Armchair Generalist

Casual Fridays

Dan Gerstein has written an interesting book in his review of how the US government has reacted to the bioterrorism challenge over the past eight years. Gerstein wasn't traditionally a bioterrorism expert until he started taking the PhD program at George Mason University. His dissertation was the basis for this book (he has a background as a strategist and policy expert). Overall, it's a pretty even-handed discussion, referencing both those who exaggerate bioterrorism concerns and the skeptics who downplay them.

The best aspects of this book is how he examines the larger aspects of terrorism motives and biotechnology, and he attempts to develop a model to analytically review the threat - employed by different classes of terrorists - against different levels of preparedness. It isn't 100 percent convincing - I think the model needs some more work, but it is an excellent attempt to move the discussion from wild-eyed exaggerations to a somewhat calmer review of facts and cost/benefit analyses. 

For those of us within the community, there isn't a lot of new information here, and (from my perspective) I don't care for his leaning toward the bioterrorism crazies. But it is comprehensive in covering the broad topic of bioterrorism, and he does reference a good deal of the activity that has taken place in this area. He does give credit to Milton Leitenberg's skepticism about bioterrorism, but then he comes up with statements like this:

Imagine a terrorist with the scientific knowledge to engineer pathogens to make certain genes express themselves, thus increasing the virulence of a pathogen by an order of magnitude or being able to encapsulate the pathogen to make it more stable in the environment. ... (three other horrific "what ifs" follow) ... These would be frightening outcomes for society and the public health community. 

Imagine if a terrorist highjacked the Space Shuttle, manipulated a spy satellite to shoot a giant chemical laser against the Space Station and caused it to plummet into the atmosphere and hit Chicago. That would be a frightening outcome also. Gerstein has a problem in that he believes too much of the what-if scenarios and hasn't adequately reviewed how much of this is really possible. Or perhaps I'm just not satisfied that he's made the distinction between probable events and theoretical "what if" games.

On the other hand, he's practical enough to state that he does not believe the terrorist threat to be an "existential threat" to the United States - which is a bold statement, considering how many politicians and other talking heads say that it is. He also acknowledges that only a very small subset of terrorist groups would have the resources, capabilities, intentions, and support structure to pull a bioterrorist incident off - and even fewer could actually pull off a large bioterrorist incident. That's a very refreshing point of view that again, one does not see in the day-to-day defense discussions. 

Overall, this is a good read - it doesn't tread any new ground (other than the analytic model concept), but it is a good unbiased review of the issues from a larger security perspective. His analytical review to examining the threat of bioterrorism against US capabilities ought to be examined and developed more. And I guess that's a good thing, since he's been recently hired to become the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering WMD for Ms. Rebecca Hersman. Nice to have some competent thinkers in OSD Policy...

Disclaimer: This book was provided to me at no cost by the publisher.

Human Volunteer Tests Are Just Wrong

Domino's Scientists Test Limits Of What Humans Will Eat

I haven't eaten a Domino's Pizza for some time, and I don't miss it.

Smart Discussions on Afghanistan

If you have some time, listen to the Charlie Rose show titled "Live analysis of President Obama's address on Afghanistan 12/01/09" - there's no direct link, but you can access it under "recent shows." In particular, Dexter Filkins (NYT) and Martha Raddatz (ABC) make some very good points and are clearly knowledgable on the topic. That's as compared to David "Bobo" Brooks, who babbles incoherently through this interview. Also features Richard Haass (CFR), Jeff Greenfield (CBS), and the ever-delightful Rachel Maddow (MSNBC). (hat tip to Alternative Brain).

It would be a much better use of your time than trying to read Robert Kagan's ridiculous WaPo op-ed, which in a shorter form would read "Quitters never win, so we can never pull out of Afghanstan."

Republicans Fail National Security

Al Kamen reminds us of the hysterical Republican party's reaction to handing the Panama Canal over to Panama ten years ago - because it was just an insane idea that the US government wouldn't want to continue occupying a country with military and civilian personnel to protect a critical economic asset.

"If we do nothing, I can guarantee you that within a decade, a communist Chinese regime that hates democracy and sees America as its primary enemy will dominate the tiny country of Panama, and thus dominate the Panama Canal, one of the world's most important strategic points," Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.) told a House subcommittee on Dec. 7, 1999, as it debated the handover.

Retired Adm. Thomas Moorer warned that China could sneak missiles into Panama and use it as a launchpad for attacking the United States. And former defense secretary Caspar W. Weinberger wrote that fall that Panama's contract with Hong Kong-based Hutchison Whampoa to control ports at both ends of the passage was "the biggest threat to the canal."

Then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) said he was "alarmed" by the Chicom contract, which "could, in fact, be a threat to our national security." The Clintonites were "allowing a scenario to develop where U.S. national security interests could not be protected without confronting the Chinese Communists in the Americas," Lott said.

The Republicans hated it when President Carter negotiated the Panama Canal treaty, with Ronald Reagan stating "we built it, we paid for it, it's ours." So what's happened since the Panama Canal turnover in 1999? Nothing, really. There was no emergent Chinese threat, as predicted by the right wing. The issue lost its political value after Reagan became president and it became clear that maritime traffic wasn't affected at all.

So why should we credit Republican fears about China today, given that they have no credibility on the issue and only intend to resurrect an external foe for political points? And please, let's not even get into the Republican hypocracy that exists over their "national security concerns" over the current conflicts  in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Decline of David Ignatius

 I used to respect David Ignatius and enjoy his columns. I enjoyed his narration between Bret Scowcroft and Zbignew Brzezinski in "America and the World." Then he took a few helicopter rides with Gen. Petraeus and I think they replaced him with a pod person. That's the only rationale I can think of with his recent comments about President Obama's speech about an Afghanistan strategy.

Military commanders appear comfortable with Obama's decision, although they wish it hadn't taken so long.

You mean that after six years of asking for reinforcements from the Bush administration, to include Gen. McChrystal's immediate predecessor, that the military officers are upset about waiting six-month strategy review after the addition of 21,000 to the size of the force in the spring? Hmmmmm. I don't think so.

The most important question about Obama's strategy isn't political but pragmatic: Will it succeed? He has defined success downward, by focusing on the ability to transfer control to the Afghans. He shows little interest in the big ideas of counterinsurgency and insists he will avoid "a nation-building commitment in Afghanistan." That will make it easier to declare a "good enough" outcome in July 2011, if not victory.

What exactly did Ignatius think was the point of military operations in Afghanistan if not to create the conditions where the Afghans could take charge of their own security? Did he think that we were just supposed to coddle the Afghani security forces forever, or until we kill every living Taliban? President Obama doesn't show interest in COIN because IT'S AN OPERATIONAL TACTIC - that's what the generals are paid to do. He just tells them what the end result is supposed to be, and whatever he decides is "good enough" is what we call victory conditions. It's not a hard concept.

Obama thinks that setting deadlines will force the Afghans to get their act together at last. That strikes me as the most dubious premise of his strategy. He is telling his adversary that he will start leaving on a certain date, and telling his ally to be ready to take over then, or else. That's the weak link in an otherwise admirable decision -- the idea that we strengthen our hand by announcing in advance that we plan to fold it.

Yeah, it's not as if setting a deadline worked in Iraq, right? Oh wait, it did. If we set the conditions for leaving, it does, at the least, allow the US government to plan resources and understand that this isn't an endless death spiral. It does force Karzai and company to understand that they won't have the US military as the palace guard forever. Here's a newsflash for David - the goal is al Qaeda. The Taliban aren't taking flying lessons or planning to smuggle themselves into the United States. We need to stop thinking that every nation needs the US military to hold their hand, and maybe, just maybe, people in another country can actually make their own way toward their own goals and ambitions (even if they aren't the same as our own).

Sebelius Drinks the Kool-Aid

Health and Human Services Secretary Kathy Sebelius has thought about all the challenges with getting the H1N1 vaccine out to the public, and she's convinced that many of the problems are due to the lack of modern technology. So she's called for a review.

 "Today, we face a wider range of public health threats than ever before in our history," Sebelius said. "It could be anthrax delivered in an envelope. It could be a dirty bomb set off in a subway car. It could be a new strain of flu that our bodies have no immunity to."

The nation's ability to respond to such threats depends not only on having enough hospital beds, emergency rooms, doctors, and equipment such as masks and ventilators, but also on state-of-the-art diagnostic tests, medications and vaccines, she said.

"But the countermeasure that saves the day during a quick-hitting public health emergency can often take years to discover, develop, manufacture and distribute," she said. "Like a lot of countries, we've often failed to make the kind of long-term investments in countermeasures we need to stay safe."
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"We were fighting the 2009 H1N1 flu with vaccine technology from the 1950s. We could race to begin vaccine production, but there was nothing we could do if vaccine grew slowly in eggs. We could make deals with foreign vaccine producers ahead of time, but we still wouldn't have as much control over the vaccine as if they were based in the U.S.," she said.

"If we wanted to avoid these problems in the future, we needed to make some long-term investments in developing countermeasures that were just as safe and effective, but could be produced faster and more reliably," she said.

Wait... this sounds familiar. Oh yes - this was the line of the Graham-Talent commission, who's backed by the Alliance for BioSecurity. And wouldn't it be special if the federal government helped the poor, under-financed Big Pharma with a few hundred million dollars to build brand-new vaccine production plants... You know, instead of doing something that would actually benefit public health, like addressing the shortages of hospital beds, ventilators, trained medical personnel, decon showers at emergency rooms, etc.

This is wrong. Big Pharma seems to have some concerns with investing large sums of money into vaccine production plants, even though they are so strongly stated as a national interest, and clearly the profits will be there after the plants are built. Oh wait... maybe eight years of underfunding and blocking the FDA from adequately doing its job is a factor in making this a risky investment. Maybe the signs of stagnation within the $5 billion-funded Project BioShield program for the past four years is a factor. Maybe the late start of the production of H1N1 vaccine, after so many warning signs, was a factor.

No, obviously all those issues are false flags, and the only corrective action we can take is to give Big Pharma a huge subsidy and promises of federal procurement to ensure that the US government can adequately respond to the extremely low probability that a bioterrorism incident might occur. File this under "DHHS hoodwinked by bio industry lobbyists."  

Too Cool

War of Words

I wanted to get back to William Owen's article in Armed Forces Journal. He's concerned that the military obsesses a bit too much on terminology at the cost of not appreciating the universal nature of war. And by "universal nature of war," he means Clausewitz's "Art of War." This terminology change has been particularly noticeable with the recent wars in the Middle East. You might have heard about the whole "counterinsurgency versus conventional warfare" debate... 

Complex warfare will take place in complex terrain, which is essentially terrain that restricts the use of weapons and sensors. Arguably, these are the same restrictions such terrain has always imposed, when it was usefully called “close terrain.” Within complex terrains, there will be civilian populations, now called the “human terrain,” and these will further restrict the use of weapons. Future wars will be conducted around and within populations, because wars are and always have been about people. The highly variable intolerance or acceptance of intentional or accidental killing of civilians has been an enduring aspect of warfare. To suggest that this is new is wholly false. British public opinion cared very little about the civilian casualties of the Boer War, but was extremely moved by Belgian and French civilian casualties at the beginning of the First World War. They were also angered by the death of British schoolchildren killed by zeppelin raids. The Western Front of World War I was played out across a highly populated area of Europe. U.S. public opinion cared little about Afghan civilian casualties or human rights in the wake of Sept. 11. Moreover, the history of warfare suggests that unintentional civilian casualties are far more a political problem than a moral one, because war is a political instrument and public opinion has always played its part.

Historically, armies have always gathered information about the ethnicity, tribal makeup and opinions of civilian populations. The argument that this was done in a “colonial” context is correct, but this is no different from doing the same thing in a “nation-building” context.
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War is not changing. The aims and purpose of organized violence for political gain are enduring and unchanging. Insurgencies are war, and most if not all of the observations made in the Army’s new FM 3-24 “Counterinsurgency” manual could have been written in 1991 or earlier. Future wars will be born of future politics, not “globalization” or the Internet. Yes, there will be “unknown unknowns,” but they are just that: unknowable. New words won’t change that.

This led to a great comment discussion in MilPub that started in general military strategy discussion but moved onto AfPak strategies and OSD leadership issues. If I can grasp the essence of the thread, some of the debate was focused on whether the new language was just a political ploy to cover ambitious plans of "influencing governments" out there, if the new language was just confused milspeak without substance, or is there really something new here. I wanted to make two quick points with respect to this discussion.

Clausewitz had some good thoughts about the nature of warfare - so did Sun Tzu. Trying to define different generations of warfare or elaborating on irregular warfare as being conducted different than conventional warfare doesn't contradict their discussions on operational and strategic warfare. It's like saying there's only chemistry as a real science, when one can break out inorganic, organic, and physical chemistry as distinct topics (not to mention quantum mechanics in chemistry). Given the challenge of irregular warfare (and I agree, the term "hybrid warfare" is strained), it probably does some good to review it and to determine whether there are some distinct differences in approaching that challenge. There are always new things to learn, better ways to approach the problem, given changes in culture and technology. I strongly recommend a review of the CT/COIN posts in Kingdaddy's (dormant) blog "Arms and Influence" for some examples.

Seydlitz89, the author of the MilPub post, says that propagandists will tell you that language is power, that the words we use do make a difference. And he's absolutely correct there, except I would say that it's more than just the propagandists. Within the Building, words have power. Names have power. If you're trying to move ahead, if you're trying to advance a new concept, if you're trying to promote a new piece of equipment, you can't succeed without associating it to the right words. We scan the Joint Staff's concept papers and Services' posture statements for the correct sentences to put into powerpoint briefs. A good deal of agonizing goes into the Quadrennial Defense Review because it's understood that the report is only so long, and one sentence in that report can mean the life or death of a program, concept, or even someone's office. We don't combat WMD anymore, we're countering WMD. Words have power, and you ignore this at your own risk.

The basics of war may not have changed, but it has become more complex and there is a desire, shall we say, to do military operations with less collateral damage and with more precision, so that we're able to achieve objectives with less "blood and treasure." At least that's the intent, until the politicians get confused about what they want the military to do (and what the other government powers of diplomacy, information, and economics are supposed to achieve). And sure, a good deal of the bloviating is people trying to sound important or trying to sell something, but that only re-emphasizes the importance of dialogue (something that is sorely lacking in the combating countering WMD community). So it is important, and it will remain important, to examine warfare and to determine whether we're communicating our intent effectively. But the Masters of War will always be watching...

Reacting to the Speech

For those interested, here's the WaPo coverage and the White House transcript. For the WMD crowd, here's the money shots:

"The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered.  And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them."

"We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction.  And that's why I've made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them -- because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them. "

Really hate the "we know terrorists are going to use nukes when if they get them" talk. As Brian Jenkins points out, achieving nuclear terror without nuclear weapons is possible and probably suits the terrorist groups just fine. Others have commented that the odds of terrorists obtaining such a device are about microscopic, due to both technical and security issues.  This myopic focus on a 1 percent chance that terrorists will build, buy or steal a 10-kT nuke and transport it to the United States without being intercepted is just insane and a massive drain on our resources and brainpower.

As for the second paragraph, I'm all for nonproliferation as one aspect of national security, but let's not fool ourselves with pretty language about "true security" coming with the rejection of "more destructive weapons." When it comes to strategic nuclear warfare, the construct was and continues to be a tripod - nonproliferation talks, strategic strike capabilities, and defensive measures. We can argue about the balance between the three legs, but this isn't going to change.

I hesitate to point to the WaPo op-eds, where the conservatives are slamming Obama while agreeing with the troop increases and the left-of-center are bitterly disappointed at the failure to commit to pulling out of the mire. But would you expect otherwise? The (next) interesting thing will be the debate on how to pay for the troop surge, since SecDef Gates promised that all future war operations bills were going to be incorporated into the overall defense budget (as it should). At about $1M per military person, it's a steep cost, but (to use a phrase noted elsewhere) if the war is worth fighting as a vital security concern, isn't it worth taxing the American public to pay for it? Or does the Congress just want to deepen the deficit? As a note, this TPM article discusses how there will have to be a "surge" in contractors - who already outnumber military troops in Afghanistan - to successfully complete the mission.

UPDATE: Prof. Walt identifies the good, the bad, and the ugly. I concur.

Joe Cirincione Does The Colbert Report

The Colbert Report	Mon - Thurs 11:30pm / 10:30c
Better Know a Lobby - Ploughshares Fund
www.colbertnation.com
Colbert Report Full Episodes Political Humor U.S. Speedskating

The President's Speech - Live Blog

2003: "bring this war to a successful conclusion..." good start. Oh, shit, he's pulling out the 9/11 argument. "to destroy al Qaeda's terrorist network... we sent our troops into Afghanistan." So when do we invade Saudi Arabia?

2008: The Iraq war took the majority of our resources... no kidding. "we will remove our troops from Iraq by 2011." good. 

2009: "Troops in Afghanistan were a fraction of what we had in Iraq... requested reinforcements did not arrive." that's overly generous of him to view Bush's decisions that way.

2010: Huge challenges remain... The Taliban has gained momentum... Our forces lack the support they need... "more serious than [McChrystal] had anticipated." I owe you a mission that is clearly defined for your service."

2012: "I took a long time to review this strategy because you and the American people deserve no less." He does have a way with words, makes Bush look like an inarticulate hick. "I opposed the war in Iraq because of the need for restraint in military power." But now we don't feel that way?

2014: "I've seen first hand the terrible wages of war." "I am convinced our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan." "This is no idle danger." I think Bacevich's argument still holds, to suggest that the "threat" in AfPak require this surge is pretty damn weak.

2015: "al Qaeda seeks nuclear weapons and they will use them if they get them" Oh bullshit. I really hate this weak-ass statement. It has no credibility.

2016: Sending first wave to south provinces, train the Afghan troops, set the stage to allow us to pull out. That is to say, as they stand up, we will stand down. I've heard this song before.

2018: "Just as we have done in Iraq..." Oh my god. what a dangerous statement. Oh, he means giving the locals back their autonomy. We'll see. "No blank checks... hold people accountable for results..." Or what? We're not going to give them billions of dollars in aid?

2020: GEN David Petraeus looks attentive, sitting in the audience. "We need a strategy that works on both sides of the border." For all this talk about supporting Pakistan, the populace there still hates us for the military operations in the region. "Pakistan people must know that we are on their side to help them" yeah good luck with that message.

2022: "Afghanistan is not Vietnam. We have a 43-nation coalition" (not really - maybe the top 10 are really helping). "We can't maintain the status quo and muddle through" (no but you could change the tactics and not directly combat the Taliban). "We can't just ignore the need for a timeline, it's not sustainable" Well, that's the truth. "I refuse to commit US forces beyond our responsibility, means, and interests."

2025: "We can't afford to simply ignore the costs of these wars... I am committed to addressing these costs as we work to bring down the deficit." "We must rebuild our strength at home" Details please. Oh, he expects Congress to do this (haha)

2026: "None of this will be easy." "Precise and nimble in the use of our military power." "Show our strength in the way we end wars and prevent conflict." Commitments to homeland defense, intel collection, taking away the "tools of mass destruction" (TMDs?)

2029: We have to use diplomacy (Bush officials "what is this word diplomacy?"). Promote our values at home - prohibit torture and close Gitmo (yeah!) Moral source of America's authority. Yes, this is a good thing.

2032: "We have not sought world domination - we do not want to occupy other nations" Well, not since December 2008 at least. Finally some applause from the cadets.

2033: "Our strength doesn't come just from the strength of our arms, it comes from our people. And also from you guys in uniform... of the people, for the people, by the people." 

2035: "Remember when we were a united country on 9/12? I refuse to accept that we cannot summon that unity again. We can find a common purpose. We are passing through a time of great trial. Our cause is just, our will unwavering."

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A pretty impressive speech, damn him. I have to admit, as Gordon notes, Obama has consistently said that he was going to add forces to Afghanistan and do the job right. I get that. I think a lot of us thought what he meant was that he was going to announce his exit plans and leave the shit-hole that is Afghanistan. That was not realistic of us, but we had hopes. In our defense, he did use the phrase "finish the job" more than once.

I still think the rationale that the Obama administration uses is shit - that somehow, securing Afghanistan is vital to our interests and that AQ is just chomping at the bits to move back into Afghanistan while eyeing Pakistan's nukes. It's weak, it's not a supportable defense to address violent non-state actors. But at the least, he offered goals, he stated his rationale, and he clearly stated that he's not relying on strictly military power. He demonstrated a basis for using all the elements of national security. And he's committing to start pulling out in mid-July 2011 (none too late to influence the 2012 elections).

So let's see how this all plays out in the next two Friedman units.  

UPDATE: GEN McChrystal approves of this strategy. Not a big surprise, he's a good soldier, knows how to salute and move out.

They're Not Our Guys

SHORTER Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK): "The only good retired generals are the ones that repeat Republican talking points."

I Am Shocked, Shocked to Discover

 ... that the British political leadership was aware that the WMD intel was weak to nonexistent and still marched on to war in 2003.

Tim Dowse, the Foreign Office’s head of counter-proliferation at the time, said that in 2001 the threat from Iraq had been placed behind those from Iran, Libya and North Korea. Iraq’s nuclear programme was believed to have been stopped by UN inspectors in the 1990. The chemical and biological weapons Iraq was thought to possess were not regarded primarily as battlefield weapons, he said.

But new intelligence suggesting that chemical and biological weapons were being produced by Iraq began to arrive in August and September 2002. “In a way it did not come as a great surprise,” Mr Dowse said. “It enabled us to firm up the assessment that had previously been carefully caveated.”

He told the inquiry that he was not surprised by the now notorious claim, in a government dossier published before the invasion, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that could be used within 45 minutes. He assumed that the claim referred to a battlefield weapon, not an interstate missile, but that was not spelt out. 

Not that it's surprising to any of us who actually were in the plans and assessment mode in 2002-2003, but the political bullshit kind of overwhelmed the system. But it's always good to ensure that the public knows how rotten the system was. The sad thing is that, if you look at the record, both Colin Powell and Condi Rice are on the record in early-to-mid 2001 as saying that Iraq wasn't a significant threat. Then in the summer of 2002, everything changed, the assessments were tweaked, the rhetoric flowed. And now here we are looking back.

Obama's Military Escalation

So in the true spirit of LBJ, President Obama is going to double down on the Bush decision to "muddle through" Afghanistan, because (as SecState Clinton said on Monday) we can't allow "an environment in which terrorist groups thrive" - as they already have in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and any number of other weak state governments. I'll reserve my comments till after the speech, but I wonder what the odds are of other nations contributing to the force. Will the Russians will add any troops? "Nyet." How about the French? "Non." The Germans? "Nein." Oh, Canada? "No." India? "नहीं." Italy? "No."

Nope, just us dumbass Americans and a few more English blokes, into the fires of hell. So glad we elected a president who promised "change." My wife noted that this seemed like a repeat of the end of the lackluster AMC mini-series "The Prisoner," where Number 6, after a long campaign of fighting "The Man," realizes that his true destiny is to become Number 2 and continue running "The Village." Maybe President Obama hasn't been reading the right stuff.

"There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."
   - George Kennan, February 1966

I want out of "The Village."

UPDATE: In other news,former VP Dick Cheney remains a huge dick.

Rumsfeld and Franks Let Bin Laden Go

A report from the Senate's Foreign Relations committee suggests that SecDef Don Rumsfeld and General Tommie Franks allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from Tora Bora in December 2001. It was a deliberate decision not to engage with overwhelming force that was available and in country, the report accuses. From Reuters:

"Removing the al-Qaida leader from the battlefield eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist threat," the report says. "But the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism."

The report states categorically that bin Laden was hiding in Tora Bora when the U.S. had the means to mount a rapid assault with several thousand troops at least. It says that a review of existing literature, unclassified government records and interviews with central participants "removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora."

On or about Dec. 16, 2001, bin Laden and bodyguards "walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan's unregulated tribal area," where he is still believed to be based, the report says.

Instead of a massive attack, fewer than 100 U.S. commandos, working with Afghan militias, tried to capitalize on air strikes and track down their prey.

"The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines," the report said.

There is this great overwhelming anger within me, that I discover that, within months of 9/11, the arrogance and stupidity of our military and civilian leadership within the former Bush administration allowed the orchestrator of the largest terrorist act against the United States walk out of Afghanistan without any concern in the world. Steve Benen reminds us that the WaPo - when it had Tom Ricks as a journalist - told us as much in 2002, before Sen. John Kerry suggested in 2004 that CheneyBush had screwed the pooch here. I cannot in any way find the expression within me to say how angry I am that despite how incompetent and foolish the neocon community is, they have pressed on with their ridiculous arguments regarding Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan when they have consistently failed in their statements on any significant point of national security.

But by all means, let's listen to them now as they advise the Obama administration on how we ought to clean up the eight year mess that they've left us. Idiots. Deliberate idiots, dangerous to our society, people who ought to be locked in public stocks and pelted with rocks.

UPDATE: Maybe I'm reading too much into this report. After all, anyone who references Michael O'Hanlon as a source needs to reconsider the position carefully. From App I, Mikey says: "Operation Enduring Freedom has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse." Yes... what a masterpiece, and it only gets better with age.