the Schindlers? Yeah, that's a photo moment - rabid right-to-life leader, Senator Frist and Representative DeLay - all buddies looking out for your rights.

Except that this is an "individual case" and "not meant to set a precedent." Because what's important here is politicking, not doing what's morally right. Call your Congressional representatives, and then make or update your living wills. It may not do anything in the near term, but we need to let these bastards know they have stepped way over the line. They're not going to be happy until there are cameras in our bedrooms as well as political commissars in the hospitals and schools, approving every social issue we engage in. This culture war is unacceptable, but if they want to fight, bring it on, bitches!

Downfall of Hitler

Saw the German film "Der Untergang" or "The Downfall" this weekend. What an experience! It largely addresses the last few weeks of Hitler's life as he lived in the bunkers under the Reichs Chancellery, as seen by Hitler's primary stenographer Traudl Junge. The film has taken a lot of controversy over whether the director was right or wrong to humanize Hitler and his Nazis, but I'm not sure the film "humanizes" Hitler as much as captures what probably was going on in those last few days in Berlin. No coverage of the concentration camps or the battles going on in the field, just Hitler's paranoia and screaming fits at his general officers who are too afraid to tell him that he has no military capability any more, and meanwhile the Russians tighten the noose around the city.

The actor Bruno Ganz did a great deal of study to get into the role of Hitler, and does an amazing job mimicking the leader. Great job by the supporting actors as well. Fantastic realism in uniforms, weapons, and vehicles. This is really an intense film, did get a bit disturbing at the end with everyone committing suicide and all, but just very well done. This is not a film glorifying or excusing the Third Reich's architects; rather, it gives you a very clear view of how detached from reality Hitler and Goebbels were and how unconcerned they were that the war was destroying their society and people.

Goebbels has this line at the end, I'm going to try to paraphrase it. Traudl asks Goebbels to convince Hitler to give up and end the war, because millions of people in Berlin might die. "The people gave us a mandate," he replies. "Now they can cut their little white throats for us." Chilling.

Two Years, 1520 Dead, and One Democracy Later

Well here we are at the two-year mark. There's bound to be a great deal of introspection in the next week, so I wanted to get this post in and out of the way. Let's remember President Bush's speech to the nation on this date.

My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.

On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are giving crucial support -- from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving in our common defense.

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Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly -- yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.

Fast forward two years, after near certain findings that there are no "weapons of mass murder" in Iraq. We wait for the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction to conclude their investigation and report their fingins at the end of March to the President. But wait! Don't look to see if the Bush administration politicized the intelligence findings! See this post in Iraq'd.

Last July, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a 511-page report into how the intelligence community erroneously assessed Saddam Hussein's nonexistent weapons of mass production programs and relationship to Al Qaeda. However, it wasn't complete. Committee members opted to defer inquiry into the politically hazardous questions of how accurately the Bush administration represented the intelligence it possessed on Iraq to the Congress and the public and how appropriately administration policymakers influenced the assessment and presentation of intelligence products within the government until after the November election. Liberals especially have been waiting with bated breath ever since.

Today, Pat Roberts, the Senate intelligence committee chairman, told everyone not to bother. "It's basically on the back burner," Roberts said after a speech on intelligence reform at the Woodrow Wilson Center. "The bottom line is that [the administration] believed the intelligence, and the intelligence was wrong."

Yeah. Of course. How silly of us to think that... The NY Times has a good editorial marking the two-year mark.

The Bush administration was famously flexible in explaining why it invaded Iraq, and the most important reason, in the minds of Americans and in the arguments made by American diplomats, turned out to be wrong. There were no weapons of mass destruction to destroy. Worse, the specialized machinery and highly lethal conventional weaponry that Saddam Hussein did control was looted during the invasion and is now very likely in the hands of terrorists. As James Glanz and William Broad reported in The Times, among the things missing is high-precision equipment capable of making parts for nuclear arms. The WMD argument was not only wrong, but the invasion might have also created a new threat.

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Mr. Bush was not honest with the American people in the run-up to the war. He hyped the WMD evidence abroad and played down the cost at home. The results of last fall's election ensured that he would pay no political penalty. But other people sit in judgment as well. Mr. Bush's determination to have his war and his tax cuts at the same time meant masking the real price of invading Iraq, and even now the costs are being borne mainly by overseas holders of American debt. The international markets know this, and over the long run are most likely to be less forgiving than American voters.

No doubt some will accuse me of rehashing old gripes. "Get over it," they say, "support the troops!" I think the troops are getting really tired of multiple deployments and no relief in sight, and they're voting with their feet... I am really looking forward to this defense strategy review Rumsfeld has started. Not sure that his technological focus is going to adapt well to the new scenarios envisioned, but no question it's time for an honest review of how America's military operates. I just don't think we're going to like his direction.

UPDATE: Phil Carter has an excellent post on the topic, as usual.

Ultimately, it's clear that the war in Iraq has strengthened the U.S. military in many key ways. It has blooded the force and given it a new generation of combat veterans trained in everything from desert warfare to streetfighting to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. It has enabled the reserves to shake off their Cold War cobwebs. And by spreading freedom and democracy to Iraq, we can hope that Iraq will never again threaten its neighbors or the United States, assuming that democracies tend to make good neighbors. But it's also crystal clear that the war has been waged at tremendous cost for the United States. We have spent hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of U.S. lives, and we have committed a sizable proportion of our military capacity to this fight. I believe that the Iraq war will ultimately be chalked up in the "win" column, but I think we have a long way to go before achieving victory there.

In the coming decades, historians with more perspective may be able to balance the costs and the benefits to produce a calculation of whether the war was truly worth it; I think we're too close to the facts now to make that assessment. Nonetheless, I think it's important to identify and understand both costs and benefits now, so that we can develop near-term policies which take them into account.